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This thesis explores the administrative challmges that the provincial and local gqvemmen1s will 
have to address in moving beyond the current crisis of the welfare stale. The argumenl that 
Canada is shifting away from state-cenlred social policy structures towards a more community 
based model of social service provision is developed and supponed by specific examples from 
Manitoba and Alberta. Arguments and evidence incorporated into each study will move beyond 
advocacy and provide reasons for the decentralit/ltion and consideration of alternative program 
delivery methods. The fiscal and administrative decentrali1.ation that has occUn'ed to date, has 
not been accompanied by political decentralit.ation, which is jimdamen1al to commlJllity 
empowermi!lll. 
This thesis is based upon the premise that the political decisions to decentralite have already 
been made, as wilnessed through a number of social policy shifts, inclllding the Canada Health 
and Social Transfer. Because the political rationale to decenlralize provides the theoretical 
framework within which to discuss administrative decentralization. this thesis takes the practical 
public administration perspective on how to implement the policy changes and create effective 
administrative systems for doing so. 
Conclusions are drawn in the thesis, including the faa thaJ public policy and program design 
. cannot be accomplished effectively by centralized planning or even centralized coordinalion of 
planning. However, there needs to be an effective administraJive system established so as to 
avoid potential problems with accountability thaJ may come with a decentralized social service 
structure. Public servants, and not unaccountable volumeers, should continue to be responsible 
for the provision and administrative implementation of social policy. A balance Ctlll be achieved 
with an organit/ltional design that establishes policy developmem and program design al the 
centre, and policy implementaJion and program delivery in the field by public servants who 
exercise their discretion on the basis of delegaled authority. 
ii 
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Decentralit.ed Social Services • An lntroducd.on 
Introducd.on 
In the last few years, much bas been written about the demise of Canada's welfare state. 
Academics and newspaper reponers have all discussed the federal government's apparent 
abandonment of its social welfare responsibilities. Headlines such as •cuts to Hurt 
Working Poor: •All Must Share The Pain," and "Erosion of Funds Feared" have 
underscored the paramountcy of deficit reduction and resulting funding cuts. The purpose 
of this thesis is not to revisit the golden years of the welfare state, nor is it to specifically 
lament the withdrawal of federal funding for Canada's social programs, but instead it will 
focus on some of the specific challenges that all levels of government, federal, 
. 
provincial, local and Aboriginal, will face in the coming years. 
These challenges encompass the inclusion of Aboriginal governments in Canada's 
political, financial and administrative sttuctures for the provision of services, the 
devolution of fiscal responsibilities from the federal government to the provinces 
coinciding with the demise of the Canada Assistance Plan and Established Programs 
Financing, and the requirement of provincial, local and Aboriginal governments to meet 
the pressures of responding to an increased need for services with decreased funding. All 
levels of government must consider the fact that past political structures have 
concentrated the power for determining policy in the bands of a few, and that demands 
for inclusion in future political structures by women, Aboriginal people, persons with 
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disabilities and visible minorities must be ~. Added to the mix, is the increased 
utilization of alternative program delivery and financing1 and the implications that this 
paradigm shift has for social services. How each level of political administration meets 
these challenges will ultimately determine the stanJS of Canada's social programs. 
This thesis explores the administrative challenges . that the provincial and local 
governments will have to address in moving l>eYond the cummt crisis of the welfare 
state. The argument that Canada is moving away from state-c.entred social policy 
structures towards a more community based model of social service provision is 
developed and supported by specific examples from both Alberta and Manitoba. 2 Alberta 
was chosen as a provincial case study because it is a province that is in the midst of 
implementing a community based model of social service provision. What is key to the 
Alberta example is the process used in determining the move to conununity·based social 
service delivery. Furthermore, this province integrates a number of alternative program 
11be term alternative program delivery and financing is used throughout the 
thesis to mean the variety of approaches governments are now taking to delivery 
programs. Alternative program delivery moves service beyond the traditional direct 
delivery method. For more information on alternative program delivery, please see 
chapter 3. 
'The two studies, Manitoba and Alberta, that are offeted as supporting examples 
are not specific case studies per se. In both situations, but particularly in Alberta, the 
chapters provide a "snapshot" of events in progress. Because the programs and 
general direction of delivery is just in the process of unfolding, the infonnation in the 
. studies is neither exhaustive nor comprehensive. They are useful in that they point out 
potential areas for contlict and concern as evaluated at this time. 
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delivery suuctures into their community based model. There is an interest in using 
alternative program delivery methods by all provinces and the Alberta study serves as an 
useful example of how the province is incorporating them into a decentralized model of 
social service provision. 
Changes in how Native child welfare is administered in Manitoba are also examined 
through a case study. This example provides an illustration of the types of problems that 
can arise in community based delivery structures. Manitoba was chosen as the case 
example for the decentralization of Native child welfare for several reasons. The first is 
that First Nation communities in Manitoba have been selected to participate in a pilot 
project. The project has resulted in a "Framework Agreement" which sets the parameters 
for the dismantling of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development 
(DIAND) and the transfer of jurisdictional authority to First Nation communities for a 
number of programs, including child welfare. This situation provides an illustration of 
both administrative and political decentralization. The second reason for selecting Native 
child welfare in Manitoba as a case study is that the province transferred administrative 
authority for Native child welfare to regional agencies in the 1980s and has had over 10 
years to identify problems and issues. Alberta, while they are in the implementation 
stages of community based delivery of child and family services, has not yet passed 
administrative authority for Native child welfare to First Nation communities. 
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Arguments and evidence incorporated into each case study will move beyond advocacy 
and provide reasons for the decentralization and consideration of alternative program 
delivety methods. The fiscal and administrative decenttalization that bas occuned in both 
case studies, bas generally not been accompanied by political decentralization, which is 
flmdamental to community empowerment. This thesis is based upon the premise that the 
political decisions to decentralize have already been made and evidence supporting these 
decision is clearly illustrated in this chapter. Because the political decision to decentralize 
provides the theoretical framework within which to discuss decentralization, this thesis 
takes the practical public administration perspective on how to implement policy and 
create effective administrative systems for doing so. Therefore, while the political 
direction for decentralization is introduced in this chapter, it is provided for purposes of 
providing a framework in which to evaluate administrative responses to decentralization. 
This chapter provides an introduction and overview of the financial and political 
environment in which social policy change is taking place. 
Chapter I sets the stage for the remainder of the thesis by developing the concept of 
decentralization, and describes what specific challenges all levels of government will face 
when meeting the issues associated with the decentralization of social services. 
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Provincial, local and Aboriginal governments need to be clear, as much as this is 
possible in a federal system of government, as to exactly what their responsibilities are, 
whether they have the political authority to implement changes, and what financial 
responsibilities will be maintained by the federal government or assumed by the other 
levels. 1be introduction also specifies the various forms of decentralization that can 
occur: constitutional, fiscal and administrative. This discussion is particularly useful 
when analyzing chapters 3 and 4. 
Chapter 2: Local Government's Response discusses how local communities and 
governments may be the optimum locale for social policy development. It develops the 
local government model of service provision and provides examples of community 
empowerment in the Province of Manitoba. The chapter also offers criticisms of the local 
development model and identifies problems that could occur when moving away from a 
state-centred model of social welfare to a more community based model. Chapter 2 lays 
the groundwork for the next two chapters, that serve as case studies of social policy 
development and implementation at the local level. 
Chapter 3: Alhena's Initiatives introduces the forms of alternative service delivery being 
utilized in Canada and discusses how the private sector has created a normative paradigm 
for the delivery of social services. It notes how the province of Alberta has recently 
decentralized its administrative responsibility for social policy development and 
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i 
implementation to regional boards. This chapter will provide the reasons for the change 
and review the progms that Alberta bas made in this regard. This study will be 
compared to the next chapter, a case study on First Nation child welfare in Manitoba. 
Chapter 4: the First Nation Child Welfare Model discusses decentralizati. specifically 
with regards to Native child welfare. The province of Manitoba bas delegated 
administrative authority to Native Regional Child Welfare agencies for the delivery of 
child welfare programming. 
Manitoba provides an excellem example of problems that can develop when local 
communities are administratively empowered, yet not all members of a community are 
included in the decision making process. It also shows how limited decentralization is not 
sufficient to make substantive changes to social policy. 
Chapter 5: Evaluation provides an evaluation of the issues raised in Chapters 3 and 4, 
in terms of how decentralization bas met (or not met) peoples' needs. The analysis used 
in evaluating the case studies is introduced in this chapter and then applied specifically 
to the case SOJdies. It is concluded that the initiatives have mixed results, which need to 
be considered carefully if these measures towards decentralization are to be applied in 
other provinces. The chapter ties the initiatives presented in chapters 3 and 4 into the 
larger Canadian context. It concludes that social policy reform is a tenuous and complex 
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topic requiring political will for successful implementation. Political will with a 
consideration for accountability and transpareney can transform community based 
structures into meaningful locales for social policy development and implementation. 
Social Senices Terminology 
The focus of the thesis is how the delivery of social services is changing. It is useful to 
provide a definition of how the term social services will be used. The term social 
services is used throughout this thesis to encompass income security and personal social 
services. Income security programs are defined as "any federal, provincial or municipal 
program having as its main objective the provision of direct financial benefits to 
individuals and families in Canada. •3 Examples include demogrant programs such as old 
age pensions that pay benefits to citizens in a defined age range regardless of their 
financial situation.' Demogrant programs are planned and administered by the federal 
government. An example of the second type of income security program, social insurance 
programs, is the Canada Pension Plan and Unemployment Insurance, which are again 
3Health and Welfare Canada (1987), "Inventory of Income Security Programs in 
Canada," page 1. 
'In the 1996 federal budget it was announced that old age pensions would be 
changed and tied more closely to income. 
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provided by the federal government.' 
The third type, income tested programs, includes the Child Tax Benefit and the 
Guaranteed Income Supplement for senior citizens. Both of these are federal programs 
but a number of provincially administered income supplementation programs have also 
been developed. For example, the province of Manitoba provides shelter allowances to 
single parent families and senior citizens. The fourth type of income security programs 
is the needs-tested programs, which are administered by the provincial and municipal 
governments and the costs are shared by the federal government. 6 
The personal social services are programs designed to support individuals and families 
and protect vulnerable individuals such as children. The personal social services include 
both statutoiy and non-statutoiy programs. Statutoiy services, such as child welfare 
programs, are required by legislation, while typical non-statutoiy programs include 
counselling, daycare as well as substitute care facilities for those individuals who can no 
longer remain at home or live independently. Personal social services are characterized 
'One exception to social insurance programs is Worker's Compensation which is 
provided by the provincial government. 
6Until April l, 1996 the costs were shared with the federal government through 
the Canada Assistance Plan. The Canada Health and Social Transfer replaces CAP as 
the federal funding method on April l, 1996. 
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by face-to-face interaction between the service provider and the consumer.' The focus 
of the remainder of this thesis is the personal social services. 
Background 
In 1994, the federal government announced its inr.entions to study and revamp Canada's 
social programs. Proposed plans to bring about massive changes to various programs 
including unemployment insurance, welfare, job training and child care were released to 
the general public for input and comment. 8 The dialogue concerning social programs was 
welcomed by academics, social activists and the business community alike, all reporting 
that there was need for revision, albeit for different reasons. The inr.ention was a 
complete overhaul of Canada's social programs, including federal-provincial financial 
arrangements. Canadians should recall that a similar exercise was attempted in the late 
1970s by Marc Lalonde, but it eventually was discarded. Shortly after this first failed 
attempt, the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for 
Canada (MacDonald Commission) examined Canada's future economic prospects and 
nervously admitted that the welfare state might now need restructuring more than it needs 
'Brian Wharf, "Social Services,• Urban Policy Issues Canadian Perspectives, 
Richard Loreto and Trevor Price (eds), (Toronto: McClelland and Stewan, Inc.), 
1990, pages 170-173. 
8canada, Ministry of Human Resources Development, "Improving Social Security 
in Canada," A Discussion Paper, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada), 1994. 
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extensions. 9 The striking result of the MacDonald Commission was that now provincial 
politicians began to use the language of flexibility and efficiency instead of universality 
when discussing social programs.10 Plans for reform were abandoned, just as they were 
in 1995, when over-riding concerns for deficit reduction and the accommodation of 
Quebec within Canada took precedence.11 
From the outset, the social security review was caught in the tensions existing among 
three separate agendas: the reform of social policy, the reduction of the federal deficit 
and the accommodation of Quebec within Canada.12 The social reform agenda is driven 
by the conviction that the social programs we inherited from the postwar generation are 
now out of date and need to be restructured. Key priorities included a coordinated 
restructuring of unemployment insurance, social assistance, training and education in 
order to equip Canadians for the global economy and to promote adjustment in the 
economy as a whole. In addition, our transfer programs needed to be redesigned to more 
9Canada, "Report of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and 
Development Prospects for Canada," Volume l, (MacDonald Commission) (Ottawa: 
Supply and Services Canada) 1985, page 75. 
1
°Derek Hum and Wayne Simpson, "Reducing Spending and Increasing Equity: 
How Far Can Refundable Tax Credits Take Us?" Canadian Public Admjnistration. 
Volume 38, No. 4, (Winter) 1995, page 599. 
11Larry Welsh and Sarah Binder, "Reform In The Cards, But It's In The Back 
Seat,• Winnipeg Free Press. March 14, 1995, page A3. 
12Murray Donnelly, "Federalism Sins Rectified," Winnipeg Free Press, March 14, 
1996, page All. 
Decenlraliz.ed Social Services - An Introduction 12 
effectively respond to child poverty and the intense financial stresses being borne by 
many young families. This broad agenda was developed through a long series of reports 
and studies over the last decade and bas engaged both federal and provincial policy-
makers.13 
The deficit reduction agenda is driven by other imperatives. It reflects the conviction that 
the level of accumulated federal debt is unsustainable and is eroding the prospects for 
investment, increased productivity and job growth in Canada.1' Moreover, the burden of 
debt-financing is crippling government. In 1993-94, interest payments on the federal debt 
were $38 billion, pre-empting one-third of all federal revenues and malting budget 
planning very sensitive to fluctuations in interest rates.15 The significant growth in 
personal taxes in Canada during the 1980s bas convinced policy makers that there is little 
room for further tax increases, and attention bas therefore focused primarily on the 
expenditure side. However, as Table 1 makes painfully clear, the deficit which was $42 
13Demonstration projects assisting single parents to get "off" welfare and find 
employment are under way on a jointly funded bases in New Bruns.wick and British 
Columbia. 
14Canada, Ministry of Finance, •A New Framework for Economic Policy," 
(Ottawa: Department of Finance), 1994, page 78. 
15In 1996-97, interest payments on the federal debt have risen to $47 .8 billion. 
Source: "Budget Breakdown,• Winnipeg Free Press, March 7, 1996, page A3. 
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billion in 1993-9416 was much too large to be tackled through cuts in discretionary 
spending alone. In this context, any significant effort to eliminate the deficit puts 
tremendous pressure on the two biggest categories of program spending: transfers to 
persons and transfers to other levels of government. 
Table 1. r7 Structure of Federal Public Spending, 1993-94.18 
Component 
Interest on Debt 
Transfers to Persons 
Transfers to Other Governments 
All Other Spending 
Total 
Billions of Dollars 
38.0 
42.4 
27.6 
50.0 
158.0 
16The deficit, due to concerted spending cuts, fell to $37 .5 billion in 1994-95; and 
$32. 7 billion in 1995-96. Project deficit for 1996-97 is $24.3 billion. Source 
Winnipeg Free Press. Thursday, March 9, 1996, page Al. 
17Keith Banting, "The Social Policy Review: Policy-Making In A Semi-Sovereign 
Society,• in Canaciian Public Admjnistration, Volume 38, No. 2, (Summer), 1995, 
page 285. 
18The structure of federal spending is provided for this time frame, so as to put 
into context the deficit reduction agenda and the justification for how the social 
reform agenda became sidetracked. 
) 
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Federal deficit reduction measures have seen the~ withdrawal of funding. In fact, \ 
The Caledon Institute notes that by far the deepest cuts in social programs have been to 
federal transfer payments to the provinces and territories in the areas of health and post-
secondary education. 19 Dan Lett in the WjMineg Free Press, equates the passing of the 
fiscal buck as a dance craze sweeping the land, as politicians at the provincial and federal 
level try to choreograph major spending cuts, job cuts, and reductions in the budget 
deficits which have become the curse of modem government. 20 Political parties, such as 
Ontario Premier Mike Harris' "common sense revolution", and Ralph Klein's •Alberta 
Advantage" have been supported by public demand for less government spending, and 
ultimately less government. At an Institute of Public Administration national seminar in 
1994, David Cameron noted: 
"that our present straightened financial circumstances appear to suppress 
or muffle social policy debate at the national level, yet foster public 
discussion of fiscal policy and incite a good deal of political conflict 
about the operation of federalism itself. "21 
The debate and discussion over the types of social services government should provide 
was ultimately displaced by the public's desire for budget-cutting exercises. 
19Ken Battle and Sherri Torjman, "Federal Social Programs: Se.tting the Record 
Straight," Caledon Institute of Social Policy, Spring, 1993, page 5. 
~an Lett, "Governments Pass the Fiscal Buck,• in the Winnipeg Free Press, 
November 15, 1995, page A18. 
21David Cameron, "Decentralization In An Era Of Fiscal Restraint,• Canadian 
pyblic Aciministration, Volume 37, No. 3, (Fall) 1994 page 440. 
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The third agenda, the accommodation of Quebec within Canada, is as old as the country 
itself. Nationalist forces within Quebec politics have challenged federal leadersbip in 
social policy since the days of the Tremblay Commission in the mid-19SOs, and since 
then politics of social policy in Canada have been fuelled as much by intergovernmental 
snuggles over jurisdiction as by substantive differences over program content. 21 
Jurisdictional conflicts came to a head again during the constitutional negotiations of the 
late 1980s and 1990s. In the aftermath of the defeat of the Meech Lake and 
Charlottetown Accords, support for separatism soared in Quebec, and federalist forces 
in the province responded with a call for significant decentralization, including the 
transfer of all social programs to the province. The jurisdictional issues simply flowed 
into non-constitutional politics. 
The social policy component of the federal budget tabled in 1995, shifted the balance of 
the agendas dramatically towards deficit reduction and decentralization. Officially, the 
budget simply set in place a framework: within which social . policy reform was to 
proceed. In practice, however, the new framework: leaves only limited fiscal and political 
room for the reform agenda. "The changes have made the tight fiscal parameters for the 
reform process explicit, and they have reduced the role of the federal government in the 
22Murray Donnelly, "Breakup Rules Must Be Clear.· Wjnnjpeg Free Press, 
March IS, 1996, page AIS. 
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definition of Canada's social future. •23 
The political response to the need for deficit reduction measures includes reductions of 
real dollars transferred to the provinces for social program spending.24 (See Table 2). 
F.stablished Programs Financing (EPf) and the Omada Assistance Plan (CAP) are to be 
consolidated into one block grant to the provinces - the Canada Health and Social 
Transfer (CHST), effective April l, 1996 and the combined cash transfer is to be cut 
significantly. Although the changes do not alter the principles set out in the Canada 
Health Act, several of the conditions embedded in the Canada Assistance Plan disappear 
in the transition to the CHST, 25 leaving provinces with greater flexil>ility to redefine 
social assistance and social services. "But free rein over social programs comes at a 
price: The provinces will lose a combined $2.8 billion in federal funding this year and 
$4.S billion the next. "26 Under this program, the federal government reduces its presence 
in various areas, such as health care, post-secondary education and the cost-shared 
23JCeith G. Banting, Op Cit., page 286. 
24Edward Greenspon, "Provincial Cash Transfer Cut By $700 Million For Two 
Years," Globe and Mail, March 7, 1996, page AlO. 
25CAP required that provinces provide assistance unconditionally to anyone in 
need. This principle is no longer in force, and provinces are now free to make their 
social assistance recipients work for their benefits. Maintained under the CHST was 
the principle that provinces can not impose a residency requirement. Since the CHST 
was announced in the 199S budget, some provinces have already been pursuing 
policies that were not allowed under CAP. 
26Ma.rgaret Philip, "Last Shared Cost Program Scrapped,• Globe and Majl, 
Saturday, March 30, 1996, page AS. 
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arrangement for social programs provided under CAP, and transfers control for spending 
in these areas to the provinces. 
A review of the intergovernmental agreements known as Established Programs 
Financing. and The Canada Assistance Plan payments is beneficial to the discussion of 
the new Canada Health and Social Transfer. EPP, CAP and equalization payments form 
the basis of the federal government's fiscal transfers to the provinces. Arduous 
intergovernmental negotiations resulted in the passage of the Federal-Provincial Fiscal 
Arrangements and Federal Post-Secondary Education and Health Contributions Act in 
1977. The Act brought into operation Established Programs Financing (EPF) which 
became the vehicle for the federal government to share a significant portion of the costs 
of provincially legislated programs, with the important exception of the Canada 
Assistance Plan. Under its complexities, EPF was based: 
(1) Payment of "block grants• based on a per capita amount, equal across the country, 
which were to grow independently of program costs, in line with growth in the economy 
as measured by GNP; 
(2) The block grants were funded in two ways: first, by the federal government Ieducing, 
by a certain percentage, its collection of certain taxes; this was expressed as the federal 
government giving up "tax points" to the province. The federal government ttanSferred 
to the provinces 13.S personal income tax points (tax points on basic federal tax) and one 
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corporate income tax point. 27 Both tax points are equali7.ed in value in a manner 
consistent with the national equalization formula. Second, a cash transfer consisting of 
the difference between the total entitlement and the value of the equali7.ed tax points 
transferred to the provinces would be made to the provinces. 28 
3) The federal government insisted that both the block grants and the amounts 
represented by the conceded tax points be accounted for and publicly acknowledged as 
federal contributions to meeting the expenditures of provinces in health care. 
Under the Canada Assistance Plan, the federal government cost-shared with the 
provinces, on a fifty-fifty basis, the costs of eligible income maintenance and social 
service programs delivered by the province. 29 The federal government payments reflected 
the program costs of provincial government which in tum were determined by the needs 
of the provincial populations and the ability of the provincial governments to provide 
27Many provinces feel that the "tax transfer• portion should not be considered a 
federal transfer. The tax points are now part of provincial taxation and federal taxes 
have been reduced. The tax points do not enter the federal expenditure or deficit 
accounts except for associated equalization. However, the federal government . 
continues to count the amount generated by these tax points as a transfer payment. 
ZBJlrovince of Manitoba, 1991, "The 1991 Manitoba Budget,• Budget Paper D, 
page 3. 
29 In the past few years, the federal government had "capped" CAP to three 
provinces, Ontario, British Columbia and Quebec, reducing their share of the 
expenditures to approximately 23 cents for each dollar spent by these provinces on 
social programs. 
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funding. 
The CHST block funding arrangement is seen as a way for the federal government to 
gain control over social spending because the plan eliminateS CAP, the last of the major 
federal f!1nding programs driven by demand. 30 A block funding arrangement allows 
Ottawa to determine funding through a pre-established formula, instead of being 
vulnerable to fluctuations in the number of people requiring assistance through various 
social programs. In return for reduced funding, the provinces will receive increased 
flexibility to determine how their block fund is spent. Increased provincial autonomy vis-
a-vis the federal government has long been the goal of many of the provinces. In fact, 
it appears that the change to unconditional block funding will provide the devolution of 
power to the provinces that years of constitutional negotiations could not bring about. 
lOJ>an Lett, •Erosion of Funds Feared,• Winnj;peg Free Ptgs, Tuesday, February 
14, 1995, page A2. 
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Table 2. Cash Transfer to Provinces, 1996-200331 
Cash transfers to provinces 
Smilion. FISC8l year 
1991 1997 1991 1999 2000 2801 211112 2003 
Nfld 410 341 281 263 244 239 235 233 
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There are a number of apparent implications to this move to block funding. Jesse Vorst, 
a University of Manitoba economist, bas said that there are very real indications that 
under a total block-funding system, income assistance programs would suffer because 
31Globe and Mail, March 7, 1996, page AlO. 
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mote money would be directed into areas that are politically atttactive.32 Announced as 
a footnote to the 1995 Manitoba provincial budget, was the projected cimndative loss in 
federal transfer.; of $391 million.33 lntemal government predictions indicate that the new 
Canadian Health and Social Transfer will shrink provincial resouices for social 
progmmming by 17 percent the first year and 20 percent the next. In real dollars, this 
is a loss of $265 million, from $750 million this year to $485 million in 1997-98.34 
1be Caledon Institute of Social Policy warns that combining the money intended for 
welfare and social services into the same fund with health and post-secondary education 
is almost as bad as providing no money at all. It is believed that welfare and social 
services will get lost in the mix, and will never have the importance accorded to services 
intended for the general population. Caledon predicts that the end of federal cost-sharing 
under CAP. by which the federal government was able to compel provincial spending on 
people in need through its SO cent dollars, means there will be no more guarantee of a 
safety net in Canada.35 It has been suggested that the Cimada Health and Social Transfer 
will trigger a war of competing social interests. 
»prances Russell, "Balanced Budget Bad News for Province,• Winnipeg Free 
!!ml, Saturday, March 11, 1995, page A7. 
33Jbid. 
34Dan Lett, "Cut First, Mend Later On,• Winnipeg Free Press, Thursday, March 
7, 1996, page B2. 
"Frances Russell, "Balanced Budget Bad New For 1be Province," Op Cit. 
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Accompanying this form of financial decentralization, is the growing inability of the 
provinces to make up lost revenues. Growing political concern about provincial deficits 
and debt is one of the clearest indications of the reality that the federal government has 
decided to shift responsibility away from Ottawa. 36 With the reluctance of Ottawa to 
engage in substantive social policy reform, serious discussion of the trimming and 
reforming of social services gets dispersed to the provinces and local communities where 
the direct encounter between citiz.en and public service occurs. 
Provincial budgets are under severe pressure in their own right, and provincial 
governments are already engaging in cost-cutting exen::ises.37 The demise of federal 
involvement in social policy, traditionally the backbone of national social services, 
creates a multitude of new challenges for provincial governments. How eacb provinical 
govermnent responds to these pressures will ultimately be determined througb a 
combination of ideology, need and ability to pay. For example in Manitoba, the 
provincial government bas committed itself to creating a balanced budget. By passing 
balanced budget legislation in 1995, the Filmon government reduced the flexibility 
Manitoba has to respond to short-term and long-term economic developments. 
36David Cameron, Op Cit., page 44-0. 
"John Douglas, •p1an Tackle Debt Ahead of Schedule," WinniJ2et free Press. 
March 7. 1996. 
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The reduction in federal transfer payments will further limit the choices the government 
has in responding to shortfalls. As Paul Thomas aptly points out, budgetary processes are 
already riddled with pressures from interest groups anxious to obtain or to protect the 
benefits received from government. With the creation of a fixed pool of money, the 
lobbying will intensify. Groups that are better organized, better financed and more 
politically sophisticated will have the advantage. Social policy groups will be more 
wlnerable to cutbacks, especially since governments have already cut their core funding 
to engage in advocacy work. 38 The Manitoba government is forcing itself into a situation 
where it will have to make major cuts in social program areas, or off-load some of its 
financial burden onto municipalities and non-profit organizations working in the 
community. 
Combining the reduced federal transfer payments with the balanced budget legislation 
forces the Manitoba provincial government to be more creative in how it provides social 
services to its clients. One answer could be simply to slash social spending and lay-off 
civil servants.39 However, the general public's responses to proposed cuts to health care 
in the province have been met with outrage and antagonism. The gap between public 
38Paul Thomas, "Bill A Simple Solution," Winnioeg Free Press; Thursday, March 
16, 1995, page A7. 
39 A telling example is the proposed contracting out of home care services in 
Manitoba. Over 1600 home care workers will be laid-off through the process. The 
money that the government saves by contracting out services will be due to the lower 
wages paid by private sector home care companies. 
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expectations and governmental capacity to maintain existing social programs is large and 
growing. How successfully governments are able to communicate to the public the fact 
that they can no longer afford certain services will determine fut.we expectations. A 
politically astut.e government will need to offer the public: more than cutbacks, it will 
need to c:onstruct a way to meet the growing cballenges of our economic: and social 
system. 
The welfare state was not constructed in a single day, nor was there a ready consensus 
amongst Canadians that the federal spending power was the appropriate instrument of 
intergovernmental cooperation in social policy. One should not expect that the new 
realities facing social polic:y will yield immediate consensus on the appropriate solution, 
nor should one despair that we will be unable to find consensus through incremental 
experimentation and accommodation. There needs to be a will, however, at all levels of 
government, to engage in meaningful discourse about what policy actions could be taken 
to provide steps in the right direction. 
Ch4pter 1: Decentralization As A Canadian Concept 
26 
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Introduction 
During and following the recent constitutional "crises" witnessed through the demise of 
the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, the federal government and many provincial 
governments began to engage in discussions and debates about administrative reform. 
While less attention has been drawn to these reforms because they are administrative and 
jurisdictional in nature, the outcomes may be as pervasive as proposed constitutional 
change. Evert Lindquist at an Institute of Public Administration national seminar in 1994, 
noted how cummt reform initiatives are often depicted as decentralization and yet should 
not be confused as such. 
"There is a tendency, given the current trends in thinlcjng about public 
management, to depict the general direction of these changes as 
decentralization and power-sharing. It is true that many reform 
initiatives call for a shift in focus towards service, partnerships, 
delayering of management hierarchies, investment in human resources 
through training and development, and an emphasis of leadership and 
new organizational cultures ... Behind the rhetoric and themes of the 
new public sector management is the reality of fiscal restraint and 
dramatic restructuring. "40 
The imperatives of controlling government deficits and reducing debt produce their own 
form of coercion; when governments downsize bureaucracies and eliminate programs it 
is rarely considered a cooperative and empowering exercise. Paul Thomas at the 1995 
~vert A. Lindquist, "Recent Administrative Reform in Canada as Decentralization: 
Who is Spreading Around What to Whom and Why?" Canadian Public Administration, 
Volume 37, No. 3, (Fall) 1994, page 416. 
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Institute of Public Administration national conference, noted during his presentation on 
problems with the new public: management theories, that any reference to a new public 
management philosophy during "rightsizing", "streamlining" or •workfon:e adjustment• 
initiatives will likely be seen as political rhetoric. 41 
The logic of decentralization is derived first and foremost from the fact that while . 
government is a single entity, it must also pursue activities wbicb by their very nature 
require a measure of particularity. The provision of social services constitutes the general 
character of public policy and programs, but at the specific: delivery level there is much 
that is particular, even unique to them. It is in this context that the concept of 
decentralization is developed. Decentralization occurs when government actors possessing 
authorities are willing to grant discretion, delegate authorities, or share responst'bilities 
with other actors, inside or outside the government and its public service, in order to 
ac:c:omplish certain tasks. At the heart of the issue is the distn'bution of power and 
authority: we thus speak of organizations being more or less c:entra1ized or decentralized 
in order to portray just where authority and power reside in a partic:ular structure. In 
. doing so we i:ecognize that both power and authority are relational.42 
41Paul Thomas, presentation "The Happy Face Models of the New Public 
Management,• IPAC National Conference, August, 1995. 
42pefer Aucoin and Herman Bakvis, The Centralization - Decentralization 
Conundrum: Qrganjzation and Management in the Canadian Government, (Halifax: 
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Those who advocate decentralization see a "centralized" system where power is situated 
at the centre, usually controlled by a few. In other words, individuals, organizations and 
communities not at the centre do not have authority, discretion or exercise control over 
their own affairs. In this view, the centre is incapable of monitoring and comprehending 
the diverse reality beyond its immediate confines and, as a result, imposes 
counterproductive and rules and controls. The centre loses sight of what and who is to 
be served, becoming more interested in means than the ends, because means are more 
familiar. The desire to remedy these problems constitutes the case for administrative and 
political decentralization. 
Decentralization is often advocated as an alternative, promising a set of governance 
arrangements more conducive to determining local needs, encouraging innovation and 
responsiveness to citizens, and furthering autonomy and democracy. Conversely, those 
who advocate centralization derive their logic from the belief that for government to 
function as an integrated, coordinated unit, centralization must occur. 
There are minimally two views on decentralization. The first sees decentralization as a 
territorial concept: national and many provincial governments are confronted with the 
Institute for Research on Public Policy), 1988; or Donald Savoie, Regional Economic 
Devel2mnent: Cana!la's Search for Solutions, 2nd edition (Toronto: University of 
Toronto), 1992, page 10. 
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challenge of managing diverse communities in large land masses; our history is replete 
with examples of political leaders engaged in delicate regional balancing acts. We 
therefore talk of the centre in relation to the periphery. In Canada, there is a myth that 
federalism is essentially decentralization. 43 As Canada is federal country, there are 
complications surrounding the legislation and administration of social programs, because 
some programs are federal, some are provincial and some involve municipal 
governments. 44 
It is obvious that the concept of decentralization is limited by this first viewpoint. 
Decentralization is more than administrative grappling over who will offer the services, 
in Canada it directly concerns the assignment and exercise of authority among levels of 
government. 45 With four different levels of government competing for resources, interests 
and programs, decentralization can become a very complicated issue. 
43For a detailed discussion of this issue in the context of the federal government, see 
Peter Aucoin and H. Balcvis, Ibid. 
44For more information see F. Strain and Derek Hum, "Canadian Federalism and the 
Welfare State,• Jacqueline Ismael (ed), The Cana!lian Welfare State: Evolution and 
TpD§ition, 1987. 
4SR.icbard Simeon, "Considerations on Centralization and Decentralization," Qinadian 
Public Administration, Volume 29, No.3, (Fall) 1986. 
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The British North America Act (1867) sets forth those responsibilities to be dealt with 
by provincial legislatures in Section 92. Section 92 lists among the responsibilities of the 
provinces, charities and charitable institutions, hospitals and municipal institutions. Such 
institutions administered all the existing public responsibilities in social welfare and 
health care. Accordingly, welfare and health, in general, are authoritatively considered 
to be within the domain of the provinces. 46 
While the provinces have the constitutional authority to enact social services, the federal 
government has also been involved in many welfare, health and housing programs, all 
without constitutional amendments changing the allocation of powers. Over the years, the 
argument was used that the provinces cannot provide the desired services or level of 
programs without the financial help of the federal government. "To overcome the 
Constitutional barrier, appeal has been made to the implicit power of the federal 
Parliament to spend its resources in ways not explicitly forbidden. •47 This so-called 
spending power is located in the wording of Section 106 of the Constitution Act, which 
allows the "Consolidated Revenue Fund of Canada• to be appropriated by the Parliament 
of Canada for the public service. 
46J:rank McGilly, An lntrodµction to Canada's Public Services, (Toronto: McClelland 
and Stewart, Inc.) 1990, pages 26 and 27. 
'
1lbid., page 30. 
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Scott in "Our Changing Constitution" acknowledges that the use made by the federal 
government of the "spending power" bas given rise to some controversy. In general 
tenns, the question is this: when the federal government gives the provinces money to 
fund programs that are within provincial jurisdiction, but in doing so imposes conditions 
that necessarily affect what the provinces are free to do, is the federal government 
actually imposing its preference in areas that are supposed to be the provinces' 
business?48 Scott puts it benignly when he says, "Ottawa learns to induce where it cannot 
command, and federal policy is made by bargains with provincial governments. •49 Peter 
Hogg concludes that • .•. the sum total of all of these programs amounts to a very heavy 
federal presence in matters which lie within provincial legislative respousibility. •50 
In summary, the jurisdictional division of powers between the federal and provincial 
governments is established by constitutional decisions involving both levels of 
government in ways that do not involve the federal government as the superior level nor 
the provincial level as the subordinate. A decentralized federal system of government, 
"'Scott, "Our Changing Constitution," in The Courts and the Canadian Constitution. 
W.R. Lederman (ed), 1964, page 29. 
*Ibid., page 28. 
50Peter Hogg, Constiqrtional Law In Omada, (Toronto: Carswell Publishers), lm, 
page 69. 
t 
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in other words, is one in which there is a relatively significant degree of authority 
granted to the provinces; but these units are not subordinate to the national govermnent. 51 
A second interpretation offered by Evert Lindquist in bis anicle, "Recent Administrative 
Reform in Canada as Decentralization,• is more consistent with the revolution in public 
management thinking and the idea of power-sharing.52 This viewpoint, Lindquist 
suggests, is that for many public servants, the periphery is not limited to the regions 
beyond the centre, but also includes the panoply of actors inside or those hovering just 
outside the boundaries of their organizations. The latter may be the citizens or 
organizations that a government agency is mandated to serve and include entities with the 
potential to deliver programs and services for a government, including for-profit finns, 
non-profit organizations, other governments, crown corporations, and private citizens. 
An equally important set of actors with whom power can be shared is located inside the 
boundary.53 Mintzberg in "Design of Decision-Making System: Vertical and Horizontal 
Decentralization,• points out that decentralization may entail granting greater latitude to 
51Aucoin and Bakvis, Op Cit., page 11. 
52See Osborne and Gaebler, "Decentralized Govermnent: From Hierarchy to 
Panicipation and Teamwork,• in Reimumting Government: How the Entrepreneurial 
Spirit is T@P§fonpjng the Public Sector, (New York: Addison-Wesley), 1992, pages 
250-279; or Barzelay and Annajani, Brea!cjng Through Bu?eaucracy: A New Vision For 
Managing in Government, (Berkeley: University of California Press) 1992. 
53Even Lindquist, Op Cit., pages 418-419. 
33 
front-line staff to deliver services to clients, or it may involve a more conventional fonn 
of power-sharing dlat occurs when senior managers delegate authority to managers 
tUrtber down the chain of authority. These alternative forms of decentralization may 
proceed in tandem with the external decentralizations noted above and with each other. 54 
Each of these viewpoints assigns a different meaning to the notion of the periphery. 
Lindquist explains dlat the territorial interpret.atlon sees the centre as the "capital" and 
the periphery as the "region,• whereas the public managmnent interpret.atlon casts the 
centre as the "apex" and the periphery as the zone around the fonnal boundary of the 
organization." However, these interpretations are not inconsistent with one another, and 
the interaction between them helps to clarify the meaning of other terms often invoked 
when discussing decentralization. Centralization occurs when most of the responst"bility 
for policy-making and implementation resides not only in the capital but also at the apex 
of the organizations. Decentralization, the sharing of power, occurs when responsibilities 
for aspects of decision-making are shared elsewhere in the organization or with actors 
outside its boundaries. Partnership more specifically refers to sharing authorities and 
54H. Mintzberg, "Design of Decision-Making System: Vertical and Horizontal 
Decentralization,• The Structuring of Organizations, (Toronto: Prentice-Hall), 1970, 
pages 181-213. 
55Even Lindquist, Op Cil., page 419. 
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responsibilities by a government with other governments, citizens and private sector 
organizations. 
Deconcentration or "territorial decentralization, "56 occurs when regional structures or 
headquarters are established away from the capital. However, deconcentration may occur 
with or without concomitant delegations of authority - that is, public servants not at the 
apex, and actors working at the boundary may feel no more empowered than they did 
before. 57 In fact, after a review of the responsibility of relocated units, Kenneth 
Kemaghan concluded that few relocations have required or resulted in the delegation of 
policy-making authority. 58 The concepts of decentralization and deconcentration must be 
understood in relative terms as no system is completely centralized nor completely 
decentralized and deconcentrated. The debate usually revolves around the appropriate 
"Brad MacKenzie, "Decentralized Social Services: A Critique of Service Delivery,• 
Continuities and Dipmtinuities The Political F.conomy of Social Welfare and Labour 
Market Policy In Canada, Johnson, McBride, et al. (eds), (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press), 1994, uses the term territorial decentralization in a way that is similar 
to the public administration term "deconcentration. • 
"For more on deconcentration see B.C. Smith, Decentralization: The Territorial 
Dimension of the State, (London: George, Allen and Unwin) 1985. 
"Kenneth Kemaghan, "Representative and Responsive Bureaucracy: Implications for 
Canadian Regionalism,• Peter Aucoin (ed), Regulatory Responsibility and the National 
Mministrative Srate, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 1985, page 38. 
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balance of resoun:es and whether key tasks should be carried out from the centre or in 
the field. 
It would be a mistake to i~ the degree to which deconcentration is and can be a 
factor in the decision to decentralize, however. Indeed, in the public sector, where 
government services in most cases, require or are most effectively provided by way of 
some degree of personal contact, deconcentration is closely linked to decentralization. s9 
While it is useful to provide a broad defi:oition of decentralization and the tenns that are 
often used in conjunction with the concept, it is often difficult to apply them to actual 
developments in administrative reforms. To make progress, it is useful to identify a 
policy sector (see case studies in Chapters 3 and 4) and then determine in whose hands 
authorities and responsibilities for designing, managing and modifying the programs and 
policies rest. For the purposes of evaluation (Chapter S), six areas will be addressed in 
terms of decentraliza.tio scanning to determine needs; designing policy frameworks and 
developing options; designing particular programs to implement policy interventions; 
S9Aucoin and Bakvis, Op Cit., page 16. 
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financing of programs; managing and monitoring program delivery; and evaluating and 
redesigning programs and policy frameworks. 60 
Obviously, it will be a complicated exercise to determine which actors inside government 
(central agencies, departments or field offices), across governments (federal, provincial, 
local and Aboriginal), and in the private sector are involved in each stage. The 
complexity may increase further when the arrangements change over time, and proposals 
for reform within a sector may simultaneously centralize and decentralize different 
authorities. For example, if a province centralizes financing of a program, but 
decentralizes responsibility for administering the program, is that decentralization or 
centralization? Or, if a government unilaterally introduces a reform against the wishes 
of a different level of government or community, one that eventually leads to 
decentralization, does that qualify as power-sharing or decentralization? 
A second source of complexity emerges from governance sYstems themselves. When a 
level of government decentralizes, devolves or delegates authority to other levels of 
government, through new administrative agreements, changes to long-standing 
agreements, constitutional change or the withdrawal of furu:!ing, it can affect the power 
60Tuese six areas were introduced by Evert Lindquist (Op Cit., page 421) as useful 
tools in evaluating decentralization activities. 
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relationships at the receiving level. What is at issue is less the process of decentralizing 
but rather the outcome or impact. 
A third point of complexity is closely related to the last. Decentralization is often cast 
as a process of liberation, associated with the need for self-determination, autonomy, and 
recognition of the need for governance systems to respond to the diverse needs of 
citizens. This is not always the case. A vision in which policy makers determine the 
investments and time required to create a new system of administration is required. 
Metcalfe and Richards in Improving Public Managemem suggest asking the critical 
question "What kind of controls and management processes should be instituted to assure 
overall direction at the same time as effective delegation. "61 Decentralization does not 
always occur with the optimum amount of planning and will not always achieve the 
desire results. Furthermore, decentralization may occur simply as a tool to offload 
financial. responsibilities to another level of government. Savoie alerts us to some of the 
risks involved in moving towards a more decentralized system in "Government 
61L. Metcalfe and S. Richards, Improving Public Management, {London: Sage), 
1987, page 79. 
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Decentralization: A Review of Some Management Considerations."62 These will be 
explored in greater depth in Chapter 2. 
Constitutional I Political 
In a paper prepared for an IPAC national seminar on decentraliz:ation issues, David 
Cameron noted that in Canada there are three types of decentralization: constitutional; 
administrative; and, fiscal. Formal constitutional amendment, 63 assigning increased 
responsll>ility to provincial jurisdiction, is a rare event in Canada. 64 Given that 
constitutional change bas been relegated to the "backbumer" following the demise of the 
62Donald Savoie, *Government Decentralization: A Review of Some Management 
Considerations,• Canadjan Public Ad!Pinistration, Volume 28, No. 3, (Fall) 1994, pages 
440-446. 
63It should be noted that significant changes have occurred in Canada as a result of 
judicial decisions. It is not within the scope of this thesis to explore these changes 
however. 
64David Cameron notes that there have been very few constitutional amendments of 
any kind affecting the division of powers. However, amendments expanding the authority 
of Parliament, such as unemployment insurance (92[2AJ) or pensions (94A), have been 
much more in evidence than amendments expanding the authority of provincial 
legislatures, such as natural resources in 1983 (92A). David Cameron, Op Cil .• page 
433. 
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Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, this paper will focus on administrative and 
fiscal decentralization. 
Political decentralization refers to the redistribution of political power and policy making 
authority. 65 While political decentralization on the surface seems similar to administrative 
decentralization, it is unique in that the locus of responsibility has shifted from one 
authority to another. An example of political decentralization provided in this thesis, 
occurs through the dismantling of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development in Manitoba and the transfer of jurisdictional authority to First Nation 
communities. While the process has not yet reached the stage of political 
decentralization, this is the ultimate goal. 
Administrative 
Administrative decentralization is defined as a level of government delegating its 
responsibility for a particular function to another level of government. For example, the 
federal Parliament transfers administrative responsibility for the execution of various 
federal functions to the provinces, often through interjurisdictional agreements. In 
administrative delegation, decentralization is normally the outcome of negotiations 
65Brad MacKenzie, "Decentralized Social Services,• Op Cit., page 98. 
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between the two orders of government, which include agreements on the terms and 
transfer of dollars, and in some cases, people. The outcomes are planned and intended. 
Fiscal 
The flow of money between two levels of government has been of central imponance in 
shaping national programs and defining the role of government in general. Indeed, fiscal 
arrangements were a centtal component to setting up Confederation in the first place. 
What is of concern is the flow of money from the federal government to the provinces 
in recent years and what is changing for the future. 
In the past, the federal - provincial fiscal transfers typically have been composed of some 
mix of the following elements: cash or tax room (the latter involving the federal 
government reducing its tax burden and the provinces raising theirs by an equivalent 
amount); grants with or without some program conditions; and cost-sharing or block 
funding (the latter involving a federal transfer whose amount is not dependent upon the 
level of provincial contribution). 66 It is not the purpose of this thesis to explore the 
complexities of these transfers, rather it is of concern that elements of fiscal 
decentralization impact upon various provincial, local and Aboriginal governments and 
66David Cameron, Op Cit., page 435. 
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that changes in the form or amount of fiscal transfers can have great impacts on other 
levels of governments, specifically with regards to social programs. 
"Despite the fact that many ... Canadians tend to look to Ottawa to play a greater role, 
the reality of the last few years is that the federal deficit and debt burden is driving 
Canada into unprecedented decentralization. "67 Recent experience with respect to 
established programs based on federal fiscal transfers has shown that both the transfer 
and the withdrawal of federal money can be decentralizing in its impact. While the 
transfer of federal money from one jurisdiction to another can be centralizing in its 
impact if it is accompanied by the imposition of federal conditions and controls, in the 
absence of such conditions, it clearly entails a degree of decentralization. The Established 
Programs Financing arrangements that began in 1977, which moved specific fiscal 
transfers away from the principle of cost-sharing, vested greater freedom of action in the 
provinces by providing an assured stream of funds on an unconditional block-funded 
basis. 
Similarly, the Canada Health and Social Transfer provides for increased fiscal 
decentralization by allowing the provinces to make specific decisions relating to the 
67Thomas J. Courchene, "Forever Amber," Rearrangements: The Courchene Papers, 
(Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press), 1992, page 53. 
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funding of social services, post-seconduy education and health care. Unconditional block 
funded dollars increase the provincial sphere of authority and decrease federal control, 
specifically leading to fiscal decentralization. However, it is also true that the withdrawal 
of federal money from the transfer system fon:es greater responsibility on the provinces 
if the service in question is not politically expendable. The move from conditional grants 
and shared.cost programs to unconditional block funding to a reduction in federal fiscal 
transfers is a move in the direction of decentralization. 68 
The fiscal decentralization that is occurring in Canada today, raises several important 
· questions. Is decentralization necessarily a good thing? Further, what objectives are being 
met by transferring or sharing powei'l It is these questions that ultimately need to be 
addressed in a substantive discussion on social policy reform. What is stated by the 
government to be a move towards improved service quality through the decentralization 
of administrative authority, can appear to the public as a reduction in levels of service 
68 The elimination of CAP by combining these expenditures with EPF transfers 
allows the federal government to off-load responsibility for social programs. Ultimately, 
this can be viewed as decentralization on several counts. First, if the provinces react by 
cutting back or redesigning social programs, it becomes "decentralitation• in the sense 
that these former national programs are progressively being determined at the provincial 
level. Second, and this is closely related to the first, bow does the federal government 
maintain standards if the cash transfer falls significantly? The maintenance of standards 
will be more fully discussed in chapter 2. 
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coupled with yet more bureaucratic obfuscation. 69 The administrative and financial 
decentralization that has occurred to date lacks a coherent philosophical base shared 
broadly across political communities. Without clear direction, decentralization will simply 
be more of the same: a revamping of the administration, coupled with program cuts and 
a reduction in services offered. 
Overview Of DecenlralizJ1Jion In Manitoba And Alberta 
While this chapter has introduced the concept of decentralization at a general level, it is 
also prudent to lay the groundwork for the two case studies that follow in subsequent 
chapters. Manitoba and Alberta, while both affected by the federal government's fiscal 
decentralization, have opted to respond in different ways. Alberta, as will be clearly 
outlined in chapter 3, has taken the concept of decentralization to the local comm1mity 
level. Manitoba, on the other hand, is grappling with the decentralization of health care 
to the local level, yet has not provided a long-term vision for the delivery of other social 
services. The second case study, found in chapter 4, concerns the administrative 
decentralization of Native child welfare in Manitoba in the context of political 
decentralization of authority through the dismantling of the Department of Indian Affairs 
69J>avid Cameron, "Summary of Discussions, "Canadian fublic Aciministration, 
Volume 37, No. 3, (Fall) 1994, page 388. 
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and Northf:m Development. 'Ibis illustration provides a clear example of the intricacies 
involved in the decentralization process and how these problems can directly impact 
citizens. 
'Ibis section offers an overview to recent provincial initiatives in both Manitoba and 
Alberta that may be interpreted as administrative decentralization. The focus of the thesis 
is the decentralization of social services, but it is important to consider the whole 
political and fiscal situation in both provinces before evaluating various social policy 
changes. 
Manitoba 
The Manitoba government is strUggling to contain its deficit. In April, 1993 the 
provincial government enacted legislation that required government employees to take ten 
non-paid days of leave during the last six months of the year. 'Ibis set a precedent that 
continues to be practised. Similar concessions were made by employees working in 
health, education and crown corporation sectors. In 1995, the provincial government also 
passed balanced budget legislation, requiring all ministers to spend within budget limits. 
Inside the civil service, deputy ministers now work with expenditure envelopes 
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determined by Treasury Board, but have more freedom to make choices within those 
envelopes. 
Efficiency and effectiveness conceptS, along with notions of increasing managerial 
freedom, began developing a higher profile in the late 1980s and continue to date. Better 
Methods, part of the Service 1st, A Quality Initiative is moving to stage two, 
implementation in April, 1996. This project has been designed to identify areas and 
processes that could be made more efficient. Since 1992, the government has began to 
implement special operating agencies (SOAs}; these entities within departments ate 
granted greater autonomy and discretion in return for being evaluated on performance 
in a discernible line of business, and must be committed to increasing efficiency and 
service quality. As of April 1996, there ate likely to be as many as fifteen SOAs in the 
Manitoba government. 
A number of decentralization initiatives have been spearheaded by the Manitoba 
government. The first was the dispersement of approximately three hundred provincial 
employees to rural areas throughout the province. This process took place over a three 
year period, beginning in the early 1990s. "The rationale was to increase accessibility 
of rural residents to service, to enhance regional input into decision-making, and to 
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provide more economic opportunity outside of Winnipeg. •71l However, ongoing fiscal 
restraint bas resulted in the reversal of some moves, while some other positions have 
been eliminated. 
Another administrative reform process that resulted in decentralization was announced 
in 1992 as the Quality Health Action Plan. The plan embraced consolidating services in 
various districts through the creation of Regional Health Councils, decreasing citizen's 
reliance on hospitals and emergency departments, developing a range of alternative health 
services, including community health centres, and increasing family and community 
involvement. The move from a hospital based, centrally regulated system requires new 
institutions. A Crown Corporation is being established to provide policy and 
coordinadon. Regional Health Councils will undertake local planning while increasing 
public participation. In conjunction with the Quality Health Action Plan, is the 
de-institutionalization ofpatieru:s from mental health hospitals. Through a multi-year plan, 
community supports were to be established that would eventually replace institutions. 
In March 1993, over two hundred hospital beds were closed and budgets have been 
decreased yearly since this date. The public demanded to know why the government had 
'IOEvert A. Lindquist and Karen B. Murray, "Canadian Administrative Reform During 
the Early 1990s, • Qmadjan Public Administration. Volume 37, No. 3, (Fall) 1994, page 
475. 
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not kept its promise that it would ensure that community health centres, in both urban 
and rural areas, had been established before significant budgetary cuts were made to the 
system. The deadline for implementing rural health care reform was extended and 
funding for home care services was cut in 1994. This clear gap between rhetoric and 
action was reinforced by other cuts in social services and education budgets. Recently, 
a Treasury Broad document outlining the province's plans for contracting out home care 
services was leaked to the media and opposition parties. The political response has been 
that contracting out services increases co-ordination and flexibility of service and is 
congruent with the plan for community based health care. The maintenance of the home 
care contracts will be provided by the Crown Corporation responsible for the Regional 
Councils. 
Alberta 
Alberta has been a position of restraint in order to remedy the imbalance between 
expenditure levels and resource revenues, which had declined significantly since the mid-
1980s due to low international prices on oil.71 The 1993 provincial election involved 
party platforms relating to the mounting debt and the need to maintain current rates of 
taxation. Ralph Klein and the Progressive Conservative Party won the election and the 
71Lindquist and Murray, Ibid., page 471. 
48 
Decentralized Social Services • Chapt~r 1 
premier committed his government, through legislation, to the elimination of the deficit 
by 1997.72 One result of this commitment was the appointment of a Government 
Reorganization Secretariat to look for methods of cutting costs and increasing 
efficiencies. It also has as part of its mandate the exploration of privatization possibilities, 
contracting-out, and partnershij>s with private business and other levels of government. 
Concomitant with drives to improve efficiency is rising interest in service quality. 
Significant interest is emerging in the concept of "one stop" provincial offices, where 
several departments are housed in a single office in order to serve clients through a single 
access point. Service quality goals are also evident in the government's "community-
based" economic development strategies known as "Seizing Opportunity." The key 
premise is that competitive challenges can only be met through innovation, cooperation 
and partnerships at the local level. One example is joint trade and tourism promotion 
where the government works in coordination with the private sector. Another important 
theme is that duplication, overlap and regulatory burdens must be reduced in different 
sectors, and this requires harmonizing the policies and programs at all levels of 
government. 
721ncidentally, not only is the province meeting its deficit reduction promises, it has 
realized a profit of $570 million for the fiscal year ending in March, 1996. Source: 
Premier Ralph Klein's Televised Address, January 29, 1996. 
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The theme of local empowerment is evident in two key sectors. The government is 
moving away from delivering health services in hospitals located in urban centres and is 
emphasizing community based alternatives, such as C(l!DmlJUity health centres and 
strategies to prevent illness. Mental health, home care and community care services are 
being governed in both rural and urban areas by regional health boards. Following the 
implementation of community health boards, is the design of a community based system 
of social service provision. Regional boards will be responsible for planning and 
implementing community designed services in the realm of child and family policy. This 
area will be the focus of a case study in chapter 3. 
The province has began "empowering" local governments by granting them "spheres of 
jurisdiction• rather than delegating specific authorities. The idea is to reduce legislation 
and to give local governments a degree of flexibility when confronting new problems. 
Of course, the provincial government also wants municipalities to assume fm.ancial 
responsibility for their new areas of authority and meet provincial standaids in 
environmental protection, roads, inspection, permits, waste management, and local 
assessments, 
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Conclu:rion:r 
Governments at all levels are in a state of transition. It is often difficult to distinguish 
between genuine impulses to decentralize and restraint under the veneer of 
decentralization and power-sharing. However, what can be stated definitively, is that 
social services in Canada are no longer in a pattern of convergent downsizing; they are 
in the midst of fundamental reorientation, where governments and the programs they 
deliver will be qualitatively different in the next five years. It is too early to predict 
where restraint measures and management reforms will take us in terms of distribution 
of power and responsibilities for serving the public once the deficit and debt problems 
have been addressed. It is unfair to say that the ideas guiding specific reforms are solely 
inspired by the need to reduce government deficits - many have been floating around for 
years, and not all in public administration venues. 13 The fiscal situation is simply 
providing the opportunity to put some of those ideas to action, admittedly not under the 
best of circumstances. 
This thesis will capture some of the elements of decentralization that are occurring with 
respect to social service development and provision. It will provide two case examples 
and evaluate the administrative reforms that have taken place. Furthermore, it will 
13See for example, Brian Wharf, Communities and Social Policy in Canada, 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Inc.), 1992. 
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provide a basis point for the future analysis of decentralization from a public 
adminstration perspective. 
Chapter 2: Local Government's Responses 
Decentruliz.ed Social Serviees - Chapter 2 
"The nation state is becoming too small for the big problems of life, 
and too big for the small problems of life. • 
Daniel Bell, sociologist 
Introduction 
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There has been speculation by politicians, public servants, social workers, academics and 
client groups that social services are- best designed and implemented at the community 
or local level. Within Canada's federal system, local governments play a role in the 
delivery of a wide array of public services and, to a lesser extent, the formulation of the 
associated policy frameworks. Social policies in Canada have been largely developed in 
national and provincial governmental frameworks, yet their consequences are played out 
and experienced in local communities. Local governments are currently not responsible 
to any great extent for the design of social policy for their citil.ens mainly due to 
constitutional arrangements and the manner in which the welfare state in Canada 
developed, leaving considerable power in the hands of the federal and provincial 
governments. 
lncongruencies between national policies and the people they are designed to serve, are 
well illustrated at the local and especially the urban level. High levels of unemployment 
and the growing numbers of families and individuals on welfare are examples of the 
inappropriateness of federal and provincial policies. Traditionally, senior levels of 
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government have designed and implemented homogeneous policies with regards to all the 
individuals in Canada, Brian Wharf. in Communities and Social Policy in Canada. makes 
the critical argument that while senior levels of government have and should retain a 
responsibility for social policy, in the past problems have arisen when these governments 
plan for communities instead of with them. 74 The resulting programs have frequently 
been ineffective and inappropriate. 75 
A growing body of literature makes the claim that a potentially powerful way to improve 
the effectiveness of social policy is to concentrate on local delivery units. Williams 76, 
Pressman and Wildavsky77, Lipsky, 78 and Brian Whart19 among others, have suggested 
that by providing sufficient resources to these units, delegating appiopriate responsibility 
and authority to them, and including the staff and consumers of these units in the policy 
74Brian Wharf, Ccunrounities and Social Policy in eanada. Op Cit., page 20. 
'l5>Jbis argument is convincingly supported by the failw:e of child welfare 
programs established by the federal and provincial governments without the 
involvement of First Nation people. This example is discussed in length in Chapter 4. 
"Walter Williams. The Implementation Peqpectiye, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press), 1980. 
77Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation, (Berkeley: University 
of California Press), 1984. 
~ichael Lipsky, Street I.eye! Bureaucracy, (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation), 1980. 
'l9Jkian Wharf, Communitjes and Social Pqlicy in Ca!l!!da, Op Cit. 
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process, social programs will potentially be improved. The term community based social 
services bas come to describe the capacity of the local community to influence policy and 
service response. 80 
This chapter will develop the idea that a significant challenge for both the redesign of 
social services and the ability of local governments to respond to citizen's needs, will be 
to find the optimum match of services and finances in a rapidly changing system. The 
central issue is whether increased involvement on the part of community organizations 
and local governments would actually improve social services. The chapter will overview 
some of the benefits of decentralization as well as identify specific problems that could 
accompany a decentralized system. 
Benefits to Decentralized Social Senices 
Canada is not a homogenous society and through immigration and the continuing trend 
towards urbanization, there is growing heterogeneity of the population. Canadian 
communities, as they absorb increasingly heterogeneous populations, have had to ask 
questions about the purposes and goals of basic social institutions. One compelling 
argument for the development of local social policies is the current crisis of the welfare 
*>Brad Mackenzie, "Decentralized Social Services" Op Cit., page 98. 
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state. It is envisioned, whether rhetorically or not, that by minimizing federal 
bureaucratic influence in social services, a better "fit" will be made between the server 
and the recipient. There is a need for cuhural sensitivity and input into policy design so 
that decision-making occurs at the point of contact closest to the actual implementation 
of policies and programs. 81 
A second reason supporting decentralization is that the prevailing pressures are for 
decentralization and privatization as federal and provincial governments attempt to 
minimize their deficits. Most western governments have sought to reduce public 
expenditure, particularly on social services. This reduction in social service programming 
has been attn'buted to the speculation that the demarut for services is inexhaustible - no 
matter what level of service is provided, organized groups of potential beneficiaries will 
campaign for improvement and .extension. The effect is "overload,• an incapacity of state 
revenues to meet escalating demand. 
Concomitant with the drive to download social responsibility, is the rising impul5e to 
have local I municipal governments or newly created regional agencies pick up the slack. 
It is apparent that there are at least two forces behind the move towards community 
driven service provision: decentralization precipitated by other levels of government 
81
.Aucoin and Bakvis, Op Cit., pages 91-92. 
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struggling to contain their deficits; and the argument that national social policies do not 
meet the needs of Canadians. Added to the mix, is the reality that the federal government 
no longer has the political will nor the finances to provide universal social programs. 
Specifically, the implementation of the Canada Health and Social Transfer demonstrates 
the federal government's willingness to disentangle themselves from the provision of 
social services. 82 
The pressing need for the development of social policies that fit the needs of the citizens 
they are designed to serve, has arisen at a time when the federal and provincial 
governments are reluctant to reform their social programs, but are searching for 
alternative program delivery methods or are offloading responsibility for social services 
onto other levels of governments. While reforms are not occurring in an optimum fiscal 
environment, local community agencies in coordination with municipal I local 
governments are potentially the best suited to design social policies that meet local needs. 
This could solve the paradox that has always plagued social policy reform; the design of 
social policy has been the responsi"bility of senior levels of government, yet social 
problems are felt direcdy in local communities. . 
82The term disentanglement has come to describe the process of the changing roles 
of governments in the provision of social services. Specifically, it is used to explain 
the withdrawal of the federal government (and in some cases the provincial 
governments) from the provision of public services. 
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Donald Savoie states in his article, "Government Decentralization: A Review of Some 
Management Consideration," that "clecentralization of government activity is regarded 
by many as holding important advantages over centralized administration. "83 By bringing 
program delivery closer to the population, it has been argued, you invariably make 
government more sensitive to the people. Similarly, it has been stated, that the quality 
of government service is likely to be better when programs are being delivered at a 
community level, rather than centrally administered from a capital region. It has also 
been speculated that government decentralization offers important advantages for 
improving the quality of services in a country as large and regionally diverse as Canada 
is. Not all regions require the same type of social programmes, and decentralization 
offers the opportunity for a better match of service to community or regional needs. 
Communitks and Social Policy 
The drive to reinvent the local community as a focal point of the delivery of social 
services and even the creator of policy, must begin with a revised concept of what a 
community actually is. Brian Wharf distinguishes a community as a "network of 
individuals with common needs and issues. This directs attention to the two essential 
83Donald J. Savoie, "Government Decentralization: A Review of Some 
Management Considerations," Canadian Pllblic Administration, Volume 28, No. 3, 
(Fall) 1985, page 440. 
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characteristics of communities • relationships and needs. •N These characteristics can be 
expressed by a group living in a geographically defined area such as a town or city, or 
by those sharing values, history, an economic base or a governing structure. Community, 
thus, is not merely defined as those residing in a politically designated geographical area 
that is presided over by an ele.cted local government, but extends to include the 
individuals who comprise the citizenship. The type of social policy required to tit the 
needs of a community's citizenry demands the involvement of citizens. 
Repairing and adapting our current system of social service delivery to every new 
circumstance is no longer working. Keeping the premise of the welfare state that bas 
been passed on to us, Canadiaftll must re-think the processes by which social services are 
offered and create another system to bring Canada into the twenty-first century. 
In order to redesign services to make them more effective, consideration must first be 
given to the social policies that provide the parameters for program development. · 
Titmuss in Social Policy: An Intmdt!sjpn. contends that social policy is all about social 
purposes, choices, and the conflicts between social pwposes and choices which have 
occurred at the governmental level, the community level and the individual level. At each 
level, by acting or not acting, by opting in or contraeting out, we can influence the 
"Wharf, 1992, Op Cit., page 16. 
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direction in which choices are made. 85 Key to this argument are three points. The first 
is social purpose which means a direction or the way in which policies are delivered (for 
example, institutional vs. community). The second is choice and conflict between 
choices. Both values and ideology compete for the allocation of scarce resources spent 
on social services. Finally, the third element is participation which includes opportunities 
to influence the social policy process. 
Further distinctions concerning social policy are made by Lindblom. He defines the grand 
issues of policy as those that focus on the distribution of income and wealth, on the 
distn"bution of political power and on corporate prerogatives. In contrast, ordinary issues 
include such topics as the governance of child welfare services, de-institutionalization, 
the development of community suppon programs and the emergence of the healthy 
community movement.16 Obviously, grand issues of policy impact upon ordinary issues 
of policy, and Chapter 1 of this thesis provides numerous examples of how federal fiscal 
policy impacts upon provincial and local government social policy. This 
interconnectedness provides the framework in which social policy is developed in 
Canada. With that said, the focus of the thesis is on ordinary issues of policy because it 
85Richard Titmuss, Social Policy: An Introduction, (London: George Allen and 
Unwin), 1974, page 131. 
UCharles Lindblom, "Still Muddling, Not Yet Through," Public Administration 
Review, (November/December) 1979, page 523. 
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is more reasonable to assume that community based organizations have the potential to 
bring about change to this type of policy. 
The period since the Second World War has witnessed the increasing importance of 
social services such as health care, education and social assistance. This is not to 
undennine or detract from the centralizing role the federal government bas played in the 
past in areas that are constitutionally provincial responsibilities. One of the major trends 
in recent years is the declining role of the federal government and the increasing role of 
provincial governments. rr While the role of the provincial governments bas strengthened 
considerably at the expense of the federal govemmem, the position of local governments 
during this period bas remained stable. 
Until the late 1960s, the prevailing conventional wisdom in local government, municipal 
or urban planning was that local politicians' influence was limited to physical concerns. 
The focus of city politicians has long been on economic and land development, suburban 
comtruction and more recemly inner.city renewal or revitalization. Unfortunately, most 
111l)avid Siegal, "The Financial Context for Urban Policy,• Urban Policy Issues 
Qmadjan Permegjve§, Richard A. Loreto and Trevor Price (eds), (Toronto: 
McClelland and SteWart, Inc), 1990, page 15. 
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local government politicians aim their policies towards buildings and physical 
infrastructures, rather than towards those who reside in the buildings or use the 
transponation routes. Social policies have generally been seen by local politicians as the 
jurisdiction of either the federal or provincial government with some notable exceptions. 
In Manitoba, 88 Ontario and Nova Scotia, welfare payments are made by municipal 
governments in both rural and urban areas, at least on a short-term basis. For the most 
part, however, social services were and have continued to be delivered and financed by 
senior levels of government. 
The late 1960s brought forth an era of citizen protest and community organizing across 
the country. Many factors fuelled this movement and competing philosophies quickly 
emerged as to how priorities should be determined and how citizens should be involved. 
During the late 1960s and into the 1970s, there was a tendency on the part of all levels 
of government to bury the true social and economic problems with money and programs. 
The net effect of this largesse was that communities and individuals received short-term 
economic benefits that ended with the funding. Not only did individuals themselves 
suffer, but community groups and action committees began to disperse and fall apart. 
"In Manitoba, the province has announced that it will move to take over city 
welfare, ostensibly to cut bureaucratic overlap and provide better coordination the 
City of Winnipeg's training and employment opportunities. This merger is currently 
entering Phase 1: The Business Case Model in April, 1996. Proposed implementation 
is January 1997. 
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A second effect of government fimding was that people and communities became 
dependent upon financial transfers for the solution to their social and economic ailments. 
The withdrawal of federal and provincial support for programs and community funding 
is still continuing and is now referred to as financial decentralization. What in reality is 
oc:cuning is that programs are being eliminated, ft•nding disappearing and those who 
need it most are being hit the hardest. 89 New solutions that involve innovative answers 
to age-old problems need to be developed. 
Potential for Decentraliz.ed Social Services 
While most social policy decisions have traditionally been at the senior government level, 
communities and individuals have always been involved in the implementation of policy 
or have felt its effects. 90 Local governments, while hesitant to be responst'ble for social 
policy for their citizens, have already been involved in the delivecy of public services. 
Hospitals, ambulance services, public health nurses, garbage pick-up and disposal, 
~ announcements (March, 1996) by the Manitoba government informed the 
public that certain welfare recipients could face cuts up to 10% of their current 
benefits. Furthermore, single parentS, with children over six years of age will now be 
considered employable and are at risk of having their benefits cut if they do not 
identify themselves as wanting employment. (Announcements noted in the Winnineg 
Free Press. March 12, 13, and 15, 1996). 
!IOJUchard Tinnuss, Social Policy; An Introduction. (London: George Allen and 
Unwin), 1974, page 131. 
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education of children, counselling, and even the payment of income maintenance all · 
effect the local government and arc affected by it. 
Recently, some municipal governments have shown an interest in taking a more active 
role in social policy programming. The present situation is that the majority of their 
interest in social policy remains in the realm of social planning departments. The areas 
of current involvement include planning for healdly communities and 
de-institutionalization. First Nation band and tribal councils compare to local 
governments in the sense dlat they provide an equivalent legal function for their 
community members. Furthermore, in several provinces, First Nation councils have 
taken control of native child welfare and arc leading the way in a proactive approach to 
social reformation at the local level. 91 
This new approach by leaders of the First Nations is concomitant widl a revival in the 
interest in community organizations. Homogenous social policies and the realization that 
the federal governments policies have not only been ineffective but actually harmful, has 
led to arguments for the restoration of First Nations control over their own communities. 
Former reform has been incremental at best and has left not only Fust Nations people 
feeling alienated but manipulated. First Nation control of those policies and institutions 
91This will be explored in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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that affect their citizens is still a pilot project that has not yet been fully implemented. 
However, it is innovative and has arisen at a time when new programs and policies are 
desperately needed. The devolution of administrative control to First Nation communities 
for Native child welfare will be discussed further in Chapter 4. 
Municipal counsellors, like leaders in First Nation communities, need to understand that 
the nature of their position involves a responsibility to their citizens, not just their 
properties. The election of a counsellor should make that individual concerned with the 
social problems, resources and requirements of the community. Politicians at all levels 
of government are elected locally, that is they are first and primarily members of their 
own communities. A responsibility to one's community should be developed through 
cooperation amongst all elected officials in a given locality. Cooperation in terms of 
planning and funding is not an unique concept, nor should its importance for potential 
development be minimized. Programs such as the Core Area Initiative in Winnipeg 
involved funding and cooperation at all three areas, as well as participation by local 
community organizations and voluntacy groups. 
Cooperation between politicians and bureaucrats at all levels of government, and 
including such community members as teachers, principals, ministers, chamber of 
commerce members, local business owners, presidents of voluntacy social organizations 
and others could function to potentially solve local problems. The involvement of 
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concerned individuals who know and understand the concerns of the local environment 
and its membership could be integral to designing policies that could lead to the 
reformation of our social state. A consideration for inclusive policies is fundamental to 
establishing a true revolution in social policy construction. Inclusive policies would take 
into account the needs of women, children, Aboriginal, the elderly, persons with 
disabilities, vistble minorities, and persons with alternative lifestyles, as well as the 
multicultural milieu in which the discussion for future proposals is developed in. 
Concepts such as First Nation control of child welfare, the development of healthy 
communities and de-institutionali2'.ation, all require well developed front-end servicing 
units at the local level. Active participation and organization is necessary to meet the 
requirements of community servicing and social policy implementation. Therefore, 
support for an expanded role at the community or local level comes from a variety of 
sources including the "common-sense view that those closest to a problem should have 
some way of contributing information about the problem - its scope, impact and the 
effect of current programs. "92 Empowerment of the delivery units, throuib enabling 
communities to ascertain the effectiveness of social policy programs, is critical to the 
development of constructive policies that meet the needs of the community and its 
citizens. 
92Brian Wharf, Communitjes and Social Policy In eanada, (Toronto, Ontario: 
McClelland and Stewart, Inc), 1992, page 22. 
67 
Decentraliz.ed Social Services • Chapter 2 
Decentraliz.ed Social Services - An Overview 
Health care, income maintenance and security, and state involvement in education are all 
pillars of the welfare state. 93 These are three areas that have all been implemented at the 
municipal level to a limited extent and have in the past required cooperation amongst 
more than one level of government. The following overview shows that there currently 
exists some interest in allowing local municipal governments to undertake social policy 
planning and servicing. 
Health care is regulated by the Canada Health Act (1984) and bas been funded through 
Established Programs Financing since 1977. The legislation provides the authority for 
the federal cost-sharing of medical care, as well as hospitalization costs. Beyond the 
required adherence to the principles of Canada's health care system, the provincial 
governments develop and maintain their own individual health care systems. In order to 
maintain adherence to the principles of the Health Act, the federal government reduces 
its transfer payments to provinces whose health authorities have allowed policy that 
deviates from the standards. 9' 
93Peter Woolsteneroft, "F.ducation," Urban Policy Issues, Richard A. Loreto and 
Trevor Price (eds), (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart), 1990, page 146. 
"Frank McGilly, An Introduction To Canada's Public Social Services, (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, Inc), 1990. See Chapters 7, 8 and 9. 
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MUDiclpalities in Canada do not have a public health function per se, and only two out 
of the ten provinces allow for local governments to play a role in health care. Alberta 
and Ontario have strong local government roles in public health, with lccal boards of 
health that have varying degrees of local political accountability." In B.C., Sask., and 
Manitoba, the urban centres have boards of health accountable to the municipality, while 
in the rural areas, the province provides the service directly. 
Recently, provincial governments have begun discussing the concepts of community 
health care services and addressing the growing costs of the current health care system. 
A reliance upon institutional care has spiralled provincial medical expenditures and is 
leading governments to seek alternative measures. Alternative service delivery is being 
sought for a Dllll1ber of services related to health care. One example of a type of 
alternative service delivery is the Manitoba government's recent proposal concerning the 
delivery of Home Care Services. 116 Home care is not governed by the Canada Health Act, 
-ti'frevor Hancock. Bernard Pouliot, and Pierre Duplessis, •Public Health,• Urban 
Policy Issues. Richard A. Loreto and Trevor Price (eds), (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart), 1990, page 190. 
!Iii Tbe announcement was made in the Wjoojgeg Free Press. February 27, 1996. 
Tbe article, "Health Services for Sale,• noted that the Manitoba government is 
interested in contracting out its $70 million a year home care programs to private and 
non-profit nursing companies. Government home care currently provides so-called 
core services in home-making, attendants, nursing and some medical supplies free of 
charge. Health Minister, Jim McCrae also noted that core services would remain 
funded by government, but clients would pay direct fees for certain unspecified 
services. Government home care has been the subject of public complaint due to its 
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and the province is able to use its discretion to provide these type of services more 
efficiently and effectively. The contracting out of these services, the provincial 
government believes, will allow for competitive bidding, more fleXJl>ility and greater 
community involvement. Home Care Services, which allow the sick and the elderly to 
remain in the home, is just one method of alternative health care that can be implemented 
at the oonum1nity level. 
Many provincial governments are in the process of discussing the holistic concept of 
community with regards to healthy public policies in the areas of health care and 
community servicing. While still at the deliberation stage, this idea would allow for 
greater diversity with regards to community design and implementation of the policies 
affecting local citizens. An example of how provincial governmems are moving the 
provision of health care services to the community level is the creation of regional health 
boards in Manitoba. 
Under a proposed system, t.en rural and regional health authority boards will be created 
and will report to a provincial Crown Cmporation. In tum. the boards and the Crown 
Corporation will be responsible for contracting out services to nursing companies, 
cumbersome bureaucracy, inflexible schedules and fragmented services. McCrae said 
that these concerns, combined with the pending federal transfer payment cuts of $367 
million for health and social services over the next two years, are forcing the 
province's move. 
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coordinating information systems, as well as overseeing case management and band1ing 
customer complaints. lbe Department of Health will remain responsible for setting 
standards and policies for services as well as allocating funding.97 lbe decision to 
de-institutionalize mentally ill or handicapped patients through the closure of large 
hospitals, is a further example of such a change in social program delivery by provincial 
governments. 98 
lbe trend towards decentralization and de-institutiooaUzatil)n exemplifies the need for 
municipal and local governments to move beyond their current fixation on the delivery 
of hard services which include core responsibilities of land development, physical 
infrastructure building and servicing as well as local boosterism. Local government's 
policies may affect the lives of citizens in their municipality or region more immediately 
than federal policies. Rural and urban bussing policies for snidents, zoning and re.zoning 
decisions, garbage pick-up and the development of land-fill sites are all examples of how 
decision-making at the local level can have enormous ramifications on individual lives. 
Unfortunately, municipal governments have allowed their policy agendas to be dominated 
by business and physical concerns in their Jocalitie11. Furthermore, provincial 
97 Alexandra Paul and Kevin Rollason, •Home Care Privatization Radical Surgery 
For System,• Wjnnjpeg Free Press. Febnwy 27, 1996, page A3. 
911 Unforamately, the requisite funding in communities has not been as 
forthcoming as the discourse on downloading of responsibility. 
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governments can control the focus of municipal itineraries through the provision of 
conditional grants. Given the history of federal and provincial government involvement 
in the provision of social services, there have been few examples of community social 
policy development beyond what has been mandated by senior governments. 
It has been contended that the development and implementation of social policy through 
local governments could be beneficial to Canada's citizens. Income security programs is 
one type of social service that is still delivered at the municipal level in three provinces. 
Manitoba, Nova Scotia and Ontario all retain municipal involvement to some degree in 
urban areas. In Manitoba, short-term income assistance is also provided by rural 
municipal governments. The financial implications for municipal governments if they are 
to continue to provide income maintenance payments is staggering. The City "of Winnipeg 
recently announced that as of April 1, 1996, it will have to reduce the amount of welfare 
paid to families with children. 99 This is the direct result of the federal government's 
withdrawal from the Canada Assistance Plan and the move to provide block funding for 
99As of April l, 1996 welfare benefits for eligible children in the City of 
Winnipeg are being reduced. City of Winnipeg officials are quoted in the Winnipeg 
Free Press. February 29, 1996, page A6, as saying that the reduction is due to the 
start of a new block funding arrangement between Ottawa and the provinces for 
health, social services and post-secondary education. The rate reduction was forced by 
the expiry of a three year old cost-sharing agreement with Ottawa. This particular 
agreement came aoout after the Manitoba government announced in 1993, it would 
only support province-wide minimum welfare rates that were far below the rates 
Winnipeg paid. To preserve the higher rates, the city had struck a cost-sharing deal 
with Ottawa. 
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all social services through the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST). Until April 
1, 1996, the City of Wumipeg was responsible for paying 20% of all payments made to 
social assistance recipients. The federal government, through CAP, reimbursed the City 
50%, and the provincial government reimbursed the City 30% of monies spent on social 
assistance expenditures. By transferring money through an unconditional block fUnd, the 
CHST gives the province increased power in deciding how they will allocate funds for 
social programs. 
The desire to provide social assistance payments with some uniformity across the 
provinces needs to be juxt.aposed against the inadequacies of municipal budgets that are 
primarily financed by property taxes and conditional grants. Therefore, while the 
majority of social programming may be best provided at the local level, senior 
governments must continue to maintain or even offload income maintenance payments 
from those municipalities that currently make them. The province of Manitoba has 
announced the administrative centraliution of the City of Winnipeg and the province's 
income assistance branches. 100 Unfortunately, this move does not extend to fiscal 
1@nie project is in preliminary stages. Implementation date is projected to be 
early 1997. 
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cemralization and the City of Winnipeg will continue to pay its portion of the income 
assistance payments, to the cidzeDs eligll>le for municipal welfare. 101 
Wharf's position is that 
"provincial ministries should only be responsible for the following 
functions: determining overall policies in services such as 
child and family welfare; allocating funds; operating specialized 
province-wide services; establishing standards of service and 
monitoring performance.• 102 
This system allows local governments flexibility in handling individual situations, while 
at the same: time, keeps the provincial government involved in such crucial areas as 
funding, supervising, and monitoring. Provincial governments will want to maintain 
minimum standaids of service. Supervision is tantamount to ensuring that local 
governments do not become lax in conrimiing to innovate and implement appropriate 
services. In order to continue to provide services for those people most deserving in the 
community, funding by senior governments can not be withdrawn. The greatest concern 
for municipal governments is that senior governmentS will continue to d~le 
themselves from the provision of social services and not provide the necessary funding 
for local governments to create community programmes. 
101Telephone Interview with Iuergen Hartmann, program manager, Social Services 
Department, City of Winnipeg, February, 1996. 
1otwbarf, Op Cit., page 181. 
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Provincial governments cannot become completely uninvolved in community policy 
development. There remains a constant need for monitoring, policy development, and of 
course funding. It has been argued that the development and implementation of social 
policies at the local level could cause overlap and result in the need for more funding 
rather than deficit reductions. This is a valid concern that could be mitigated by the 
allowance for new arrangements in cost-cutting ideas. U>cal governments or local 
subcommunities will be best able to determine the need for subsidi7.ed day care spots, the 
amount of community home or lodge care for the elderly, as well as addressing concerns 
in public safety. An actual fit between need and the provision of social policy will help 
cut costs by elimiimting excess programming. 
Problems Associated With DecentralizJltion 
The purpose of this section is to identify problems that are associated with the 
decentralization of social services. Though these difficulties do not completely mitigate 
the potential benefits associated with decentralization, they do provide an appreciation 
of some of the problems and considerations that need to be addressed in planning to 
decentralize government operations. 
This section has been fUrther subdivided to address problems that may be specific to 
administrative decentralization and political decentralization. While political 
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decentralization will often face all of the problems associated with administrative 
decentralization, this form of decentralization may also bring with it other concerns. 
Problems With Administrative Decentralkation 
The first consideration is cost and funding. The cost of social services partly depends 
upon the scope of the programmes involved in meeting social policy goals. However, 
while decentralization can involve cost-savings by streamlining programmes to meet local 
needs, in other areas costs can actually be increased. Regardless of the type of programs 
offered, certain administration costs are often higher in decentraliz.ed operations. Costs 
for travel, communication and relocation all must be considered and factored into 
budgets. Furthermore, during periods of transition, duplication may be necessary so that 
while the new organization is being established in the receiving community, the 
centralized organization continues to operate as a back-up to ensure that an acceptable 
level of services is maintained. 103 
Another important consideration in looking into the possibilities for the decentralization 
of social services is the need for obtaining staff commitment. 1°' Though it is possible to 
103R. Chartrand and A. Clayton, "Planning a Relocation: The Project Matane 
Experience,• Ootimum, Volume 8, No. 2, 1977, pages 19-30. 
1
°'Donald J. Savoie, "Government Decentralization,• Op Cit., page 442. 
76 
Decentraliud Social Services • Chapter 2 
staff a number of positions through local hiring, it is highly desirable to have some 
employees relocate with their units so that a sense of continuity is maintained in the 
organization. It is also highly unlikely that the kind of expertise with the required 
experience in government operations will be available in smaller communities to fill a 
number of management and professional positions. 
Obtaining staff commitment is vital to a successful decentralization program, but it is 
important not to overlook the relevant client groups and non-government organizations. 
Consultations should take place with the program's client group whenever consideration 
is given to decentralize the organization delivering the program. Consultations with the 
client groups and interested associations should take place over such things as the 
preferred locations for new offices and what impact the changes are likely to have on 
program delivery and level of services. 
A third important consideration associated with administrative is deciding on the scope 
of the decision-making authority that ought to bi: decentralized. Whatever level of 
decision-making authority that is decentralized, there will be a need to establish new 
management processes and new forms of commimications. The distance between regional 
offices in a decentralized organivition will pose new management problems. Good 
communication strategies and the implementation of management information systems is 
critical to the success of decentralization. 
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Problems of control and accountability also need to be addressed in putting together a 
decentralized plan. Decentralizatio will invariably disrupt traditional control syst.ems and 
issues of ttanSparenCy must be addressed not only for the polfficlans to feel comfortable 
with the new system, but the public and clients as well. "The political environment in 
which governing takes place is normally regarded as the most centralizing determinant 
of public administration. •!OS This occurs for three reasons. First, ministers, individually 
and collectively, wish to xecei.ve credit for decisions they perceive will be to their 
partisan advantage. Visl"bility is crucial if such advantage is to be secured. The second 
major reason the environment is normally regarded as a centralizing determinant stems 
from the obvious desire to avoid political embarrassment. Cautious ministers will prefer 
not to delegate even when this means a considerable workload for their office. Third, 
ministet'S wish to be seen as responsive to public demands, special interests, their 
individual electoral constituencies and their political party. Ministers must appear to be 
in charge and this creates a tendency towards centrali7.ed decision-maldng. 106 
1mAucoin and Bakvis, Op Cit., page 90-91. 
1116/bid. 
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Problems. With Political Decentralir.ation 
Traditional criticism for the decentralization of services and the empowerment of local 
communities bas tended to focus on the disappearance of community. Community 
strength.. citizen participation and involvement, and the willingness of locally elected 
officials to become involved in providing social policy for their citizens are all 
tantamount to creating sound social policy. While this argument does have face validity, 
in reality, most communities are already respmwl>le for providing specific services. 
Canada's public education system is delivered on the premise of local school boards 
involving the active panicipation of community members. Daycare, senior's services, 
recreational activities are other examples of programs that are implemented at the local 
or regional level by community members. 
A second major concern is the mah1renance of standards. There is resistance to the idea 
of decentralization from those who assume that government should provide public 
services or eDforce regulations according to "national" standards and policy criteria. 
Concomitant with the discourse on accountability and transparency is the discussion that 
bas centred around how national or provincial norms or standards are going to operate 
with regards to social policy. If such norms or standards are to exist, they are going to 
have to be the result of federal-provincial-local cooperation, and not by the vinue of the 
federal government imposing standards on the provinces. The federal government is 
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quickly losing the fiscal and hence, political, capacity to impose standards, but has yet 
to propose any alternatives. 1117 
Changes to the mainreuance of standards could create an ad hoc approach to the 
availability of programs and wide variances in spending. 108 While there is reason for 
concern that the demise of the welfare state also means the erosion of national and even 
provincial standards, the premise underlying the decentralization of social services is that 
programs can be tailored to meet community needs. Community requirements will vary 
widely from region to region as well as province to province. Decentralized social 
services actually encourages differences in programmes, funding and availability and 
proponents believe that it is these differences that encourage creativity and innovation. 
Innovation and creativity, in turn, can lead to cost-effectiveness and greater efficiencies 
as well as more effective responses to community problems. 
1
'"Reg Alcock, Winnipeg Liberal MP for Winnipeg South, has said that federal 
studies have shown that since Ottawa began block funding post-secondary education in 
1978, most provinces, including Manitoba, have not kept up their end of the support. 
In 1978, the federal government shared funding for post-secondary education with the 
provinces on a 50-50 basis. Since going to block fi1nding, only Quebec now pays 
more than 50 percent of the cost. In all other provinces, the federal government has 
assumed the greatest burden for funding post-secondary education. Manitoba, for 
example, now contributes only, 24 percent of its total post-secondary education costs, 
Ontario 32 percent and British Columbia 33 percent. Dan Lett, Op Cit., page A2. 
10SWbile there are potential Charter implications associated with this problem, it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to discuss them. 
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While most social services can be tailored to meet community needs, specific social 
problems know no boundaries and are found in all communities in the country. The 
pressing issues of poverty, the lack of affordable housing, alcoholism and crime need 
concentrated effons by the federal and provincial governments. In the past, federal. and 
provincial governments have developed social policies and programs in response to these 
problems. For their part, local governments have not been willing to take on the 
responsibility for social policy. Their reasons have included a lack of funds, the 
:recognition that social problems are complicated and a conviction that these problems are 
the.responsi'bility of senior governments. 
This conviction had its origins in the Great Depression when municipal governments 
clearly lacked the capacity to respond to the devastating effects of nation-wide 
unemployment. Somewhat reluctantly, the federal government resumed responsibility for 
coping with the impact of the depression, but this stance was gradually replaced with one 
of leadership in developing Canadian health and social welfare programs. Recently, 
however, the ieluctance to provide fUnding or increase their role in health and social 
programs has returned. 109 
1®Brian Wharf, Communities and Social Po!icv, Op Cit., page 20. 
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An important criticism of creating local social policy comes from Andrew Sancton 
(1986). He contends that allowing local governments to take control of social services 
would mean only one thing - cutbacks. "Since social services are always consumed by 
a powerless minority and paid for by a sceptical majority, the dangers involved in 
opening up the private world of the social services to the local democratic process are 
obvious" .110 Sancton captured two of the gravest concerns associated with the 
decentralization of social services. The first is that there is no guarantee that allowing 
local or regional agencies to administ.er or provide social programs would guarantee 
greater equality of access. In fact, it has been suggested that the local arena is more 
easily "captured" by business and other special interests than the provincial or federal 
level is. This argument is supported by the typical agenda of local governments -
economic development and infrastructure construction or renewal. Municipal 
governments are not the only local governments that can be captured by specific 
interests. Chapter 4 of this thesis depicts how in some First Nation communities, the 
social welfare agenda has been captured by political purposes. 
110Andrew Sancton, "Municipal Government and Social Services," an unpublished 
paper, Department of Political Science, University of Western Ontario, London, 
Ontario, 1986, page 61. 
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Closely related to the criticism that local agendas can more easily become captured by 
competing interests is the concern that decentralization may result in "acute localitis. "111 
Montgomery notes that there are several symptoms of this disease, including the tendency 
for a relatively small group of elites to exercise a disproportionate share of influence, and 
for communities to be insulated, isolated and resistant to new ideas, thus becoming 
complacent about unacceptable social conditions. 
The first symptom descnlled by Montgomery is that a relatively small group of elites 
may exercise a disproportionate share of influence on the social programs in a given 
locality. The example developed in Chapter 4, shows that First Nation women do not 
have an equal share of influence with regards to child welfare decisions made in their 
communities. In the· article, "Feminism and First Nations: Conflict or Concert,• Leslie 
Brown, Cindy Jamieson and Margaret Kovach discuss ways in which First Nation women 
are "silenced.• They refer to the way dominant First Nations community members 
effectively silence women, as well as self-silencing, a problem that has arisen as a result 
of internalized oppression.112 Not only are First Nation governments dominated by men, 
but municipal governments also tend to have a uneven proportion of men and women. 
111John Montgomery, "The Populist Front in Rural Development: Or Shall We 
Eliminate The Bureaucrats And Get On With The Job?" Public Administration 
Reyiew, (January/February) 1979, page 59. 
112Leslie Brown, et al, "Feminism and First Nations: Conflict or Concert?" 
Canadian Reyiew of Social Policy, No. 35, (Spring) 1995, pages 72-75. 
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Therefore, parallel to mainstream politics, men have effectively silenced women by 
monopolizing the political leadership and political structures. 
Closely related to who bas control of the political agenda is the concept of how scarce 
resources are allocated. At the local level, competition for these resources can become 
intense. Previously in the chapter, the three elements introduced by Richard Titmuss as 
key to social policy development and implementation were overviewed. The first is a 
purpose or a direction. Decentralized social services tend to focus on implementation of 
programs in a community setting. The second element is choice and the potential for 
conflict that may arise between choices. This refers to the fact that social policy is really 
about compromise between conflicting values. Rejean Laundry, in "Biases in the Supply 
of Public Policies To Organized Interests," notes that policy decisions produce allocations 
ofvalues. 113 In an environment of conflicting interests and competing resources, there are 
invariably winners and losers. At the local level, resources are even more scarce, and 
conflicting interests will be more evident. 
While local governmental authorities are not eager to undertake new responsibilities, and 
for the most part decentralization is perceived to be simply downloading or "a rhetorical 
113Rejean Laundry, "Biases in the Supply of Public Policies to Organi™ 
Interests: Some Empirical Evidence, "Policy Communities and Public Policy in 
Canada A Structural Approach, William Coleman and Grace Skogstad (eds), 
(Mississauga: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd.) 1990, pages 291-293. 
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tool to cut services," 114 paternalistic federal policies have tended to neglect some of 
Canada's most important citil.ens. Some feminist academics like Caroline Andrew, 
suggest that inclusive policies could be best designed through the municipal agenda, even 
more adequately than by senior levels of government. Andrew, in Political 
Arrangements. Power and the City, suggests that the pressure placed by the networking 
of women's groups is especially suitable for influence on the political systems of urban 
areas. She further contends that "municipal politics have always included the provision 
of concrete services and the necessity to work out in detail the relationships between 
different services directed to the same population. "115 
A concern for women's issues and family needs is a key element in the undertaking of 
social services by local government in Canada. Women, children and the elderly tend to 
be the groups directly influenced by social policy change. Income maintenance payments, 
daycare, education, adequate health care, recreation programmes and facilities, affordable 
housing, and public safety are services that are critical to this segment of our population. 
Thus, municipal and other local governments must be aware of the needs of the 
individuals and families that they will be servicing in their new undertakings. As already 
114Caroline Andrew, "The Feminist City, "Political Arrangements: Power and 
!jty, Henri Lustiger-Thaler (ed), (Montreal, Quebec: Black Rose Books), 1992, page 
116. 
115lbid., page 114. 
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stated, an awareness that social concerns may be more likely heard at the local level, 
lends credence to the argument that not only will the trend towards decentralization 
increase local government responsibility in the area of social and community services, 
but also be constructive for the creation of a truly inclusive community. 
The latter symptom of "acute localitis", insulated and parochial communities, is 
graphically illustrated by a case of child abuse and neglect in a small community in rural 
Nova Scotia. Brian Wharf in "Social Services" describes the case and referred to the fact 
that parents, relatives and other members of the community were aware that child abuse 
and neglect bad existed for years. 116 The charges were finally laid by a newcomer to the 
area who commented that incest bad been an accepted way of life for the 300 families 
living in the community. To detect this symptom of acute localitis, provincial legislation 
must contain standards of performance iii the fields of service such as child welfare, and 
an accreditation system needs to be put in place to ensure that agencies perform in a 
competent fashion. 
The second element of the concerns offered by Andrew Sancton, and closely associated 
with the first, is cutbacks. Many local governments currently suffer significant fiscal 
problems and as a result they will always be beholden to the provincial government for 
116Brian Wharf, "Social Services," Op Cit., page 186. 
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maintaining financial support to social programs. 117 Transfer payments are made to local 
governments by federal or provincial governments and they tend to take the fonn of 
conditional or unconditional transfer payments. There are three main reasons for the 
provision of transfer payments - fiscal gap, interjurisdictional spill-over, and fiscal 
equitY. 118 Fiscal gaps have emerged between local government expenditures and local 
government own-source revenue because the main fonn of local government own-source 
revenue, the property tax, bas not been a particularly buoyant source of revenue. At the 
same time, local governments have been forced to cope with expenditures generated by 
increasing urbanization and demands for improved services. 
Inter-jurisdictional spill-overs or externalities occur when expenditures made by one 
localitY benefit other jurisdictions. Municipal councillors are reluctant to spend money 
on programs that benefit other jurisdictions. However, the provincial government is 
aware that these expenditures are necessary for the good of the entire province. 
Therefore, it provides a conditional transfer to offset this spill-over and so encourage 
municipalities to spend more on this service. 
117 Andrew Sancton, "Municipal Government and Social Services," (London: 
Department of Political Science, UniversitY of Western Ontario), 1986. 
118David Siegal, "The Financial Context for Urban Policy," Op Cit., pages 25-28. 
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The third rationale for inter-governmental transfers, concern for fiscal equity, arises 
because of differences in the abilities of local governments to raise funds. Municipalities 
with large, stable industrial and commercial tax bases can raise sizable amounts of 
revenue through the property tax. Municipalities with weaker tax bases or higher costs 
are often forced to impose unduly high mill rates on residential property owners. 
Provincial governments usually step in to reduce this problem by providing transfers to 
the municipalities with the weaker tax base. 
One of the major problems with provincial transfers from the standpoint of local 
governments is that the province bas absolute control over the level of these payments. 
Thus, they can change significantly from year to year, depending upon political 
priorities. The largest proportion of conditional transfers from provincial governments 
to municipal governments are for programs in the areas of education, health, 
transportation and communications. Conditional transfers, in recent years, have often 
taken the form of the provincial government cost-sharing the program, i.e. each fifty 
cents of municipal expenditures results in one dollar of total expenditure on the program. · 
This makes programs that receive conditional transfers more attractive than those that do 
not. 119 But in turn, such transfers can result in municipal governments shifting their 
priorities to attract these payments. 
119David Siegal, Op Cit., pages 26-28. 
88 
Decentrali:ord Social Services - Chapter 2 
When this occurs, municipalities an: conscious that they an: vulnerable to shifts in 
provincial priorities. The provincial government could be very interested in a program 
for a number of years and encourage local governments to develop extensive delivery 
systems on which local citizens become dependent. Later, provincial priorities could 
change, resulting in a reduction or total withdrawal of provincial funding for this service. 
However, the municipality can not shift gears so easily because it bas an extensive 
delivery system in place and a clientele that bas come to rely on the service. Often the 
municipality must continue to provide the service, but without provincial assistance. 
Another problem with conditional transfers is evident. The transfer of funds can tend to 
muddle accountability. Stripped of all the administrative trappings, a transfer payment 
is basically one level of government spending money raised by another level of 
government. If the service is not provided properly, whose fault is it? Did the 
government making the transfer provide too little funding or impose inappropriate 
conditions? Or did the recipient government use the funds unwisely? It is difficult for a 
citiz.en to know which government should be held accountable for problems in this type 
of situation. uo 
!20Richard Loreto and Trevor Price, Urban Policy Issues C11p;yljan Perspectives. 
(Toronto, Ontario: McClelland and Stewart, Inc), 1990, page 8. 
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Conclusions 
Local governments have the capacity to innovate and create interesting new methods of 
empowering local citizens in self-help methods. Local government leaders, in 
coordination with other members of local communities, need to ascertain specific needs 
within their area and be able to implement constructive responses. Counselling for crisis 
prevention, as opposed to treating with crisis intervention; job training and educational 
opportunities instead of unemployment cheques; recreation programmes for physically 
or mentally challenged people in distinction from inactivity and institutionalization; 
adequate daycare facilities to provide quality care for children so as to allow mothers to 
find employment and get off social assistance; and recreational activities for youths who 
are currently hanging out on the streets of urban centres are all areas that local 
government leaders can explore. 
What appears to be needed is a newly conceived model of local government. While 
provinces continue to tightly control the finances and activities of municipalities due to 
what has been termed the "constitutional insignificance of the municipality," local 
governments are generally blessed with less ideological conflict. The absence of political 
parties could aid in the conception of a governmental framework that is more cooperative 
rather than conflictual in nature. A conceptual model of local government would be 
multicultural in nature in order to respond to the needs of Canada's heterogeneous 
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communities. It would also be inclusive so as to allow women, children, the elderly, the 
financially disadvantaged, the disabled, people with alternative lifestyles among others 
to have a voice in the formation and implementation of policies. Local government needs 
to be more about community and a community's citizens than the land that is included 
in its political boundaries. 
Social policy and the provision of personal social services can be adapted to the 
cooperative style of governing. Local government could create a ponfolio of social 
services within its mandate. Thus a particular official or group of officials would liaison 
with other community members to create a framework that would be adaptable to its 
citizens. Many people in a community are already involved in the provision of social 
services. Ministers provide counselling, religious organizations may offer shelter or food 
banks, teachers and educators offer counselling to younger members of the community, 
recreation directors create activities for all those active, senior's coordinators offer Meals 
on Wheels and transportation for seniors, among other important community members. 
Community organizations exist even without mandate from government, yet they have 
no political empowerment. What is also lacking is coordination of those groups that 
currently act as social facilitators in an area. 
The involvement of citizens in the reinvention of the community as the locale for social 
policy is paramount to the delivery of equitable policies. Provincial governments have 
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to be willing to continue to fund necessary income maintenance programs such as 
welfare, and n:lieve those municipalities who are cummtly providing these payments of 
their burden. Local governments must develop a responsibility for their citizens not just 
their citizen's property. A social responsibility includes caring for others and developing 
methods of self-help and mutual aid. This chapter provides a st.aiting point for further 
exploration into an undeveloped yet important future consideration in social services. 
Chapter 3: Alberta's Initiatives 
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Introduction 
The health, education and social welfare programs which have taken shape through this 
century are a source of pride to Canadians and envy to many nations. In recent years, 
however, economic pressures have contributed to the retrenchment of federal involvement 
in social programs. At the federal level, the Government of Canada is implementing the 
Canada Health and Social Transfer to replace the Canada Assistance Plan and other social 
program financing. At the provincial level, governments across the country are in the 
process of "rethinking" or redesigning their services. 
The previous chapter focused on the issues concerning decentralization, mainly from a 
local government viewpoint. It reflected on how decentralization could be used to provide 
more effective social programming and delivery. This chapter provides a counter-point 
to Chapter 2 by introducing the concept of decentralization from a public administration 
or political management perspective. It discusses how the twin imperatives of cost 
reduction and managerial freedom are also driving the move towards decentralization. 
Unfortunately, while decentralization is often portrayed as one aspect of reinventing 
government, it may not always be the panacea for social-ills. In fact, when 
decentralization is accompanied by reductions in fiscal transfers, it will not likely 
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accomplish the social and political goals it is implemented to meet. 121 
The twin them.es of managerial freedom and administrative decentralization, as advocated 
by both the federal and provincial governments, are not new developments. In 1962, the 
report that emerged from the Glassco Commission underscored the potential benefits of 
both. This report has generally been regarded as the major turning point in modem 
federal administration, given the deregulation of central controls over departmental 
management that followed.122 The concepts of managerial freedom and decentralization 
in the public sector have been based in pan on the private sector cozporate model. The 
private sector has in effect created a normative paradigm for the delivery of social 
services in many provinces. As governments attempt to become more efficient and 
business-like in their operations, they are emulating private sector models. Increased 
managerial autonomy and decentralization have long been the central themes of the 
corporate paradigm and thus, in pan, account for the increased interest of provincial and 
121The province of Alberta is decentralizing its delivery of child aDcl family 
services at the same time as the government is drastically cutting expenditures in 
social services. Published plans to cut public education funding by $238 million, post-
secondary education funding by $206 million, health care by $748 million, family and 
social services by $328 million, and municipal grantS by $87.8 million. Tony Clarke, 
"Public Services and the Provinces - Alhena,• In The Public lnteJ;est. The Value pf 
Public Seryices, Steven Langdon, Judy Rebick, R. Warskett (eds), (Maple Pond, 
Ontario: Voyageur Publishing), 1994, pages 77-79. 
1:ticanada, Re.port of the Royal Commission on Government Ornpjption, 
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer), 1962, Volume 1. 
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local governments in pursuing dlese dimensions for policy implementation. 
Then: are also specific political and government factors involved in the plans and 
proposals for enhanced managerial fm:dom and decentralization in public administration. 
Politically, there are increased demands for a more accountable political state. These 
demands almost always arise from the perception that the administrative state is one in 
which public servants, the non-elected arm of government, have significant power, as 
distinct from authority, in the process of govemance.123 Some advocates for managerial 
fm:dom believe that •a more accountable state would acknowledge accountability 
problems by delegating authority to managers in as precise a manner as possible, and 
then holding them accountable for its exercise. •124 
The governance factors involved in planning for decentralization and managerial fm:dom 
constitute a response to at least two factors. On the one band, the fiscal restraints of the 
modem state require that managers have greater flexibility in the use of expenditures 
precisely because there are fewer nesources available to meet demands. On the other 
band, organizational responsiveness in times of "environmental turbulence,• when 
WO.P. Dwivedi, (ed), The Public Mminimtive State in Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toromo Press), 1982. 
124Aooin and Bakvis, Op Cit., page 3. 
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coupled with a political environment characterized by a high degree of regional diversity, 
demands organizational decentralization. In both unitary and federal states this feature 
of contemporary political environments bas produced a marked de jure or de facto 
devolution of authority to lower levels of government: provincial, regional, Aboriginal 
and municipal/local. 125 
The provincial government in Alberta, under the leadership of Premier Ralph Klein has 
been searching for ways to decrease public spending in social services while increasing 
responsiveness to consumers. Alberta, like many other provinces is grappling with ways 
it can more effectively and efficiently deliver social services. However, unlike the other 
Canadian provinces, it has gone much further in its efforts to "reinvent" the way 
government provides its services. From a public management standpoint, "productive 
management and responsive decision-making have become central issues in public 
administration" because of the importance of the administrative state in the governance 
of social programs. 126 
The spatial dimensions of public administration have become especially critical as 
125Richard Simeon, "Comments on Centralization and Decentralization,• Canadian 
P!lblic Mmini!!tratjon, Volume 29, No. 3, (Fall) 1986, pages 445-461. 
126J>eter Aucoin and Herman Bakvis, Op Cit., page 2. 
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governments reflect on the effectiveness and efficiencies of their social services. 
Kemagban and Langford make the argument that the public seems to have a fairly clear 
idea of what is meant by efficient and effective service. In essence reliable, competent, 
quickly delivered, relevant and responsive programs. They go on to note that while these 
two values may appear straightforward to the public, they are often less clear to public 
managers. 127 One of the reasons they are often unclear is because of the conflicting 
signals received on the meaning and importance of efficiency and effectiveness. 
To the auditors, financial officers, central controllers, and other players in the program 
evaluation industry, efficiency and effectiveness are technical values, used to measure 
organizational performance and assist in the process of holding public servants 
accountable for their actions. Efficiency within this context, becomes little more than a 
measure of labour productivity, while effectiveness is a reflection of the impact of a 
program on its stated objectives. 128 The cost-oriented approach to efficiency and 
effectiveness is the driving force behind many policy decisions which often have the 
effect of reducing and eliminating services to the public. 
127Kenneth Kemagban and John W. Langford, The Responsible Public Servant, 
The Institute for Research on Public Policy and the Institute for Public Administration 
in Canada, 1990, page 119-120. 
1281. CUtt, •Accountability, Efficiency and the Bottom Line in Non-Profit 
Organizations," Canadian pyblic Administration, Volume 25, (Fall) 1982, pages 311-
331. 
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The Alberta government, at a time when it is reducing expenditures to child and family 
services, bas embraced the concepts of community based design and delivery of child and 
family services and bas begun implementing a model that is radically different than any 
other implemented in Canada today .129 Coinciding with the establishment of regional 
agencies that will be transferred responsibility for the implementation of child and family 
service policy is the utilization of alternative program delivery methods. The next section 
will provide an introduction to the concept of alternative program delivery which will set 
the stage for the case study on Alberta. 
129See Table 1 as an indication of budget cuts. Source: Province of Alberta, 
Budget 1996. 
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Table 1. Spending Profile, Province of Alberta. Millions of Dollars130 
Companible Compamble 
1993194 1!19419S 19951'96 1996197 1997198 
Actual FoRcast Budget Target Tmget 
A. Spendln11 • Operat11111 Target 
Oeneral Revenue Fund 
Income&Employment 
ProgrnmJ 974.5 749.4 757.S 738.7 721..2 
Child Welfare Services 164.0 164.2 178.8 192.0 194.9 
Services 10 Persons 
with Disabilities 236.0 243.8 253.5 261.4 276.5 
DayOue 73.8 14.S 63.7 60.2 60.2 
Office for the Prevention of 
Family Violence 7.8 10.4 7.8 7.8 7.8 
Children's Advocacy 1.3 .1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 
Commissioner of Services 
for Children o.o 0.4 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Aboriginal Affairs S.9 6.6 7.5 7.3 7.3 
MetisSetllements 
Transition Commission 6.3 6.0 5.3 4.7 4.7 
MetisSettlcmenis Appeal 
Tribunal 0.7 0.8 I.I 0.9 0.9 
BalanceofDepanment 61.0 59.3 63.2 62.6 61.4 
Smuiory Expenditure 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 
Total Operating 1,!!61.3 1.347.0 1.372.2 1.369.4 J,368.7 
Projected Reductions (214.3) 25.2 (2.8) (0.7) 
B. Spending • Capital 
bMst-nt Tal'lld 
Minisuy 3.6 2.0 1.0 0.4 0.4 
Business Plan Revenue Proposals 
Fcdeta1 Government cost sharing 
revenue changes resulting 
fromThttt-Year Plan 588 525 525 522 523 
130Soun:e: Province of Alhena, Provincial Budget, 1996. 
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Altemative Program Delivery and Rnandng 
Part of the pressure that not only the Alberta provincial government, but other provincial 
governments and the federal government face, is derived from a combination of 
demands. These demands include the need to reduce deficits and accumulated debt; 
deliver services and provide the types of service that citizens want in the manner they 
seek; and, provide a range of services consistent with the willingness of citizens and 
corporations to bear certain levels of taxation. 131 It is in this context that governments 
have been actively reviewing their programs. They are considering whether to continue 
delivering those programs and, if so, whether they can be delivered in more effective, 
less costly, and potentially more responsive ways. 
The banners under which Canadian governments undertake such reviews to restructure 
their service delivery are numerous and vary considerably across jurisdictions. They 
include outsourcing and contracting out, partnetShips, privatization, commercialization, 
empowerment, downsizing, delayering, decentralization and devolution. Whether or not 
governments emphasi7.e one approach over another, it is useful to view all of these 
initiatives as part of an important paradigm shift. 
131KPMG, "Canadian Oovemments and the Search For Alternative Program 
Delivery and Financing," A Preliminary SUrvey, (KPMG Centre For Oovemment 
Foundation and IPAC), October, 1995. 
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It is often practical to consider the numerous names and approaches under a blanket 
heading known as alternative program delivery. The concept of alternative program 
delivery and financing embraces a wide range of activities, some of which are familiar 
while others constitute more recent innovations. What is a new occunence is that 
contemporary political governments appear not only to have the political will, but also 
popular support for significant policy and program changes. Two additional developments 
have served to make the search for alternatives even more compelling. The first is that 
citizens are more demanding about the quality of service they receive. Second, 
governments are in a good position to respond to these demands because of the 
opportunities created through emerging technology. 132 
KPMG in "Canadian Governments and the Search For Alternative Program Delivery and 
Financing,• groups different program delivery and financing alternatives into three broad 
categories. These groupings are reflected in Table 2. 
132/bid., page 2. 
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Table 2133 
Grouping Program Delivery and F1nanclng Alternatives 
Finding New Management 
• devolution 
• privatization 
• elimination 
• mergers 
Internal Changes 
• new leadership, culture and expectations 
• new organizational structures and processes 
• increased productivity with new infonnation technologies 
• shared systems or contracting out the systems 
• improved financial management 
External Changes 
• commercialization and cost recovery 
• shifting administrative instruments 
• private or public partnerships to improve delivery 
• contracting out service delivery 
Some alternative delivery initiatives, titled Finding New Management in Table 2, shift 
the ultimate responsibility for restructuring to the private sector, to other governments, 
to new management within the public service, or they eliminate a function without 
working to fmd any substitute. Another category of initiatives, Internal Changes, groups 
1331bid., page 3. 
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those attempts to improve the internal organizational frameworks within government in 
which programs are delivered. This may involve appointing new leaders, adopting new 
organizational structures or taking advantage of new information technology, shared 
systems or approaches to financial management. Such reforms may not be visible to 
clients and citizens, but may improve the effectiveness and efficiency of operations. A 
final set of alternatives provides visible changes to clients and citizens in the form of user 
fees, different instruments for delivering programs (i.e. shifting from subsidies to tax 
credits), or relying on different providers to deliver services. 
The program delivery groupings are relevant to this chapter as the Alberta government 
is devolving authority for child and family services to Local Authorities. Coinciding with 
this development is the increased utilization of privatization and cost recovery projects, 
private and public partnerships to deliver programs, as well as contracting out the actual 
delivery of child welfare services. A more indepth evaluation will be found in Chapter 
S, which will explore what alternative service delivery may mean for social services. 
The remainder of this chapter is a case study which provides an overview to the changes 
that are proposed in Alberta. The implementation stage has yet to begin, therefore the 
chapter focuses on the process involved in the design of the new community based model 
of social program delivery. Conclusions are made at the end of the chapter that tie some 
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of the proposed changes ta concems related to decenttalized models of social service 
provision. 
Background to DecentraliZDlion In Alberta 
The province of Alberta is widely acknowledged to be a leader in the downsizing and 
reshaping of govemment.1" Despite the ambitious refonn of government, there is no 
central coordinating point pushing for alternative delivery. The budgetary goals adopred 
by the government encourage each department to pursue change differently. Several 
government services are being privatized or provided through outsourcing and partnership 
agreements. It is in the context of massive restructuring and rethinking of how the 
government of Alberta is going to provide its services, that the decentralization initiatives 
emerged. 
In November 1993, the Government of Alberta appoinred a C(lU!missioner of Services 
for Children with a mandate to design a new integrared, 135 more effective and 
134Jn 1993, the number of government departments was reduced from 23 to 17. 
Moreover, SO agencies, boards. commissions and funds will have been merged or 
disbanded by Matcii, 1996. 
135
"1..aying the Foundation., A Guide for PJaooing Children's Services in Alberta,• 
Handbook 1, Office of the Commissioner of Services for Children., Province of 
Alberta, June 1995, defines integrared service delivery as bringing all levels of 
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community-based system of support to children and families. The appointment of the 
CQmmissioner was the first step in the change process intended to be fundamental in its 
impact on expenditures, structures, services and outcomes. The main thrusts of the 
reforms include: 
• clear provincial policy direction, high expectations, and a spirit of innovation, 
creativity and re-invention; 
• reduction of the kinds of services delivered directly by government - a clear 
rationale is required for those services that the government continues to deliver; 
• value for money - elimination of wasteful or unnecessary administration or 
activity; 
• existing organintions, structures, agencies and even services may no longer be 
necessary, affordable or desirable. 136 
The decision to redesign services for children and families is not just a component of a 
broad government reform initiative. It is a response to a growing dissatisfaction with the 
inability of service systems to adapt and respond to the needs of children and families. 
government, private, non-profit, and volunteer services together at the community 
level to minimi:ze duplication of effort and improve access for, and responsiveness to, 
children and families in need (page 31). 
136Qffice of the Commissioner of Services for Children, "Planning and 
Implementing A New Approach To Services For Children and Families, Beginning 
The Transition," Province of Alberta, page 1. 
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"For some time government, service organizations and individuals have 
recognized the need for fundamental changes to the way we provide 
children's services. Over the years governments have assumed more 
and more responsibility for 'solving' social problems. "137 
106 
The remainder of this section describes the Alberta provincial government's logic in 
determining the need and extent of the reforms. This information has been presented in 
order to provide an overview of the process leading up to the implementation and will 
be more fully evaluated in Chapter 5. 
The Alberta government announced that the growth in government services has 
reinforced an assumption that more means better ... that as more programs are created, 
and more resources are assigned to those programs, this should unquestionably lead to 
better quality of life. The belief is part of the assumption that the result of the growth in 
government services has been a growing dependence on government when what parents 
need, in the majority of cases, is help in developing their capacity to help themselves. 
It has been argued, in fact, that as economic and social factors have taken their toll on 
the family, so have the very systems and services which have been established to help 
children and families. 
1370ffice of the Commissioner of Services for Children, "Focus On Children: A 
Plan For Effective, Integrated Community Services For Children and Their Families," 
Government of Alberta, November 1994, page 3. 
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This view holds that the helping professions and the government's service systems have 
unwittingly helped to undermine the family, and have created obstacles to strengthening 
the family and the community. The professionals who work within the child and family 
service systems, particularly large ones, provide solutions that often tend to be 
inadvertently imposed, rather than developed with families. In the process, families may 
well receive the message that they are powerless and incapable of finding their own 
solutions. What families need, in the majority of cases, is help in developing their 
capacity to help themselves. 
The existing service system also tends to focus on individuals to the exclusion of the 
family and extended family. This approach fails to acknowledge that the family situation 
is often part of the child's problem, and it conveys the powerful and harmful message 
that the family is irrelevant. In many cases, in order to help a child, it is necessary to 
address issues and problems of the family as a whole. The "child within the family" and 
the "family within the community" are the new focuses of Alberta's services. 
The current system in Alberta includes of range of services provided to children and 
families through government departments, schools, social service agencies, health 
centres, the justice system, volunteer and other organizations. The underlying assumption 
to the change in Alberta is that incremental adjustments will no longer yield the required 
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levels of improvement in quality and cost-effectiveness. Nor will they improve the well-
being of families in Albert.a. The government of Albert.a believed it necessary to redesign 
their approach to providing services. 
Between December 1993 and June 1994, more than 3,300 Albertans, from 65 
communities, provided their views on children's services to the Commissioner. The 
Commissioner's office and interim working groups held approximately 250 meetings 
across the province. In addition to these meetings, Albertans made 212 submissions to 
the Commissioner. The findings of the consultations are detailed in a background paper 
called "Finding a Better Way: The Consultations and Research leading to the Redesign 
of Children's Services in Alberta.• 
The consultations indicated overwhelming public support to transform the existing system 
so that it provides co11111111nity-managed, integrated and more prevention-focused services. 
In fact, the consultations focused on the fact that communities are in a much better 
position than large government organi7.:1tions to understand the needs of children and 
fmnilies, and to design tlext"ble, effective responses to those needs. Government, the 
consultations concluded, should restrict its activities to developing overall policy, setting 
service standards, monitoring results and providing adequate and equitable funding for 
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community delivery of services.138 In addition, Albertans also indicated that integrated 
planning and delivery of children's services would reduce the fragmentation and gaps in 
current services. If services were made easily accessible, and were provided through a 
"one-window" access, professional staff could respond with more creativity to the needs 
of children and families. 
Another major goal of community based children's services should be enhanced 
prevention and early intervention services. Families need help before they reach crisis, 
and before the family's resources are completely exhausted. Early intervention helps 
communities become more self-reliant and successful in solving problems before they 
escalate. 
As Alberta is a multi-cultural province, effective services must acknowledge the diversity 
of cultures and recognize that there are many different traditional views of the family. 
While only nine percent of Alberta children are Aboriginal, almost fifty percent of the 
children in the care of Child Welfare are Aboriginal. Children in Aboriginal communities 
experience a higher incidence of health problems and disabilities, as well as a lower level 
of educational attainment. The Commissioner was told very clearly that current services 
have not been successful in improving the health and well-being of Aboriginal children. 
138/bid., pages 3 and 4. 
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Aboriginal people shared the same goal of integrated and community-based services. 
They expressed that programs must value their culture and be sensitive to local situations 
and conditions. Involvement with Aboriginal people must also recognize their self-
government objectives. Many Aboriginal communities noted that they want to move 
toward governing their own children's services. 139 
As well as consulting with Albertans, the Commissioner researched other areas, and 
assessed the strengths and weaknesses of various approaches. Jurisdictions from across 
Canada, the United States and other parts of the world face the same challenges with 
respect to social policy. In Alberta's assessment of other jurisdictions, they concluded 
that the jurisdictions that have tried to improve social services by simply promoting co-
ordination and by adding more programs to the existing mix of government services, 
have not been successful. 
A key component to effective change, in their opinion, appears to involve actually 
integrating policy development and the delivery of social services. The purpose of 
integration is to remove organizational barriers, budget conflicts and gaps in services. 
Another finding from the experience of other jurisdictions is the importance of involving 
communities and parents in the redesign of service delivery. To be successful, service 
1391bid., page S. 
111 
Decentralir.ed Social Services - Chapter 3 
redesign requires shared responsibility for setting service goals and delivering services. 
It must also allow for a wide variation in the content of local initiatives. Finally, research 
into other jurisdictions also noted the critical role that evaluation plays in service 
redesign. The only true measure of success is positive results for children and families. 
The volume of services, is not by itself, a measure of success. 
The Proposal For DecentraliZJJlion and AllemaJive Service Delivery140 
Following months of consultation and research, Mike Cardinal, Minister of Family and 
Social Services in Alberta, announced a new approach to delivering children's services. 
The key points to the approach are that: 
• communities have the best understanding of their local needs for children's and 
family services; 
• communities can play a valuable, positive role in planning and delivering their 
own children's services; and, 
• communities want responsibility for children and family services. 141 
140J:or an overview of the milestones in the decentralization process please see 
Appendix A. 
"'Officer of the Commissioner of Services for Children, "Laying the Foundation, 
A Guide For Planning Children's Services In Alberta," Handbook 1, Province of 
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To support the new way of providing services, the government will establish 17 service 
areas (See Appendix B) with boundaries the same as the Regional Health Authorities. 
Within each service area, a Regional Steering Committee will be appointed to co-ordinate 
a community planning process to develop a Service Plan for the region. Based on the 
Service Plan, a Local Children's Service Authority will be established to administer the 
new system in the region. 
Four areas of change were identified to effectively redesign children's services: 
community delivery, early intervention, Aboriginal services, and integrated services. The 
first area of change, community direction, means that government will gradually move 
out of the direct delivery of children's services. Communities will assume this role 
through a transition period that is estimated to take three years. 142 Communities include 
service recipients, family members, and concerned citizens and they should be involved 
in all aspects of planning, decision making, service delivery and monitoring. This 
includes the development of processes which involve family and community members in 
critical decisions about children, particularly where these decisions may result in the 
removal of a child from family or community. 
Alberta, June 1995, page 6. 
142See Table 3. Source: Province of Alberta, Provincial Budget 1995. 
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Table 3. Province of Alberta, Cblld Welfare Budget143 
, 
1994·95 1995·96 1996·97 
164M 
65% 
176 M 188M 
- Services Delivered by Govemment 
Se!Vlces oerwered by Community 
•Government will remain responsible for 
Policy, Legislation, Monitoring & Evaluation 
1997·98 
192M 
* 
14Source: Province of Alberta, Provincial Budget, 1995. 
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Government will assist communities to plan, integrate and monitor children's services 
and continue to be responsible for legislation, standards, funding, monitoring and 
evaluation. An emphasis will be placed on providing services to children in their own 
families and communities. The Action Plan proposes that new Local Authorities be 
established for designing and managing all children's services in their area. Agencies 
should deliver these services based on contracts tendered through an open, competitive 
process. In order to test new program ideas, pilot projects should also be funded. 
Early prevention, was identified as a second key area of action. Early intervention 
programs will be created to reach out to children and families before a crisis occurs. A 
key element of this proposal is that families and communities are expected to help and 
support each other to ensure children and youth remain safe and healthy. Energies must 
be redirected to help families in a proactive way, rather than through crisis intervention. 
The province of Alberta has committed to Early Intervention Program funding over the 
next three years. Half of the funding will go to programs for Aboriginal children. 
For Aboriginal families, programs involving community heaHng circles and the 
participation of elders have also demonstrated their effectiveness. By increasing early 
intervention programs over the next three years, there will potentially be a significant 
reduction in the number of children in care in residential facilities, foster homes, 
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correctional centres and group homes. The cost savings in these areas over the next three 
years should be redirected to early intervention programs. In the long tenn, effective 
early intervention programniing will reduce the overall costs of providing children's 
services. 144 
Closely related to early prevention programs is the third key area, Aboriginal services. 
The planning and delivery of children's services will be more culturally sensitive with 
greater involvement from Aboriginal C(\IDJ!1lmities. Coordinated programming and close 
working relationships will be encouraged between all Aboriginal people and Regional 
Steering Committees. 
Finally, the fourth important area of action is integrated services. By imegrating 
children's services at the community, regional and provincial level, the diverse needs of 
children will be better met. Integrating services will improve access, responsiveness and 
will reach goals not achievable by one group alone. 
1
"Commissioner of Services for Children, "Focus on Children, A Plan for 
Effective, Integrated Community Services For Children and Their Families,• Province 
of Albena, November, 1994, page 11. 
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Structures1a 
Community Working Groups 
These are the groups that will develop a preliminary service plan for their communities, 
First Nation communities, settlements, or areas of a city within each of the 17 regions. 
The process can be taken on by existing groups or new groups that will have to be 
established. Working groups may include: children and families; children and family 
advocates; elders; clients (current and previous); community representatives from various 
geographical points within a region; trained professionals who work with children; 
contract service providers, their networks and associations; community volunteers and 
board members; donors, charity board members and representatives from not-for-profit 
organizations; sponsors and funding bodies for programs and services; organizations that 
provide training; professional organizations; cultural, spiritual and religious 
organizations; and, business. 
145 
"Redesign of Children's Services, A Precis; • Office of the Commissioner of 
Services for Children and Families, Province of Alberta, January, 1996; and "Laying 
the Foundation, A Guide for Planning Children's Services in Alberta,• Handbook l, 
Office of the Commissioner of Services for Children, Province of Alberta, June, 
1995. 
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Phase 1: The Preliminary Service Plan 
The beginning of the service planning process involves a detailed analysis of each 
community in the region. The focus must be on the needs of children and families. 
The process involves community working groups developing a plan which: 
i. determines vision, goals, outcomes and action plan for the region; 
i. builds on the four key areas of change: community delivecy, early intervention 
programs, Aboriginal services and integrated services; 
i. assesses the current needs and gaps in services for children and families; 
i. ensures community involvement at all levels of service planning including: Who 
was consulted; How communities were consulted; The feedback and 
recommendations received; What effect this consultation had on the plan? 
From the prelimiNry service plans produced by working groups, the Regional Steering 
Committee prepares a preliminary Regional Service Plan and submits it to the Office of 
the Commissioner of Services for Children for review. 146 
146
"Redesign of Children's Services, A Precis, • Office of the Commissioner of 
Services for Children and Families, Province of Alberta, January 1996. 
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Regional Steering Committees, appointed by the Minister of Family and Social Services, 
are resp<>DSJole for developing the service plan for their regions. Their job is to design 
and co--Ordinate a process within their region that engages residents through working 
groups in various communities to propose service plans. 
A Steering Committee, composed of approximately 14 to 17 members including two co. 
chairs appointed by the Commissioner of Services for Children, must establish working 
relationships and communication processes with the working groups that keeps the 
development of plans as open as possible and continually weaves together the work of 
the groups and communities so that a regional plan evolves. The Steering Committee 
must ensure groups are working within a framework of the service planning handbooks, 
legislation and government standards. 
Phase 2: The Regional Service Plan 
Upon approval in principle of the preliminary plan, the Regional Steering Committee will 
develop a service plan which: 
• builds on the Preliminary Plan; 
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• describes the provision of children's services; 
.. ensures compliance with provincial policy and standards; 
.. co-ordinates children's services between regions; 
• co-ordinates children's services with other authorities providing social services 
(e.g. Regional Health Authorities); 
• is within the funding range provided. 
The more detailed service plan for the Redesign of Children's Services at the regional 
level is then submitted to the Commissioner of Services for Children for government 
approval. 147 
Community Facilitators I Aboriginal Facilitators 
The facilitators are employees of the Commissioner of Services for Children. Their role 
is to support the total rlanning process. This includes assisting co-chairs and members 
of Steering Committees and community worlc groups in developing service plans. 
Children's Services Authorities 
Once the service plan has been approved for a region, a Children's Services Authority 
120 
Decentroliud Social Sermn • Chapter 3 
will i:eplace the steering committees and will assume responsibility for developing 
business plans, allocating funds, inviting and evaluating service delivery proposals, 
managing overall services and mahuaining community involvement in identifying 
priorities and refining the planning processes. 
Phase 3: The Business Pkm 
The business plan is the responsibility of Children's Services Authorities. It will outline 
the details of how the service plan will be implemented. Therefore, it will cover the 
following components: types of services and programs and projected outcomes; budgets; 
human resource planning; training; organizational structures; facilities'; specific 
implementation plans including comract management, client involvement, and ongoing 
community input; and, detailed evaluation procedures including outcome 
measw:ements.148 
The quality and delivery of social services have become especially important in this era 
148
"Redesign of Children's Services, A Precis, • Office of the Commissioner of 
Services for Children and Families, Province of Albena, January 1996. 
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of social ttamformation and fisca1 deficits. Most governments have been slow to 
understand the nature of the problem and have reacted with reductions in funding and 
other restraint measures, that are cost-effective but do not respond to n:al needs. Cal!llda 
has a social safety net that was developed in the 1960s to respond to the problems of that 
decade; but it has become increasingly inadequate for the much higher levels of economic 
insecurity that prevails in the 1990s. The answer is not to scrap all of our existing 
programs; it is essential to maintain a social safety net; but there is a need to restructure 
policy and programs to deal with contemporary problems. 
At stake in the ttamformation of how Alberta provides its child and family services is 
the notion of quality and delivery. The Children's Service Authorities (Local Authorities) 
are given the responsibility of developing and implementing business plans and 
det.ermining service providers. The service providers will be contracted by the Local 
Authority to provide child and family services to the communities. Alberta is 
decentralizing social services as well as introducing contracting-out and a variety of other 
alternative service delivery units. In essence, the question is not whether the private 
sector can more cost-effectively deliver a service, their goal is to make a profit, it is 
whether they will provide the best service to the connnunity. Advocates of privati7.ation 
and alternate service delivery will argue that because this organizations must compete, 
the private sector is forced to provide good service in order to win or keep the contract 
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and customers. The shift from public services provided to citizens, to private services 
sold to consumers is a very important paradigm shift and one that will have a large 
impact on public administration. 
This paradigm shift has important implications for universality, standards, and the quality 
of service provided to customers. Overton says that although there is some variation in 
the ways in which the provinces have responded to the federal retrenchment, there are 
also some similarities. All have pursued, albeit at different rateS, privatization, 
voluntarism, and greater local responsibility. Much of the welfare burden has been 
shifted to private charities. 
Food banks, soup kitchens and clothing depots have become institutionalized means of 
meeting human need. In addition to reducing the federal deficit at provincial expense, 
this shift of child and family services from public to private auspices createS a different 
set of government principles for social services.149 Functionalists purport that it does not 
matter if the provision of social services is by public/private or a mix of the two. 
However, the private sector, by relying on charity and voluntarism, cannot ensure that 
people will have adequate income of standard of service. 
1491. Overton, "Dissenting Opinions," Perception, Volume 15, No.l, 1991, pages 
17-21. 
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In sttiving for efficiency, financial accountability, consumer choice, and less dependence 
on the state, Brad MacKenzie argues that CODSWDerS will be expected to purchase 
services from a range of options. This fundamental change is part of the return to a 
residual model of welfare, where government is more concerned with cost-containment 
and accepts responsibility for only those in absolute poverty. t.!O Given the experience of 
Alberta in coping with declining revenues and the political imperative to reduce the scope 
of government, the effects of restraint measures can be perverse.151 Alberta is poised on 
the brink of a major reorganiTiition of the way it provides social services to its citizens. 
Chapter S will propose some of the likely outcomes of such a change. 
UOSrad MacKenzie, "Decemralir.ed Social Services,• Op Cit., page 100. 
151John W. Langford and Kenneth J. Hoffman, "Fear and Ferment, Public Sector 
Management Today,• Pinaman pyblic A4ministration, Volume 29, No. 4, (Winter) 
1996. 
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Milestones: November 1994 - January 1996 
The following are key activities that have taken place since the plan for the Redesign 
of Children's Services was announced in November 1994. 
• The plan to Redesign Children's Services was announced by the Minist.er of 
Family and Social Services. 
The Commissioner of Services For Children was mandated to design a new, 
integrated, more effective and community based S)'Stem of support to children 
and families. 
• Seventeen Planning Regions were established with the same boundaries as 
Regional Health Authorities. 
• Deputy Minist.ers' and Assistant Deputy Minist.ers' Committees of partnering 
departments (Family and Social Services, Health, Justice, F.ducation, 
Community Development, Aboriginal Affairs) were established to provide 
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leadersbip and addn:ss issues. 
.. A series of public meetings across the province explain the redesign initiative 
and invite public participation in the planning process. 
.. A general letter goes out through the media to all interest.ed citizens and 
advises them of the process for selecting oo-cbairs and members of Steering 
Committees in all regions and requests volunteers and nominations. 
.. Steering Committee oo-cbairs were appoint.ed by the Minister for the seventeen 
regions; there is at least one Aboriginal co-chair in each region. 
Service Plan Handbook #1 ("Laying the Foundation: A Guide for Planning 
Children's Services in Alberta") was published. 
.. Baseline information for each of the 17 Planning Regions was published 
("Getting to Know Your Community"). 
Hundreds of volunteers, through existing groups or new working groups set 
up, began to develop preliminary service plans for their communities. 
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.,. Early Intervention Program Funding Guidelines for Children's Services in 
Alberta were announced . 
126 
.,. The Early Intervention Program Funding Guidelines for Children's Services in 
Alberta were announced. 
The Early Intervention Program, Guide Books for Applicants Part 1 and Part 2 
(explanation of program and process for submissions) was published. 
A special RITE long distance number was put into operation for the Early 
Intervention Program • 
.,. A Provincial Advisory Committee was established to guide the development of 
standards for children's services . 
.,. Approximately 100 applicants were invited to submit detailed proposals for 
funding under the Early Intervention Program . 
.,. Members of Regional Steering Committees were appointed and initial 
orientations were conducted. 
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" In September, 1995 a newsletter was established to provide updates on what is 
happening in the redesign of children's services across the regions and through 
the Commissioner's office. 
A Council of Regions was established in October 1995 to provide advice to the 
Commissioner concerning the redesign of children's services. There was 
representation from each of the 17 planning regions. 
" The first issue of the newsletter "Focus on Children" was distributed in 
November 1995. 
" To date, 29 applicants have been approved for funding under the Early 
Intervention Program. The successful applicants represent different regions of 
the province. 
" Enabling legislation to provide for the establishment of Children's Services 
Authorities is being prepared in consultation with partnering departments and 
Steering Committees. It is expected to be tabled in April, 1996. 
Source: "Redesign of Children's Services Precis, • Office of the Commissioner of 
Services for Children and Families,• Province of Alberta, January, 1996. 
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Appendix B 
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Introduction 
As noted in Chapter 2, social policies in Canada have largely been developed in national 
and provincial governmental frameworks, yet their consequences are played out and 
experienced in local communities. m Local governments are cummdy not responsible to 
any great extent for the design of social policy for their citizens. An ill-fit between 
national policies and the people they are designed to serve is well-illustrated at the local 
level, especially for First Nations people. High levels of unemployment, marked 
dependencies on income transfers, high suicide rates among First Nations' youth, as well 
as the increasing numbers that are incarcerated by the justice system are all examples of 
the inappropriateness of federal and provincial policies to First Nations people. "Native 
peoples have struggled against sustained attempts by the state to reduce their status ..• 
and against the persistent inability of Canadians generally to appreciate their unique 
position. • IS3 
This chapter proposes the idea that First Nations' social problems, with specific regards 
to child welfare, are best dealt with at the local level by community members who are 
IS2J3rian Wharf, Cnmmpniries and Social Policy In Canada, (Toronto: McClelland & 
Stewart) 1992, page 20. 
153Frances Abele, and Daiva Stasiulis, "Canada as a 'White Settler Colony': What 
About Natives and Immigrants?" The NeW Qnn'i11p Political f&ononw, Wallace 
Clement and Glen Williams(ed.s), 1989, page 240. 
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capable of ascertaining the needs and concerns of their people and implementing practical 
consensual solutions through self-government initiatives. The argument is made that while 
the delivery of child and family services could be more integrated and inclusive under 
future First Nation self-government, the dual-bilateral and tri-partite system of social 
service policy development and delivery in Manitoba, bas social, political, jurisdictional 
and financial problems. These need to be closely examined in order to provide for 
meaningful community solutions. 
A community-based model of government, that includes the voices of women in the 
decision-making processes, would be a step in acknowledging the important social and 
political contributions that women have to make. 154 In reviewing some of the current 
problems of the Native CFS agencies, this chapter suggests that the dominant patriarchal 
non-Aboriginal culture shapes First Nations leaders' opinions about the role women play 
in their communities. The result bas been a polarization pitting social concerns against 
political aspirations. As a case study of decentralization of social services, the chapter 
provides a glimpse of some of the problems associated with community delivered child 
welfare programs. It focuses on the process by which First Nation Child and Family 
Service Agencies were given the mandate to deliver child welfare services and more 
specifically on the power struggles that can arise when local governments are given 
154 Personal Interview with Kathy Mallett, director of Original Women's Network of 
Winnipeg, January 13, 1995. 
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control of implementing social service policy. While some of these problems have been 
exacerbated by the political sttuggle First Nation communities face in achieving self-
government, it is worthwhile to examine and evaluate (Chapter 5) these issues. 
First NaJions Women and Self Government 
Since the early 1980s in Manitoba, social services have undergone a transformation with 
regard to First Nation children. There had been significant concern displayed over the 
high number of Native children removed from their homes and placed in white foster 
care or adopted into white homes in what has now been referred to as the "sixties 
sweep. "1" The response to the outrage and politicization of these events by Native 
women's groups was the decentralization of child and family se~ces in the early 1980s 
and the creation of regional Native Child and Family Service (CFS) agencies (see 
Appendix A for a current list of Manitoba's Native CFS agencies). Tripartite or dual-
bilateral agreements156 were drawn up between the federal government, provincial 
155 Report of the First Nation's Child and Family Task Force, "Children First Our 
Responsibility," Manitoba, November 1993, page 15. 
156 Agreements signed with First Nation Regional Agencies have generally taken the 
form of a tripartite agreement involving the federal government, the provincial 
government and the First Nation Tribal Council. In the early 1980s, before policy was 
established, the Dakota Ojibway Tribal Council entered into two complementary but 
separate bilateral agreements with the province of Manitoba and the federal government. 
Thus, the term "dual-bilateral" was established to refer to this form of agreement. 
133 
Decentralized Social Services - Chapter 4 
government, and First Nation communities, giving these agencies the mandate to provide 
child and family services in their geographical jurisdictions. 157 The perceived solution to 
the problems that contributed to the cultural genocide of First Nations was the 
implementation of provincial social policies by First Nation regional agencies. 
These political and social changes have often been considered a part of the larger project 
for First Nation self-government in Manitoba, and have had an enormous impact on the 
personal lives of the people residing in the communities. Aboriginal women's groups, 
social workers, bureaucrats, academics and journalists have all asked questions 
concerning the social implications of the move toward First Nation self-government, 
especially as it relates to women and children. This chapter, in addressing the need for 
community development initiatives, will discuss a few of the pressing issues which 
surround the current system of First Nation delivery of Child and Family Services. It will 
be noted how certain problems could either be intensified or resolved through the ttue 
self-government and the dismantling of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development (DIANO) in Manitoba. Particular attention will be paid to the concerns of 
First Nation women that have been expressed through interviews conducted in research 
157 The one exception to this rule has been the Sagkeeng First Nation which has been 
practising non-mandated Child and Family services to the community of Fort Alexander 
since the 1970s and falls under the authority of the Eastman provincial regional office 
(a non-native CFS regional office). 
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for this paper. 158 
To date, there bas been little credence or academic attention paid to First Nation 
women's control over social services or input into self-government initiatives. Native 
women's groups have been vocal in their criticism of self-government where it entails 
the further domination of First Nation men over the lives of women and children. 159 They 
want the opportunity to have their voices included to balance the social requirements of 
their families and the politics of self-government. 160 
The basis of this chapter is an analysis of current literature, interviews with 
representatives from First Nations child welfare agencies, First Nations women, First 
Nations leaders, as well as the provincial and federal bureaucrats directly involved in the 
restoration of jurisdictions through the dismant1ing of DIAND. Through this assessment, 
a better understanding is gained of the social and political communities that have 
· 
158The author interviewed 22 First Nation women from a variety of First Nation 
communities. The women were contacted by the author with the assistance of the 
Indigenous Women's Collective, and live in a number of different First Nation 
communities throughout Manitoba. While the selection was not completely random, the 
opinions attnbuted to interviews are those of these women and not the author. Their 
names have not been included in the bibliography so as to protect their anonymity. 
Throughout the text, the interviews will be referred to numerically. 
159J>ersonal Interview with Kathy Mallett, director of the Original Women's Network 
of Winnipeg, January 13, 1995. 
160Jnterviews with First Nation women, interview numbers 1-20. 
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developed with regards to First Nations' social service delivery and the negative impact 
the social and political divisions have had on members of First Nation communities. 
The Dismantling of DIAND 
The concept of self-government emerges from Native history and aspirations. Native 
peoples have a unique political and constitutional position, 161 "yet they recognize that 
their marginality can only be dealt with by capturing a degree of political power which, 
has hitherto, been denied them. "162 Throughout the period of political and administrative 
subordination to the federal government, First Nations have retained strong memories of 
political independence; moreover, the bitter experiences of colonialism have kept alive 
in their souls a vision of self-determination - a sovereign government by their people. 163 
The claim for self-government is that it is an inherent right, pre-existing the arrival of 
Europeans and the cultural, political and economic domination that followed. 
For First Nation people, the self in self-government means more than delivering 
161Frances Abele and Daiva Stasiulis, Op Cit., page 241. 
1621ohn Loxley, "The Great Northern Plan,• Studies in Political Economy, No. 6, 
(Autumn) 1981, page 162. 
163Menno Boldt, Suryiving as Indians: The Challenge of Self-Government, (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press) 1993, pages 87-88. 
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programs and administering policies designed by other governments and non-Aboriginal 
people. 164 It means defining, through the practice of policy development and 
implementation, how First Nation governments can be used to come to terms with 
important problems and objectives in Native communities. 165 To administer the programs 
as designed and financed through a residual model of social welfare166 is to merely 
replace the existing non-Aboriginal Department of Indian Affairs with a Native one. 
There is a need to move away from the paternalism167 of the cum:nt system to support 
16'Winnipeg Council of First Nations, •A Position Paper on the Dismantling of The 
Department of Indian Affairs and Urban Self-Government,• Presented at the Assembly 
of Manitoba Chiefs Conference on Self-government, 1994, page 18, notes that the mere 
dismantling of Indian Affairs and systems would not be "self-government" per se, but 
rather •self-administration. • 
165Frank Cassidy, "Aboriginal Governments in Canada: An Emerging Field of 
Study,• Canadian Journal of Political Science, Volume 23, No. 1, 1990, page 80. 
1661n the book, Alternatives to Socia] Assistance in Indian Communities, Frank 
Cassidy, and Shirley B. Seward (eds), lnstimte for Research on Public Policy, 1991, 
there is the assertion (page 4) that cum:nt programs in place to serve First Nation's are 
based on the residual model of social welfare, which is the dominant one in Canadian 
society. The model is keyed to the administration of individualized social assistance 
transfers to people who have failed for whatever reasons to meet the minimal demands 
of the market. The interventionist policies designed by the provincial government with 
regards to child welfare have been constructed in a similar fashion. The simations that 
warranted intervention in the past ended with children being removed, not just from 
homes, but from entire communities. As with social assistance, First Nations have 
asserted that these measures are completely culmrally inappropriate and have demanded 
that a more holistic, community-based approach be adopted. 
167Chief Ovide Mecredi, Alternatives to Social Assistance in Indian Communities, 
Ibid., pages 4-5. 
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for First Nation self-government. 168 According to the director of Ma 
Mawi Wi Chi Itata Centre, George Munroe, the dismantling process also means 
empowering the people in communities to take control over their communities' problems 
and find solutions. 169 It means giving women and children a voice in the development 
process. 
In Manitoba over the last few years, close attention has been paid to issues surrounding 
the dismantling of DIAND and the restoration of jurisdictions through First Nation self-
government. This focus is understandable, given the importance of the agreements. 
Nevertheless, it has shifted attention away from other worthy issues, some of which are 
critical for true self-determination. These areas include CFS and the development of 
delivery of other social services in First Nations communities. Both the ability of a non-
Native government to implement policies and attitudes in First Nation communities 
continue to make it difficult to develop culturally appropriate programs. 
As Vern Morrissette, et al. 170 argue, the process of colonization involves creating 
168/bid., page 8. 
169personal Interview with George Munroe, Director of Ma MaWi, Winnipeg, 
February 15, 1995. 
1
'°Vem Morrissette, Brad McKenzie, and Larry Morrissette, "Towards an Aboriginal 
Model of Social Work Practice Cultural Knowledge and Traditional Practices," Canadian 
Social Worlc Review, Volume 10, No. l, (Winter) 1993, page 94. 
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dependency through: structural measures such as removing Aboriginal people from their 
land through treaties and the implementation of reserve system; cultural measures such 
as displacement of traditional forms of governance with representative democracy and 
an authoritarian model of leadership; social and economic measures such as the creation 
of a welfare economy; and, the devaluation of traditional spiriniality and knowledge 
through the residential school system, the health system and the child welfare system. 
During the course of economic and political development in Manitoba, the foreign 
"white" system imposed itself on the Native economy. The sociopolitical culture as 
determined by non-Native political structures and economic activities became the basis 
of colonialism and colonial relations. 171 The colonial exploitation of Native society over 
the years, resulted in a transformation of the social relationships that caused the 
subjugation of First Nation women. First Nation men in Manitoba became responsible 
for the production of commodities in the fur trade and the development of mercantile 
capitalism and in doing so, assumed the role as provider of the family. First Nation 
women were thus encouraged and even forced to become dependent upon men. 172 The 
171Ron G. Bourgeault, "The Indian, the Metis and the Fur Trade, Classism, Sexism, 
and Racism in the Transition from 'Communism' to Capitalism,• Studies in Political 
f&onomy, No.5, 1981, page 50. 
1121bid., page 55. For an indepth review see Sylvia Van Kirk, Many Tender Ties: 
Wonien in the Fur Tra<le Socjety. 1671-1870 (Winnipeg: Watson & Dwyer Publishing 
Ltd), 1980. 
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Indigenous Women's Collective of Manitoba noted in their "Report on the Discussion of 
the Inherent Right to Self-Government,• that 
the role of the political order of European societies lay in the positions 
held by men who owned property, and their ability to generate a strong 
financial position for themselves. This role did not require the 
involvement of women. In fact, women and children were considered 
part of the property held by men. 173 
Morrissette et al. make the connection between the colonization policies of the Canadian 
government on First Nation's people and the adoption of a colonial attitude among 
elements of the Aboriginal community itself. They state that "this [bas] contributed to the 
high level of internalized violence within Aboriginal communities, particularly against 
women and children, and the failure of Aboriginal leaders to address this issue 
adequately. "174 Therefore, First Nation women are not only battling the non-Native 
society for respect and recognition of their concerns, they must also fight for these issues 
with men in their own communities. 
While Morrissette and his colleagues develop an understanding of colonialization and its \ . 
impact upon First Nations communities, they do not address the patriarchal overtones that 
are both implicit and explicit in policies such as the Indian Act and the effects that these 
1731ndigenous Women's Collective of Manitoba, Inc., "Report on the Discussion of 
the Inherent Right to Self-Government,• submitted by Courchene, Eileen Joyce, 
September, 1994, page 6. 
11
'Morrissette, et al., Op Cil., page 94. 
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influences have bad upon First Nation men and their attitudes towards women. Sections 
of the Indian Act coniinue to refuse women the right to own reserve housing or property. 
By assigning a male as head of the household, The Act naturally suboidinates the woman 
and makes her dependent upon a man for subsistence.175 
"Women have never been completely excluded from public life; but, the way in which 
women are included is grounded., as firmly as their position in the domestic sphere, in 
patriarchal beliefs and practices. *176 The band councils and Indian government struclUres 
in place are creations of the federal government for the pUipOse of administering federal 
transfers and programs. These structures are completely rooted in the colonial and 
patriarchal traditions of the Indian Act, and serve to generally exclude women from 
having a political voice within their communities. The conditions of unrestrained power 
and an atmosphere of no-rules was engendered by generations of colonialism, the Indian 
Agent and the Indian Act. When the Indian Agents left communities, many First Nation 
leaders were thrust into positions of power within their communities and nations with a 
virtual blank cheque on decision-making in the community .111 
1
"15Carol Pateman, "The Public/Private Dichotomy,• The Disorder of Wgmen 
(Standford, California: Stanford University Press) 1989, page 123. While Pateman is not 
specifically referring to these cin:umstances, she develops the theory of the universal 
dichotomy between private and public in civil society itself. 
116/bid., page 132. 
111James Wastasecoot, The First Pmpective, April, 1995, page 2. 
\ 
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John Loxley, in *The Great Northern Plan,• discusses the replacement of the Indian 
Agent by Native federal employees. By virtue of their new position they now occupy a 
contradictory position within their communities.178 They are mainly male employees who 
hold positions of authority as granted bY the federal government, but are not policy-
makers. The conflicting pressures of the state's desire for accountability and the 
comrrnmities' need for more flexibility in policies and financial spending, places these 
people in a nebulous position. They may be considered part of a neo-colonialist agenda 
because they are respollSll>le for the implementation of state policies and programs, while 
they also struggle to appear responsive to their own communities. 
In many communities, the male-dominated Native leadership has hidden and perpetuated 
problems of child abuse. 119 In order for problems of violence and abuse to be addressed 
at a community level, a zero tolerance policy on violence must be adopted by the chiefs 
and councillors. Sharon Carstairs, former Liberal Party leader of Manitoba, stated that 
"the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs (AMC) has got to be more open about what is 
happening on reserves. Collective rights end up being only the rights of its male 
178Jobn Loxley, Op Cit. 
11
'Dave Rider, "Native Kids Can't Be Protected,• The Winnipeg Sun. Tuesday, May 
26, 1992, page S. Also discussed in interviews with Kathy Mallett, Director of the 
Original Women's NetWork, January 13, 1995 and social workers from Anishinaabe 
Child and Family Services and West Region Child and Family Services, February 14, 
1995. 
\ 
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members. "180 It is not enough to simply restore jurisdictional authority to First Nations' 
governments. A process of empowerment for women and their communities will need 
to occur to allow for true community development and the acceptance of responsibility 
for current problems. While these problems have been the result of policies of 
paternalism, subordination and colonialism, all community members need to work 
together to ascertain solutions that will help communities and people to heal. 
The restoration of jurisdictions to First Nations is, in essence, a political step towards 
self-government. The Framework Agreement, signed on December 7, 1994, occurred 
with the objective of establishing a formal, binding process between the Minister 
[DIAND) and the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs for the purpose of restoring to First 
Nations governments the jurisdictions consistent with the inherent right to self-
government.181 The dismantling of DIAND is symbolically important for the communities 
and the AMC, as complete administrative control will be transferred from the federal 
government to the communities. However, for the Chief and Councillors in First Nation 
communities to be more than administrators of other governments' policies, they need 
the authority to pass their own laws and policies within their jurisdictions. Furthermore, 
1
"'Ruth Teichroeb, "Child Protection the 'Big Issue,' Mccrae Asserts," ~ 
Winnipeg Free Press, January 6, 1992. 
181
"Framework Agreement: The Dismantling of DIANO, the Restoration of 
Jurisdictions to First Nations Peoples in Manitoba and Recognition of First Nations 
Governments in Manitoba,• December 7, 1994, Winnipeg. 
143 
DecentTalized Sodal Services • Chapter 4 
the political symbolism of the dismantling process needs to be juxtaposed against the 
patriarcbal systems existing in many communities, where political interference into social 
affairs by First Nation leadership is commonplace. 182 
It is the lived reality of First Nation women that they, J1101'1' so than the men in the 
communities, are involved with local and provincial authorities whose jurisdictions 
include health, education and child welfare.183 Not only have these areas been perceived 
by the political leadership in provincial and federal govermnlIDtal structures as 
appropriate for women, it has enforced a structural reality on the role First Nation 
women play in their own communities. Kathleen Jamieson has articulated that First 
Nations women experience multiple jeopardy: they are women, and tbey are Native. 
They not only face white male governments but also male-dominated Native 
organizations.184 For women to have a role in self-government and for communities to 
be troly involved in development initiatives they need to free themselves from the social • 
political division that has been imposed upon them by a colonist society and work to 
overcome the dichotomy. Women need to be perceived as having an important role to 
182Expressed in interviews 1-16; 19-22. 
10Expressed in all 22 interviews. 
184Katbleen Jamieson, "Multiple Jeopardy: The Evolution of a Native Women's 
Movement," At!aptis, Volume 4, Number 2, 1979, pages 157-178. 
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play in community development and be accorded equality in treatment and attitudes. 185 
The Current Child Welfare System 
This section reviews some of the problems that are inherent in the current Native child 
welfare system in Manitoba. First, the problems surrounding constitutional responsibility 
are noted; next, the conflicts between centralization and decentralization are introduced; 
then the need to define an urban mandate is discussed; and finally, this section overviews 
the over-riding financial implications of the dismantling process and the need to make 
social considerations politically relevant. While a few of these factors could be resolved 
through the dismantling process and the restoration of jurisdictions, others could be 
intensified if credence is not given to their existence. Unresolved constitutional and 
jurisdictional issues are over-riding concerns. These include the federal government's 
devolution of responsibilities to the province for standards' maintenance and child welfare 
policy development, and arguments over who is ultimately responsible for First Nations' 
families and children. Obviously, the objective of self-government is to resolve these 
constitution and jurisdictional issues. What this essentially means is that the current 
jurisdictional wars will be solved when First Nations regain control and authority over 
185Indigenous Women's Collective of Manitoba, Inc, "Repon on the Indigenous 
Women's Perspective in Manitoba for the Royal Commission on Aboriginal People's,• 
submitted by McKay, Celeste, August, 1993. This report provides a synopsis of 
Indigenous women's viewpoints on self-government and other initiatives. 
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their own lives. 
While the federal government bas consistently refused to pass Indian child welfare 
legislation, 186 it still retains exclusive constitutional authority to enact legislation with 
respect to First Nations. Section 91 (24) of the Constitution Act of 1867, gives exclusive 
legislative authority for Indians and lands reserved for Indians to the federal government 
and the federal government bas used this in the past to enact The Indian Act. This 
relationship was also referred to in section 35 of the Constitution Act of 1982, which 
affirmed Aboriginal and treaty rights. The Indian Act, with the exception of education 
and limited health regulations, is silent on social services. Section 88 permits provincial 
laws of general application to apply to Indians on the Reserves, unless these laws are 
inconsistent with federal legislation. Provinces legislate under section 92( 13) of the 
Constitutional Act of 1867, which sets out the provinces exclusive jurisdiction in property 
and civil rights. Although the federal government bas the constitutional authority to enact 
special legislation in Indian child welfare matters, it chooses not to do so, as child 
welfare is considered to be a provincial responsibility. The policy of the Department of 
Indian Affairs bas been to secure agreements with the provinces and the territories to 
186personal interview with senior provincial civil servant, Department of Family 
Services, February 13, 1995. 
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deliver child welfare services on reserves. 181 
While the provincial government is responsible for provision and service standards with 
regards to First Nation child welfare, the federal government provides the financial 
support for child welfare in First Nation communities. The provinces and the federal 
government currently do not agree over which level of government is responsible for 
funding child welfare initiatives for First Nation families off-reserve. Child welfare is 
provided primarily by the provincial government, but is partially financed by the federal 
government through the Can81ia Health and Social Transfer. Chief Dennis Pashe notes 
"that the lack of resources and services which denies healing ... is the result of a game 
of political football played between the federal and provincial governments. "188 
The jurisdictional complexities for the provision of social services to First Nation's 
peoples have resulted in the fmgmentation of many programs. The federal position that 
services and programs to . Natives residing in First Nation communities must be 
accommodated within existing federal-provincial jurisdictional arrangements and practiCes 
has resulted in gaps in programs and services. With regards to child welfare, provinces 
187Jlarbara Pimento, "Native Families in Jeopardy - The Child Welfare System in 
Canada,• Occasional Papers in Social Policy Analysis, No 11, Department of Sociology 
in &lucation, Toronto, 1985, page 1. 
188Chief Dennis Pashe, "Debit Audit Seen as a Ploy,• Winnipeg Free Press. 
Thursday, February 9, 1995, page A7. 
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have enforced their statutes in such matters as custody and removal of children from First 
Nation commUDities, while non-statutory services, such as counselling and family support 
have been available inconsistently to Native families who live in First Nation 
commUDities. 189 Further problems have arisen because Ottawa and the province both 
refuse to assume financial responsibility for non-mandated services in the commUDities. 
Therefore, while there is adequate funding for crisis intervention into families, there is 
little or no funding for prevention-related activities. 190 
Federal preference has been for the delivery of social services through institutions . 
accredited under provincial jurisdiction191 or to provincial standards as is the case with 
child welfare. 192 The approach developed in Manitoba required that First Nation's 
regional agencies meet the provinces service delivery standards and implement provincial 
policies on child welfare. Native agencies are incorporated through agreements with the 
province and the federal government that are either tripartite or dual-bilateral. They 
189Gary Schaan, "Holistic Social and Health Services in Indian CommUDities, • edited 
Johnson, Andrew, McBride, Stephen, et al, in Continuities and Discontinuities The 
Political Economy of Social Welfare and Labour Marlcet Policv in Canada, (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press) 1994, page 114. 
190Jnterview with a social worker for West Region Child and Family Services, 
February 14, 1995. 
191For more information on this see J. S. Frideres, Native People in Canada: 
Contemporary Conflicts, (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall) 1988, pages 260-295. 
19Z(Jary Schaan, Op Cit., page 114. 
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receive their mandate through an order-in-council. As the situation currently stands, all 
of the iegional agency agreements have expired (they were originally for three years) 
with the exception of the Cree Child and Family Caring Agency which signed an 
agreement in 1993. 
While the tripartite or dual-bilateral agreements are required in the existing legislation, 193 
they are not actually the incorporating instruments. An order-in-council and a subsequent 
schedule allows the Minister, with the approval of Cabinet, to enter into agreemems with 
Native bands or tnOal councils for the incorporation of the band or council to become 
an agency and provide services under the Child Welfare Ac:t. Although the schedule 
allows for individual bands to form child welfare agencies, the province prefers to sign 
with tribal councils.194 The provincial rationale behind not mandating individual bands 
to implement provincial child welfare practices is that there is more service 
accountability, policy coordination and economy of scale with regional boards.195 
CUrrently, seven regional agencies exist in the province of Manitoba: Cree Child and 
1
"Govemment of Manitoba, The Child and Family Services Act, 138/91, amended 
December 1, 1993, outlines the, agencies incorporated to fu.lfil the provincial child 
welfare mandate. ' 
194'fhe one exception to this was the creation of Awasis which involved three tnOal 
councils and three independent First Nation communities. 
195J>ersonal Interview with senior provincial civil servant, Department of Family 
Services, February 13, 1995. 
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Family Caring Agency; Awasis; West Region; Anishinaabe; lntertribal; South-F.ast; and 
Dakota Ojibwa. (See Appendix B for a map and geographical picture of each agency's 
mandate area). 
The term jurisdiction is used by the provincial government to defme the geographical 
area for which CFS agencies are mandated. In the case of CFS agencies, the term is used 
to denote the First Nations' claims for service provision for its membership for the 
purpose of administering the child protection mandate.196 The current system, while an 
improvement over the past white centralized CFS system, should not be taken as a . 
concme example of First Nation self-government. The policies are still the outputs of 
the government of Manitoba even though they allow for some cultural flexibility. In the 
current system, accountability is generally directed to the government, not to the people 
in the communities.197 With a primary financial focus on intervention, there is neither 
adequate flexibility nor finances to develop more holistic and culturally appropriate 
practices. 
196Peter Hudson, and Sharon Taylor-Henley, "I jnking Social and Political 
Developments in First Nations Communities,• in Rebirth Political. Economic and Social 
Develonment in First Nations, Anne-Marie Mawhiney (ed), (Ontario: Laurentian 
University, Institute of Northern Ontario Research and Development) 1993, page 51. 
197Tuere are exceptions, however. In some communities there have been measures 
of community accountability established; comunity child welfare boards and Tribal 
Council Boards, for example. 
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Three separate inquiries into First Nation's child welfare have recently come to light. 
The Aboriginal Justice Inquiry (1991)198, the Desjarlais Inquest (September 1992)199 and 
the First Nation's Child and Family Task Force (November 1993)200 all examined the 
Native child welfare system and produced reports that differed in their treatment of the 
subject. In essence, the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry and the First Nation Child and Family 
Task Force both recommended that increased decentralization and further moves towards 
First Nation self-government were necessary to deal with the underlying causes of 
violence, abuse, and neglect in Aboriginal society. The Desjarlais Inquest, however, 
recommended that further accountability and centralization was necessary for protection . 
of First Nation children. 201 
Georgina Crate, director of lntertribal Child and Family Service Agency, noted that there 
must be responsibility, ownership and accountability for and by the First Nations for the 
quality of care, policies and standards that are provided. 202 Only through community 
19liprovince of Manitoba, •Aboriginal Justice Inquiry,• 1991. 
199J>rovince of Manitoba, Department of Justice, "The Desjarlais Inquest,• 1992. 
200J>rovince of Manitoba, Task Force for First Nations Child and Family, "First 
Nation Child and Family Task Force Report,• November, 1993. 
201Province of Manitoba, Department of Justice, "The Desjarlias Inquest Repon, • 
September, 1992. 
211ZCJeorgina Crate, "Grassroots and Power,• The Winnjoeg Sun, May 8, 1992, page 
23. 
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accountability and the desire to address such problems such as violence and abuse can 
healing begin. Policy development by the provincial government, along with the 
centralization and strict accountability for the past, was not effective in solving child 
welfare problems. There is no indication that returning Native child welfare to a 
centralized, strictly controlled environment would solve the problems that are inherent 
in the system. Therefore, while accountability and political interference are both 
problems under the current provincial child welfare system, the process of empowering 
communities through self-government, to address problems by designing programs and 
policies that meet their needs, is a more effective way of ensuring ownership and 
accountability for the system. 
1be second problem that has arisen in the Native CFS agencies is the conflict that occurs 
between the regional offices and local control by the chiefs.203 Tensions arise when 
individual bands demand control of CFS in their own communities yet the regional office 
wants central control for reasons of accountability - both in t.enns of policy 
implementation and financial responsibility. This pull between the political dichotomies 
of centralization and decentralization has led to claims of political interference in social 
services and direct conflicts of intetest. Criticisms have been voiced by urban Aboriginal 
women's groups and First Nations women that First Nation leadership has emphasim:l 
1113fnterviews with all First Nation women (1·22). 
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political goals at the expense of service goals and they fear that achievement of self-
govermnent would continue to concentrate power in the hands of the chiefs - who are 
predominately male.204 The point emphasized by the women was that they favoured 
regional control of child welfare, which would hopefully offset the domination of the 
chiefs in local social matters.205 
The following events occurred in Manitoba in 1992 that underscored the notion of a 
centralization - decentralization conundrum.206 Because some children in care had died, 
while others had been allegedly left or placed in potentially abusive homes, Aboriginal · 
women's groups and the province publicly accused some chiefs of complicity and 
political self-serving interference. The chiefs responded by accusing the province of 
ulterior motives, specifically for disguising its failure to act on the recommendations of 
the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry and attempting to discredit aspirations for self-govermnent. 
Finally, one of the Aboriginal women's groups publicly expressed its doubts about self-
government and whether or not women and children would be protected by it. w 
204Hudson and Taylor-Henley, Op Cit., page 52. 
205Interviews 3-5; 7-18; 21-22. 
206Tue phrase centralization - decentralization conundrum was used by Peter Aucoin 
and Herman Bakvis in their book The Centralization - Decentralization Conundrum: 
Omanizption and Management in the Canadian Govemment, (Halifax, Nova Scotia: The 
Institute for Research in Public Policy) 1988. 
wHudson and Taylor-Henley, Op Cil., page 54. 
153 
DecentnJU:.ed Social Services - Chapter 4 
The situation that occurred in 1992 between the chiefs and the provincial government 
UJlderlines the battle that First Nation women face. The concern of both the chiefs and 
the provincial government was saving face and avoiding political embarrassment. Choices 
were made within comnn.inities that wete political in nature; the chief or band council 
interfered in social decision-making processes by insisting that children remain in 
potentially abusive situations because of who the family was related to.* 
First Nation women have been and continue to fight against patriarchal structures in 
government, in their own communities, and in society. First Nation women have 
successfully fought against aspects of the patriarchal Indian Act and won the right to keep 
or regain (if previously lost) their Indjan status with Bill C-31.209 Yet other aspects of the 
Imtian Act still remain extraordinarily patriarchal - with men being the owners of the 
property and houses in most comrmmities. The chiefs and other men in the communities 
who support political goals over social goals reinforce the divisions between men and 
women. Ultimately, thete is a dichotomy between the First Nation women who struggle 
208Jnterview with Kathy Mallett, Director of the Original Women's Network, January 
13, 1995; social worker from West Region Child and Family Services, February 14, 
1995 and interviews 6, 12, and 14 with First Nation women. 
2Dllpor more information on this, see Enough js Enough Aboriginal Women Speak 
Qin, as told to Janet Silman (Toronto: The Women's Press), 1987. Bill C-31 is an 
amendment made to the Indian Act which allows for First Nation women and children 
to regain their Stanls which they previously would have lost through marriage to a non-
status man. 
/ 
154 
Decentralir.ed Social Services - Chapter 4 
for social goals and service provision and men who desire to achieve political self-
government. Unless these two elements can be successfully accommodated there will be 
no unity in the political front to secure self-detennination. 
George Munroe bas noted that Aboriginal women do have a valid concern in fearing that 
certain chiefs will utilize the political mechanism of self-government to increase their 
own personal power. However, he worries that divide and conquer techniques have been 
successful in separating the Aboriginal community. 21° Communities must join their social 
("low road") and political ("high road") forces, 211 in order to provide for mea;ningful 
change and achieve self-government. 
While there is a need to unite the political and the social in terms of self-detennination 
and accord social goals greater respect, social policy must also be kept appropriately 
separated from political aspirations for women to feel powerful and comfortable in their 
own communities. 212 The patriarchal Indian Act and the dominant white culture have been 
instrumental in reshaping Native attitudes towards women and the role they play in their 
communities. As in the non-Aboriginal society, the power of the political orders came 
21
°I>ersonal Interview, George Munroe, Februacy 15, 1995. 
211Hudson and Taylor-Henley, Op Cit., page 54. 
212Interviews 1-8; 11-18; 21 and 22 with First Nation women. 
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to lie with men, leaving women and children to be considered the property of men. The 
colonization processes undertaken by policies of the Canadian government, have caused 
discord, adversarial attitudes and dysfunctional communities. 
For women to feel secure Ullder self-government, their voices need to be included. The 
current band council system is an extension of DIAND to which the Chief and Council 
are responsible. 213 Many women are concerned that the "restoration of jurisdictions• 
will merely concentrate more power in the bands of a few chiefs. This could have a 
further negative impact on their lives and the lives of their children. The establishment 
of a Women's Directorate, as advocated by the Indigenous Women's Collective, would 
allow First Nation women to be guaranteed participation in self-government initiatives. 214 
The Directorate would be designed to ensure the active involvement of First Nation 
women, both on and off-reserve, in all matters directly affecting them. The Women's 
Directorate would be accorded input equal to the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs on both 
political self-government and community development initiatives. It would involve First 
Nation women in the decision-making process through referenda and the Directorate 
would encourage women to organize and fonn their own First Nation women's 
community councils. Through these initiatives, the Directorate would provide women a 
2131ndigenous Women's Collective, Op Cit., 1993, page 27. 
214Indigenous Women's Collective, Op Cit., 1994, pages 44-48. 
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strong voice alongside the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs and it would encourage political 
accountability and participation in self-government. 
Accountability to an authority above the community political leadership must also be 
developed both in terms of self-government and cunent child welfare programs. The 
Cree Nation Child and Family Caring agency (1993), Manitoba's newest agency, built 
into their tripartite agreement the mandatory exclusion of the chiefs and the band 
councillors from the regional authority. South-F.ast Child and Family Services bas also 
developed policy that prevents the chief or members of the council from sitting on the 
board of the agency. These two agencies are the exceptions, however. Other agencies, 
such as Anisbinaabe and Intertribal have publicly declared that political interferenee bas 
caused conflicts of interest. The Dak0ta-Ojibway Child and Family Services was singled 
out in the Desjarlais Inquest as requiring the separation of politics from its social agenda. 
Native women's groups and the First Nation's Child and Family Task Force indicated 
that a Native directorate should be established to act as an appeal mechanism when 
conflicts occurrlng in agencies. 
The final challenge for Child and Family Service provision under self-government is the 
need to develop a practice for urban areas. zu Rosalee Tizya, in Aboriginal Governments 
2~ Aboriginal Justice Inquil'y states that there are approximately 32,000 treaty 
people in Winnipeg. Census Canada estimates this figure to be 45,000. Winnipeg Free 
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and Power Sharing in Canada, notes that the Indian Act system has left off-reserve 
Natives dangling between the jurisdictions of the federal and provincial governments. The 
federal government has limited its responsibility to on-reserve Indians, while provincial 
governments have argued that all Aboriginal peoples are a federal responsibility. 216 
Currently, all child-welfare agencies operate in a defined geographical area. Several 
First Nation CFS agencies feel that they should be given a mandate to operate on an 
outreach basis in urban centres. Other urban social agencies want a mandate to provide 
an increased spectrum of services. 217 While the jurisdictional problems218 concerning 
which level of government will be responsible for urban Aboriginals will no longer be 
an issue with First Nation self-government, the requirement for intervention in certain 
CFS cases poses a geographical problem. The current urban agencies are not mandated 
by the province, and provide voluntary services in a status blind manner. 
tm§I, June 13. 1994. 
216Rosalee Tizya, Aboriginal Governments and Power Sharing in Canpda, Douglas · 
Brown (ed), summary of proceedings of a conference at the Institute of 
Intergovernmental Relations, February, 1992, page 21. 
21
'Personal Interview, Wayne Helgason, Executive Director of Winnipeg Social 
Planning Council, President of National Association of Friendship Centres, January 20, 
1995. 
218Indigenous Women's Collective, Op Cit., August 1993, page 25, discusses the fact 
that for women living off-reserve, the issue of self-government is more complex in terms 
of jurisdictional debates (for example, child welfare issues, etc.) than it is for women 
living on reserve. 
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Will urban Native CFS agencies have to be devised to overlap with the current non-
Aboriginal CFS authorities or will existing CFS agencies have their mandate expanded 
to allow them to operate in an outreach capacity to off-reserve members? Native CFS 
agencies have attempted to extend their mandate to off-reserve members in the past, 
causing conflict with provincial CFS agencies. For example, one case concerning 
outreach services referred to provincial court in 1991, concluded with the ruling that the 
current child welfare legislation does not legally extend Native agencies' mandate off-
reserve. 219 Also many First Nation people residing in Winnipeg or other areas of the 
province, do not belong to a specific community in the province. This would.necessitate 
the creation of an urban or provincial Native child welfare agency to fulfil the function 
of providing child welfare to families off-reserve. These new Native agencies, if 
designed, would have to define exactly who would be eligible to receive their services -
would eligibility apply to status Indians or would child welfare services be provided on 
a status-blind basis? These two issues remain problematic in outlining concerns for urban 
CFS. 
Conclusions 
The federal government now actively recognizes First Nation self-government. It has a 
219Zena Olijnyk, "Judge's Ruling: Native Groups Denied Jurisdiction," Winnipeg 
Free Press, May 10, 1991, page Al and AS. 
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framework agreemem in place to dismantle DIAND in Manitoba and the government 
currently devolves 853 of its administrative authority in areas such as education, social 
assistance, and child and family services to First Nation communities and agencies. 220 
These measures need to be accompanied by steps to provide for autonomy with regards 
to CFS and alternative approaches to social assistance, both of which are tied intrinsically 
and holistically to the social and political components of self-determination. 
Will the dismantling process create true self-determination and afford First Nation 
communities the ability to take control of community developmen~? 1be federal 
government is very anxious to hand First Nations' people self-government. In an era of 
deficit reduction and cutbacks to social programs, would any government increase 
f11nding to a marginalized group of people? Concerns have been raised that this may be 
the foreshadowing of an off-loading of fiscal responsibility. 1be federal government, 
since the 1980s, has been slowly cutting programs and services 221 and many First Nation 
leaders and women believe that the economic and social situations in many communities 
will get worse before community development initiatives have any impact upon the 
Z20penona1 Interview with Grand Chief Phil Fontaine of the Assembly of Manitoba 
Chiefs, February 24, 1995. 
221Murray Angus, And the l iS Shall Be First: Native Poljcv in an Era of CutbaW, 
(Toronto: NC Press Limited) 1991, page 23 poses that Native people will inevitably be 
among the victims of any cuts in government spending because they are already a 
marginalized group in Canadian society - demograpbic:ally, regionally, economically, 
politically and racially. 
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problems. 
1be dismantling process is being positively received by the federal government because 
it may be able to relieve itself of long-term f"mancial responsibility to the communities -
most of which are suffering from poor housing, inadequate hospitals and educational 
facilities, and basic amenities such as running water or electricity. The transfer of 
responsibility would leave Ottawa appearing less politically accountable for First Nations' 
pe0ple and communities. Greater local control will result in Native people controlling 
their own futures, but unless funding levels are stabilized or increased, _the restoration 
of jurisdictions may worsen current circumstances. 222 Furthermore, there is rampant 
corruption and nepotism in many communities - a sentiment echoed by all the women 
interviewed.223 The chiefs concerned have a political power that is seldom challenged. 
Women do not want this type of unaccountable, corrupt patriarchy to be given even more 
power through self-government. 
In many First Nation communities people still react with fear to the suggestion of self 
government, not because they do not understand what it means, but because they fear the 
consequences of greater power being concentrated in the hands of one or a few people 
mlbid., page 27. 
223Interviews 1-22. 
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in their First Nation under present conditions. 224 Women have been side-lined, dependent 
upon the chiefs for determining whether they will get housing, or even whether they, or 
another family member will be employed in one of the few positions available in the 
communities. Their lack of control over their own lives is reflective of the lack of control 
First Nation people have had over their lives for 125 years. The patriarchal community 
structures have been established and encouraged by the dominant white political culture 
for the administration of treaty lands and do not constitute traditional political cultures 
or norms. The result has been the pitting of women and their social concerns against men 
and their political aspirations. There is a real need for these social and political goals to 
meet and work together for community development. 
Community oriented and decentralized social services have the greatest potential for 
addressing problems common to the delivery of child and family services. However, only 
an emphasis on participatory democracy, which integrates the communities' social and 
political goals, can allow for increased accountability in the communities. 225 If this 
condition is not met, self-government will fail to adequately address many of the 
problems of the system it hopes to replace. 226 The first priority of First Nation leaders 
224James Wastasecoot, The First Perspective, April, 1995, page 2. 
225MacKenzie, Brad, "Decentralized Social Services: A Critique of Models of Service 
Delivery," Continuities and Discontinuities, Op Cit., page 106. 
2261bid., page 108. 
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should be to build viable eommunitier' that will enable policy-making to address the 
inherent problems in child welfare administration. 
221Jndigenous Women's Collective, Op Cit., September 1994, page 39. 
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APPENDIX A 
DAKOTA OJJBWAY-mand.atedsinceJuly 1981; serves Sbands; andhad420children 
in care in 1993. Head office is in Brandon, Manitoba. 
ANISHINAABE - mandated in March 1986; serves five bands and had 229 children in 
care (1994 statistics). Head office is in Ashem. Anishinaabe divided into two in 1988: 
EAST • INTERTRIBAL and West - ANISHINAABE. 
SOUTHEAST CHll..D AND FAMILY - mandated since April 1983; serves 8 bands; 
and had 257 children in care (1994 statistics). Head office is in Winnipeg. 
WEST REGION CHll..D AND FAMILY· mandated since September 1985; serves 9 
bands; and had 244 children in care as of September 1993. Head office is in Dauphin. 
AWASIS AGENCY OF NORTHERN MANITOBA· mandated since July 1984; serves 
26 bands; and had 649 children in care (before SW AMPY CREE CHll..D AND 
FAMILY was formed). 
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THE CREE NATION CHILD AND FAMILY CARING AGENCY - mandated since 
December 1, 1993; serves 8 bands; (no recorded statistics on children in care as of yet). 
Head office is in The Pas. 
SAGKEENG CHILD AND FAMILY - non-mandated agency that provides social 
services in 
Sagkeeng First Nation (Fort Alexander) which has been incorporated since November 
1976. It is part of the Easnnan provincial regional office. 
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On April l, 1996, the federal government implemented the Canada Health and Social 
Transfer. This change is important for several reasons. rll'St, it signals that the federal 
government is no longer willing to be an active partner in the provision of social services 
in Canada. m Second, it offers a window of opportunity to create new and effective 
methods of delivering social programs. Provinces are already implementing radical 
changes to their social service programs in their 1996 budgets229 and attn'buting the 
changes to the implementation of the CHST. While most provinces are cutting their 
social services, 230 education, 231 and health spending and attn'buting these cuts to the loss 
2lltbomas Courchene, Presentation, Canadian Social Welfare Conference, University 
of British Columbia, June, 1995. 
229por example, the province of Manitoba announced that it was going to encourage 
welfare recipients to find employment. Single employable people, childless couples, and 
single parents with children over six years of age will bave to accept available 
employment or risk having their benefits reduced by as much as $100 per month. Part 
of the supports which will be put in place to assist people in returning to work: will be 
subsidized day care and training programs. Source: Paul Samyn, "PCs Want Welfare 
Moms To Work,• Winnipeg Free J>ress, March 13, 1996, page Al; and Alice Krueger, 
"Youth NOW Means Training For Young People On Welfare,• Winnipeg Free Press, 
March 15, 1996, page A4. 
230Soth the province of Alberta, which is reducing Family Services spending by 12 % , 
and the province of Manitoba which is cutting the Family ServiCes budget by $10 
million, are examples of provinces CODCel11ed about transfer payment reductions. 
231The province of Manitoba is reducing its public education funding again in 1996, 
and is blaming the CHST. Source: Manfred Jager, "School Taxes Hiked,• Winnipeg Free 
lr,m, March 13, 1996, page A3; "Trustees Bitter Blame Province,• Winnipeg Free 
lr,m, March 13, 1996, page A3. 
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of the Canada Assistance Plan and the fifty-cent federal dollars it paid, they have been 
given increased flexibility in how they spend their transfer payments. 
Welfare and social service costs are the primary responsibility of the provincial 
governments from a constitutional perspective. The federal government is involved by 
vinue of its spending power; in 1994-95, Ottawa spent an estimated $8 billion on Canada 
Assistance Plan related expenditures.231 The federal government is also involved 
marginally in service delivery to designated populations for which it has clear 
constitutional authority - for example, status Indians and Inuit, prisoners in federal 
conectional institutions, immigrants and veterans. 
There has been little substantive debate in Canada about how to reform social services 
in an efficient and effective manner. In fact, social services have always been the "poor 
cousin• of social policy. Social services typically are treated in a residual, last resort 
fashion - much like the enabling legislation that supports them. 233 The reasons for the 
neglect of this subject are unclear. Part of the reason arises from the fact that the term 
"social services" tends to be a generic phrase which encompasses a wide range of 
231Sherri Torjman. "Is CAP In Need Of Assistance?" A New Social Vision For 
Qinada? Keith Banting and Ken Battle (eda). School of Policy Studies, Proceedings of 
a Conference Held At Queen's University October 17, 1994, Kingston, Ontario, page 99. 
233/bid. 
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disparate activities - including child care, child welfare, personal supports, counselling 
and income support payments. The delivery as well as the dimensions of social services 
are incredibly diverse throughout the country. For example, services may be 
decentraliud and delivered by a private agency with users charged for the services or 
services may be centraliud and provided by a government department on an as needed 
basis. Within any given area of service there are combinations of government, voluntary 
organizations and professionals in private practice. 
In addition to social services' vast scope, there are problems in assessing their impact. 
While their costs and caseloads can be tracked, it is difficult to measure their effect on 
individuals, families and communities. Yet social services are no less important that other 
public services and will become increasingly significant in the future, given labour 
market and demographic trends. 
Chapters 3 and 4 introduced two policy sectors: child and family services in Alberta and 
Native child welfare in Manitoba. Chapter 3 noted how Alberta is in the process of 
reorganizing social services in that province, including the increased utilization of 
alternative program delivery options. The decentralization of child and family services 
to local authorities has important implications for the long-term administration of child 
welfare programs. Conversely, Chapter 4, with its emphasis on Native child welfare in 
Manitoba, discussed the process of administrative decentralization that has been in place 
I 
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since the 1980s and showed how there bas been ample time to discuss the problems and 
potential solutions. One such solution is of course, self-govermnent, and the First Nations 
in Manitoba are involved in the "restoration of jurisdictions• which will ultimately result 
in true political decentralization. 
This chapter will provide a sectoral evaluation of the two policy areas introduced in 
previous chapters. Based upon a recommendation by Dr. Evert Lindquist, the following 
approach will be utilized in detemiining if decentralization bas occurred. For the 
purposes of evaluation six areas will be addressed in terms of decentralization. It is 
important to determine in whose hands the responsibilities for these areas rests: scanning 
to determine needs; designing policy frameworks and developing options; designing 
particular programs to implement policy interventions; financing of programs; managing 
and monitoring of program delivery; and, evaluating and redesigning programs and 
policy frameworks.234 
Scanning To Detennine Needs 
In Alberta, the provincial government requested citizens' views on how the present 
system of Children's Services could be improved to better serve and protect children at 
234Evert Lindquist, Op Cit., page 421. 
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risk and their families. Through advertised requests and a consultation process, the 
Alberta government asked for input from Albertans on how to improve their social 
service system. More than 3,300 Albertans from 65 communities offered a response. The 
responses included the message that "leadership and responsibility should be returned to 
the community. •235 
While consultation may seem like a credible move by the province of Alberta, there have 
been concerns raised that this process did not really include the clients of Children's 
Services.236 The "consensus• reached by Albertans included only 3,300 of the province's 
2,500,000 citizens. This does not necessarily invalidate the entire consultation process, 
but it begs the question, who was consulted? Furthermore, because the province was able 
to draw its own summaries and conclusions from the consultations, it is conceivable that 
the published results closely coincided with the provincial government's desired outcome. 
The Commissioner reported that parents and communities want an active role in the 
redesign of services and in the responsibility for the well-being of their children. He 
noted that communities best understood the problems and issues experienced by local 
children and families and could determine the best ways of responding to them. 
2350ffice of the CommiSllioner for Children's Services, "Redesign of Children's 
Services A Precis, •Province of Alberta, January, 1996, page 2. 
236Calgary Herald, editorial, February 14, 1996. 
----------
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Government programs were not designed for this flexibility and had overlooked the 
positive role communities could play in protecting and helping children. 237 As a result, 
the province of Alberta is advocating and implementing a community driven approach 
for the redesign of children's services. 
A community based approach, as articulated by the province of Alberta is distinct from 
the community development planning process. The community development planning 
process of problem articulation and identification is the process whereby what may 
initially be perceived as the problem - by those who first identify it - is articulated so that 
a large number of people in the community perceive the problem and recognize its 
linkages to other elements in community life. The community based approach also has 
as its goal broad community involvement and support, but it does not ensure that those 
who experience the problem actively participate in solutions. While they may go along 
with whatever action occurs, those experiencing the problems will not have had a part 
in formulating or implementing an action plan. 238 
2370ffice of the Commissioner of Services for Children and Families, "Redesign of 
Children's Services A Precis," Op Cit., page 2. 
238David Smith, •A Community Development Approach to Health Planning," Em 
Person Plural, (Montreal: Black Rose Books), 1995, page 90. 
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The Alberta government is using the language of the community development 
approach, 239 but it is not facilitating this type of process. Alberta is instructing 
individuals, families and voluntary organizations to identify social problems as 
community problems and work together to find solutions. The process of evaluating 
needs and implementing effective programs has traditionally been the jurisdiction of the 
provincial government. By accepting "ownership" of the problems, Alberta believes local 
authorities will find effective solutions and at lower costs. 
Community development is an activity with two characteristics. First, the action is 
initiated bY a local group to meet the needs or interests of the local group. Second, the 
group perceives the problem as their problem and mobilizes resources to deal with it. 2Ml 
This characterization shows quite clearly how Alberta is not using a community 
development approach, as the government is imposing a local authority structure for 
service delivery. Community development approaches are characterized by the 
community self-identifying problems, not having a level of government identify problems 
239J>at Armstrong, "Unravelling the Safety Net: Transformations in Health Care and 
Their Impact On Women, • Janine Brodie (editor), Women and Canadjan Public Policy, 
(Toronto: Harcourt Brace & Company), 1996, page 136 talks about bow government has 
been successful. in appropriating the language used by women's groups and other 
community development associations. She cautions against accepting their words at face 
value and suggests an examination into how they are being used. 
2«>J>avid Smith, Op Cit., page 93. 
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as local concerns. The process being employed in Alberta may be more closely associated 
with a community based approach to social service delivery. 
Once the government determined it was moving towards community based delivery of 
services, Phase 1: The Preliminary Service Plan was put into action. This process 
included a detailed analysis of each community in a given region. It involved community 
working groups developing a plan which determined vision, goals, outcomes and action 
plans for the region; it assessed the current need and gap in services for children and 
families; and it offered the opportunity for community involvement. The community 
working groups were encouraged to consider how voluntary organizations (i.e. church 
groups) or families wanting to assist in the provision of services could be included in 
their plans. 
Some Local Authorities, composed of volunteers, may respond in the manner that the 
province is articulating, with increased voluntarism and the elimination of services that 
have been provided by professionals or their replacement with local service providers. 
Other Local Authorities, may fall apart under the pressure of the increased work load 
caused by the amount of voluntarism required to make the new system work. Or 
members of the Local Authorities may begin to feel that the problems of the community 
are not as important as their own problems, or that of their families. If community 
I I 
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members do not identify with the type of problem or the extent to which it impacts upon 
their lives, they are not as likely to mobilize resources to find solutions. 
The new normative paradigm created by decentralization, privatization and the increased 
utilization of alternative program delivery methods all contribute to the perception that 
little attention has been given to questions of equity, justice, or entitlement. The private 
sector, by relying on charity and voluntarism, cannot ensure that people will have an 
adequate income or standard of service. Only governments can guarantee rights. The 
private sector or local community may not pick up the slack left by the government's 
withdrawal from social welfare. In fact, available evidence points the other way. 241 
When the language of the community development approach is invoked to encourage 
community involvement in the delivery of social services, there may be some initial 
excitetnent generated. What will soon become evident to the people in the communities 
is that the language is used as a ruse to disguise the true meaning of the decentralization -
cuts to services. Once communities are "empowered" and are responsible for providing. 
services to themselves, provincial timding cuts will have been effectively offloaded onto 
the communities. Since 1991192, the Alberta government has cut spending to family and 
241Robert Mullaly, "Social Welfare and the New Right: A Class Mobilization 
Perspective," Continuities and Discontinuities, Op Cit., page 86. 
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social services by over 25 % . 2A2 While spending will be increased to child welfare by $50 
million over three years, 243 this money is directed at project based early intervention 
activities, and is not available across the system. 
With regards to Native child welfare in Manitoba, needs are generally determined at the 
local level through the Band or Tnbal Council and filtered up to the Native Child 
Welfare Regional Agency. The problem is, of course, that the province and the federal 
government also do their own assessment of needs, and filter them back down. The 
conflicting assessments interact at the Native Child Welfare Regional Agency. 
Unfortunately, since the provincial government determines mandated programs based 
upon their understanding of child welfare needs and the federal government determines 
t\Jnding based upon the provincial government's mandated programs, the analysis done 
by the band or Tribal Council is often irrelevant for t\Jnding purposes. The scanning is 
useful, however, when First Nation communities have additional t\Jnding that allows 
them to implement preventative or culturally appropriate programs.244 
2'lprovince of Albena, Provincial Budgets 1990-1996. 
2431995/96 - $10 million; 1996/97 - $20 million; 1997/98 - $20 million. Source: 
Office of the Commissioner of Services for Children, "F.arly Intervention Program 
Funding Guidelines For Children's Services in Albena," Province of Alberta, Part l, 
May l9SS. 
™Interview with a social worker, Anishinaabe Child and Family Services, February 
14, 1995. 
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Through the dismantling of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 
First Nation communities in Manitoba will be given jurisdiction for the provision of child 
welfare services. Since child welfare bas been identified as one of the "fast track" items, 
it is conceivable First Nations will have authority for their own child welfare programs 
shortly. 
Designing Policy Frameworks and Developing Options 
In both case studies, the design of policy frameworks is centralized at the provincial 
level. However, in Alberta, community working groups are responsible for developing 
options for the types of services that are delivered within the frameworks. Wit4 respect 
to Native child welfare in Manitoba, agencies are encouraged to develop culturally 
appropriate options for prevention-related programs. In order for there to be some degree 
of standardization or level and type of service offered throughout the province, policy 
frameworks need to be developed through the provincial government. Furthermore, 
because child welfare policy is based upon legislation and involves the safety of children, 
there is a need to keep the ultimate responsibility centralized. 
The province of Alberta bas recently announced that it will be tabling new child and 
family service legislation. The new legislation, which will be based upon the redesign 
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of services to be delivered from a community level, is expected to integrate more than 
one dozen pieces of legislation currently relating to children's services. 
As previously mentioned, the dismantling of DIAND, will have implications for the 
delivery of child welfare programs, but also for the design of associated policy 
frameworks. While the province currently bas jurisdiction over child welfare, the federal 
government bas been the level of government responsible for First Nations people. Under 
self-government, First Nation communities in Manitoba will be responsible for the design 
of culturally appropriate policies and programs as well as the allocation of budgetary 
dollars for necessary services. Given the concerns that many First Nation women have 
with respect to self-government,245 there will need to be some resolve to the power and 
political disputes occurring in the communities. 
Designing Particular Programs To Implement Policy Interventions 
In Alberta, During Phase 2: The Regional Service Plan, programs are being designed at 
the local level through service plans and filtered up to Regional Steering Committees for 
approval. This phase prescribes that upon approval in principle of the preliminary plan, 
2451nterviews with 22 First Nation women; Kathy Mallett, Director of the Original 
Women's Network; and, social worker for Anishinaabe Child and Family Services 
Agency. 
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the Regional Steering Committee will develop a service plan which: builds on the Local 
working groups preliminary plan; describes the provision of children's services; ensures 
compliance with provincial policy and standards; coordinates children's services between 
regions; coordinates children's services with other authorities providing human services; 
and, ensures the plan is within the funding range provided. 
These programs designed through the service plan may be provided through professional 
agencies, the public sector, the private sector or through voluntary organizations. In fact, 
all of the working documents provided to help community working groups in their 
evaluation of the types of programs needed in their area encourage the use of voluntary 
and private sector organizations. 
The lack of a coherent planning structure in program design is obvious. Although the 
province's mandate is to provide coordinated and integrated child and family services, 
the structure does not permit, let alone facilitate, this kind of planning. Each community 
will complete an inventory and articulate their wishes about a number of specific 
projects. However, each community working group does this in isolation from other 
working groups. Given the multi-dimensional factors involved in social services, the need 
for a new way of thinking and planning has become essential and must be reflected in 
the structure of the planning authority. Local working groups are responsible for 
I 
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designing the type of services they feel their community needs. On what basis are they 
prioritising services: visibility, crisis intervention, or cost? 
In Manitoba, preventative and culturally appropriate programs are developed through the 
Regional Native Child Welfare Agencies. Crisis intervention and other mandated services 
are determined centrally by the provincial Department of Family Services. Ironically, 
there is little federal funding for any programs that are not mandated by the province. 
Some funding is provided for support services and is used to provide counselling and 
prevention services. Therefore, if the Agency chooses to provide these types of services, 
which include counselling and other prevention aimed programs, they must do so at their 
own expense. 
Financing of Programs 
In Alberta, the community based service plans are filtered up to one of the seventeen 
Regional Authorities which will consolidate the local service plan to form a regional 
business plan. The regional business plan is approved by the Office of the 
Commissioner. Provincial funding will be provided to the Regional Authorities based on 
key factors such as child population, numbers of high-needs children and other socio-
economic elements. The Regional Authority will distn"bute funds among its communities 
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based upon methods for fund management put forward in the business plan. Local service 
plans will be the basis of funding for service agencies. 
Decentralization of the budgeting process is important because it is the critical component 
for governments in the determination of a service strategy. Line employees cannot be 
creative in their understanding of client needs and prefeiences if they are never permitted 
to participate in determining the range, quality and mix of services to be provided. In 
Alberta, the actual service providers are not going to be given the opportunity to 
participate directly in budgeting and prioritising of programs. Instead, they will act in an 
advisory capacity to Local Authorities who are under no obligation to take their advice. 
The Alberta government has earkmark:ed additional fimding for prevention programs; $25 
million for Aboriginal children and $25 million for other Local Authorities' projects.241i 
This funding is approved on a project specific basis and is reviewed yearly. A focus on 
prevention related activities and programs is laudable, in fact it may help the Alberta 
government meet its long range targets of reductions in spending on social services. 
However, when funding is limited and is awarded on a project specific basis, programs 
are not likely to be coordinated or integrated into a larger plan for prevention activities. 
:l46Qffice of the Commissioner of Services For Children, •:Early Intervention Program 
Funding Guidelines For Children's Services in Alberta,• Part l, May, 1995, page 2. 
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A further concern related to project funding is that the "piece meal approach" does not 
provide services equally to all families in need in the province. As mentioned earlier in 
the thesis, an inconsistent availability of services and benefits has possible Charter 
implications. Project fUnding tends to favour "short-tenn, quantitative results" styles of 
projects rather than long-term qualitative programs that may produce more benefits but 
they are not readily discernible. The insecurity of project funding also means that funding 
can be easily withdrawn, possibly leaving the community to continue offering the 
program at their own expense. 
Funding social programs specifically designed for small geographic areas does not reduce 
overlap and decrease costs. Because fUnding is allocated based on local service plans, 
there is a real concern that needy people will fall between the "funding cracks.• Once 
the govermnent has allocated its funding to Local Authorities, any additional programs 
will be at the cost of the local community. This is obviously a problem given that the 
people composing local authorities are volunteers, and are not necessarily the best suited 
for determining the types of programs that will meet the needs of children and families. 
When services cannot be fUnded provincially, or due to the project funded strategy 
adopted for programs, financial support is not renewed or approved, the local community 
authority may be pressured to provide the service voluntarily, or see someone in need 
in their C(lDUDlmity go without. 
I 
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The government of Alberta is in the process of offloading cuts to social programs on 
individuals and organizations in communities. Community based services will help to 
eliminate the "notion• that the province has an obligation to provide social services to 
its citizens, which will in tum keep costs down. 
Decentralization necessarily implies varying standards of service, which in tum raises 
important questions about equity and accountability. Services may be more integrated and 
coordinated in one local authority than in another. Furthennore, different communities 
may have different levels of willingness to take on increased volunteer activities. Should 
citizens in a province have different levels of service? Just as importantly, should citizens 
in different provinces have varying standards of service? 
In Manitoba, Native child welfare in First Nation communities is financed by the federal 
government. The complexities of this issue were discussed in detail in Chapter 4. Suffice 
to say, that budgets are presented to Native Child Welfare Agencies who must allocate 
their spending accordingly. By basing funding on mandated services, the federal 
government has effectively constrained Native Child Welfare Agencies from offering 
culturally appropriate prevention activities. 
, \ 
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Managing and Monitoring Program Deli11ery 
In Alberta, the management and evaluation of program delivery by service agencies will 
be bandied by the Local Authorities. They are responsible for ensuring that mechanisms 
are developed in every community "to ensure that the safety and security of children is 
a priority. that services arc accessible and effective, that performance of service 
providers is monitored and evaluated and that all opportunities for streamlining 
administration are vigorously pursued. "247 
Phase 3 of Alberta's plan to decentralize social services involves community 
management. It is proposed during this phase that communities assume responsibility for 
the long-term management of their own services. As the transition is completed, the 
provincial government will have fully transferred the responsibilities for the allocation 
of program funds and human resources to the newly created Local Authorities. The 
provincial government's role at that point would be to provide overall direction and to 
maintain respomibility for policies, funding, monitoring and evaluation. 
Ul'J>rovince of Alberta, Commissioner of Services For Children, ~Focus on Children 
A Plan for Effective, Integrated CommuDity Services For Children and Their Families," 
November, 1994, page 22. 
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After gaining experience in service planning and implementation, the Local Working 
Groups will be invited to make proposals to become Local Authorities. Local Authorities 
will assume responsibility for developing business plans, integrated service plans, and 
managing overall services. The members of Local Authorities will be drawn from a 
range of organizations and individuals, including parents, service recipients, volunteer 
associations, youth groups, cultural organizations, local govenunent, business people, 
sports groups, charitable organizations, service clubs, citizens, and RCMP and police 
departments. Service providers and individuals who will be funded through the local 
service plans will play an advisory role to Local Authorities. The authorities will be 
accountable to the provincial government. 
In Manitoba, the Regional Child Welfare Agencies are responsible for implementing and 
ensuring child welfare programs adhere to provincial legislation. They have been 
delegated authority through tri-partite and dual-bilateral agreements between the Tribal 
Councils, the province and the federal government. In this regard they have achieved 
administrative decentralization. 
The move to decentralize decision making and to free "Local Authorities" or "Regional 
Agencies" from too much central control holds implications for accountability. In 
Canada, our political accountability system is underpinned by the principle of ministerial 
accountability. The notion of empowerment and reducing central control raises 
\ 
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fundamental questions about bow the principle will apply in the future.248 Though it is 
being increasingly challenged, the principle of ministerial responsibility still makes the 
minister accountable for both policy and administration. In traditional settings, the 
minister can secure an explanation for why things have gone wrong from a bureaucracy 
based upon hierarchy. 
When communities or individuals are being "empowered" it is usually prudent to ask 
who has the power, and what are they going to do with that power. In chapter 2, a 
concern about power and political struggles related to questions of who has the right to 
put forward demands, of who can speak in the political arena was discussed. 249 Chapter 
4 then provided a glaring illustration of what can happen when political power is not 
shared equally between all members of a comrmmity. Decentralization to Local 
Authorities, will bring about changes to the power structure in the connnunity, or even 
exacerbate existing ones. If clients, First Nation people and women are not given the 
opportunity for input into program design, decentralization will not achieve its goals. 
241B. Guy Peters and Donald J. Savoie, "Managing Incoherence The Coordination 
and Empowerment Conundrum,• Canadian Centre for Management Development, 
Research Paper No. 16, July, 1995, page 29. 
249.Jane Jenson, "Gender and Reproduction: Or Babies and The State,• in Studies in 
Political F.conomy. 20 (1986) pages 9-46. 
; 
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Often clients have been marginalized because they are seen as dysfunctional or not 
striving hard enough. When people are part of a "devalued or powerless community," 
they tend to absorb the identity. Our system of service delivery bas been effective in 
creating labels for the users and clients of the system. It will be a challenge to include 
them in the decision-making process, but they can bring valuable insights to the type of 
services that can best help them. 
The push towards empowerment of l.ocal Authorities and removing decision-making 
constraints could be a very dangerous move. The individuals and organizations 
comprising l.ocal Authorities all participate on a voluntary basis. There are significant 
legal implications concerning the management of provincial money by voluntary 
organizations. This concern for accountability extends beyond fiscal tramparency. 
Considering that l.ocal Authorities will be "responsible" for the monitoring of child 
welfare service agencies, it would seem logical that these authorities be comprised of 
professionals, people who are capable of making informed and educated decisions. Child 
welfare involves children who may have been in abusive or neglectful siruations, and by 
design requires trained professionals to make the "barer decisions of whether a child 
should remain in the home or not. The proposal for Local Authorities in Alberta, 
requests volunteers from community members who may have little or no experience in 
dealing with children and families in trouble. If there was an error in judgement about 
the service provider or program offered, how could the provincial government politically 
I ' 
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hold the Local Authorities accountable? In fact, recent child welfare legislation 
introduced in Alberta, proposes that Local Authorities will not be held accountable for 
actions or decisions made in good faith. 250 
Evaluating and Redesigning Programs and Policy Frameworks 
As previously mentioned, the province of Alberta will remain ultimately accountable for 
the community based Local Authorities. The province will maintain its role in funding, 
evaluation, program and policy redesign. The Department of Family and Social Services 
is introducing performance measures as part of its long and short term planning. These 
measures will become central to planning and evaluating Department programs. Three 
groups of measures are particularly relevant in determining success: Program Outcomes; 
Program Outputs; and Efficiency Measures. 
Program Outcomes will be based on the Department mission of "helping families to be 
responsible and accountable; helping adults to be independent; and keeping children 
safe." Alberta has determined that they can measure their programs by determining 
whether or not they have an effect on three key areas: safety and security of children; 
250Janice Tibbetts, "Critics Flay Child Welfare Plan,• Winnipeg Free Press, April 3, 
1996, page B2. 
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safety and security of persons with disabilities; and client self-sufficiency. Some of the 
measures for program outcomes will be: 
• Percentage of day care centres which meet government standards; 
• Percentage of children who stay free from injury or neglect following department 
intervention; 
• Percentage of children in the custody of Child Welfare whose needs are being 
satisfactorily met in their placement; 
• Supports for welfare caseload per 1,000 population; 
• Proportion of closed welfare cases that remain closed for 12 months; 
• Percentage of agencies serving persons with disabilities that meet government 
standards. 
Program outputs refer to the actual goods and services the Department delivers. Program 
OUlpllts will be measured in a number of ways. Some examples are: 
• Percentage of error-free files; 
• Ratio of training placements to total welfare caseload; 
• Percentage of children requiring •face.to-face• contact with a social worker; 
• Percentage of cases involving Aboriginal children where placement is culturally 
apptopriate. 
I 
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Efficiency measures are identified by the Department as ways that meet the Department's 
goals of efficiency. responsible fiscal management and cost control. Examples of 
eft1cieru::y measures include: 
• Cost per case load for child welfare; 
• Percentage of variance between budget allocation and expenditures; 
• Administration and support costs per capita; 
• Department expenditures as a percentage of provincial expenditures and GDP. 251 
With respects to child welfare in Manitoba, the evaluation, redesign of programs and 
policy frameworks is also done centrally by the province. 1be Native Ageru::ies are 
currently given a mandate to implement policy, not design it. The province is responsible 
for legislation, policy, standards and evaluation. Through the dismantling of DIAND, the 
responsibility for children in First Nation communities will be politically decentralized 
to First Nation governments. While the federal government is dismantling its 
administrative structures, it will still retain constitutional responsibility for First Nation 
people.252 Conversely, the provincial government claims the authority to enforce child 
welfare legislation for all children in the province. 1be jurisdictional conflicts may not 
251Province of Alberta, "Alberta Advantage,• 1995/96 - 1997/98, Family and Social 
Services, pages 18 and 19. 
252First Nation people challenge this by stating that their right to self-government is 
pre-Constitutional. 
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be easily ended, even with political decentralization. A further complicating factor, as 
noted in Chapter 4, is the number of First Nation people residing off-reserves or in urban 
centres. The province and the federal government do not agree on who will provide 
services to these people. Self-government, if it extends to urban areas, may solve this 
jurisdictional conflict. On the other hand, if fiscal decentralization does not occur at the 
same time as political decentralization, First Nations government may not be able to 
afford to provide services in urban settings. 
Conclusions 
What does this review tell us about the trend towards decentralization of social services 
in Canada? The first is that often when the administrative decentralization of program 
delivery occurs, the centralization of evaluation, funding and the design of policy 
frameworks occurs simultaneously or else is never relinquished. The second, and perhaps 
more important conclusion, is that social services are being decentralized, but the fiscal 
imperative for doing so appears more compelling than any concern for client needs. 
There are two focuses that have been of concern to this thesis. The first is fiscal 
decentralization and the issue of which level of government ultimately pays for social 
services. The second is administrative or political decentralization and the issue of who 
actually delivers the services. With respects to fiscal decentralization, Canadians are 
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witnessing reductions in federal transfers to the provinces, money that is used to fund 
social services. The CHST in tum is being invoked by the provinces to legitimize their 
own social service cutbacks. Cuts to programs like education, are being felt at the local 
government level. School boards are having to raise education taxes to offset provincial 
funding cuts. 
Fiscal decentralization can have enormous ramifications for how programs are delivered. 
As shown in Chapter 1, the federal government does not have constitutional jurisdiction 
for social services. However, due to the nature of their spending power, they have bad 
a heavy influence in the provision of social services. The decision to disentangle 
themselves from the direct funding of social services by withdrawing federal finances, 
is ultimately decentralizing in its impact. The provinces will have to prioritise the 
services they choose to deliver and cutback or offload other programs. Provincial 
cutbacks can also be decentralizing, as municipal governments often have to continue 
essential services like public education, even with less provincial funding. 
The second focus of this thesis bas been who actually delivers the service. Two case 
studies depicted how the decentralized delivery of social services can be associated with 
a number of problems. In public administration the search for more effective and 
efficient service providers is ongoing. The decentralization of social services and the 
increased utilization of alternative program delivery methods appear to be the way of the 
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furure. As with any change, there are some imponant considerations that need to be 
addressed before blindly accepting decentralization as an effective redesign of social 
service delivery. 
Robert Mullaly writes that resuucturing is moving the Canadian welfare state further 
away from the notion of citizenship (equality of entitlement) to one based on class 
(inequality of entitlement). He goes on to note that this restructuring has been 
underestimated by many because it has not been accompanied by the "bombastic language 
of Reagan or Thatcher" and because the parameters of the welfare state have always been 
defmed too narrowly. 253 For example, focusing on aggregate government expenditures 
for social services led Jenson to find no attack on the welfare state, only corrosion. 254 
Expenditures on social services may actually be rising as a result of high unemployment. 
Thus, conclusions about social expenditures alone may be misleading. They tell us 
nothing about the new normative paradigm being adopted for the delivecy of social 
services in Canada. 
The new •corporate• paradigm that stresses efficiency, effectiveness and empowermem 
is having an effect on how services are provided. It is fashionable and accepted in an era 
:153Robert Mullaly, Op Cit., page 77. 
254Jane Jenson, "Different But Not Exceptional: Canada's Permeable Fordism," 
Canadian Reyiew of Sociology and Anthropo!on. 26, No. I (1989), pages 69-94. 
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of fiscal restraint to adopt such a paradigm and approach to public administration. Social 
services are generally concerned with the redistribution of social costs and benefits, and 
in terms of personal social services this involves the issue of access to needed services. 
Privatization and concern for holding down costs are likely to reduce equity and social 
justice. 255 
Decentralization and a community based model of government are not a panacea for all 
of our social problems. In fact, few things are. What this form of social service provision 
does offer is increased flexibility and the opportunity to tailor programs to fit local needs. 
In determining whether a government will move more towards a more decentralized form 
of social service provision they need to clearly weigh the benefits against the multitude 
of "what ifs." When Aucoin and Bakvis used the term "centralization - decentralization 
conundrum" they were addressing the hard question of finding the appropriate balance 
between the two models of organizational design. They advocate a "tight-loose" pattern 
of centralization - decentralization whereby there is a tight or centralized direction over 
the major policy area, and loose or decentralized discretion and autonomy over the ways 
to achieve policy goals. 256 
255Brad McKenzie, Op Cit., page 105. 
256Aucoin and Bakvis, Op Cit., page 5. See also Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. 
Waterman, In Search For Excellence, (New York: Harper and Row), 1982, pages 318-
325. 
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There are imponant lessons to be learned. The first is that public policy and program 
design cannot be accomplished effectively by centralized planning or even centralized 
coordination of planning. This is not simply because Canada is such a big country, nor 
that the Canadian political system is a federal one. Rather, it is due primarily due to the 
fact that the Canadian socioeconomic order is complex and diverse and our political 
economy is highly regionalized. Our geographical size contributes to our regionalized 
political economy; and our federal system serves to institutionalize several dimensions 
of it. The complexity and diversity of our socioeconomic order extends beyond the 
regionalization of our political economy. Regional and local cultures, although often 
exaggerated in their variations, do exist and create differences in demands for state 
intervention in socioeconomic affairs. 
This is not to argue that Canada is unique in these respects; indeed most, if not all, 
advanced democratic countries are confronted by such complexity and diversity. Nor is 
it to argue against planning by government. Rather, it is to suggest that improved 
planning for policy development and program design requires a more comprehensive 
knowledge and understanding of the forces at play in the socioeconomic and political 
orders, including their own regional dimensions. This is unlikely to be achieved if 
regional or local information is not incorporated into the planning process. 
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The second lesson is that tentrali7.ation and decentralization as factors in organizational 
design can be mixed in ways that do not require a rigid division between policy on the 
one hand and operations on the other, with the former centralized and the latter 
decentralized. Rather, there needs to be a tight-loose configuration whereby policy 
development and program design are established for the government at the centre and 
policy implementation and program delivery are managed in the field by public servants 
who exercise their discretion on the basis of delegated authority. 
Public servants or employees of local governments, and not volunteers, should continue 
to be responsible for the delivery of social services. This is a critical factor in a 
decentralized organizational design. Even if the actual services are provided· by a 
spectrum of alternative delivery methods, public servants who are specialized in the 
social service field, need to be employed for monitoring, evaluating and designing the 
service. 
In order to complement the delivery of services, local authorities composed of volunteers 
could act in an advisory capacity to the decentralized units. This form of organizational 
design would improve upon the Alberta government's proposals by maintaining political 
accountability as often governments are much more comfonable with an organiz:ational 
design that builds in clear concepts of accountability. The use of local govemments or 
public servants offers clear accountability for the province and will help meet some of 
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the public's demands for a transparent state. Voluntary organizations spending provincial 
funds (that were in pan transferred from the federal government through the CHST} 
occludes transparency. 
Policy development and program design should involve strategic regional input; policy 
implementation and program delivery in the regions should involve centre-regional 
interaction over policy interpretation. This tight-loose configuration implies that mutual 
adjustment constitutes the norm for decision-making" Regional or local officials are not 
simply Jet loose with delegated authority to do so as they please; but neither is decision 
making or coordination so tight that direct supervision or complete standardil.ation is 
imposed on regional or local officials. 
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